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Management Summary 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are an ongoing trend in the life science sector, and especially 
big pham1a companies have been active buyers, acquiring, amongst others, innovative biotech 
start-ups. fupractice, M&As often fail due to fanlts in the post-merger integration (PMI) phase. 
PMI is essentially difficult between big phaima and biotech stait-ups due to organisational 
differences and the organic nature of a biotech 's innovativeness. Whilst extensive literature is 
available on the subject, there still is a need for bridging the gap between theo1y and practice to 
give tailored advice for excellence in PMI for this type of unde1taking. As the trend of M&As 
between big pha1ma and biotech sta1t -ups is likely to continue, a practical review of context-
specific success factors (SFs) may help companies to master the integration task. 
This thesis aimed at identifying specific SFs for the integration ofbiotech stait-ups into 
big pha1ma. To do so, the practical applicability of theoretical success fo1mulas as well as 
employed best practices were investigated for this integration scenai·io. Hence, selected 
established integration success frameworks and hypotheses on M&A trends and motives by 
acadetnic scholars and indust:Iy expe1ts were tested. The methodology consisted of a qualitative 
analysis of desk research and interviews, with a focus on M&As between 2005 and 2019 where 
the top 20 big phaima acquired Swiss biotechs. A ti·end analysis of such M&As was made for 
general contextualisation, and a case study analysis on PMI SFs was conducted, featuring 
GlycAit and Roche, ESBATech and Alcon/Novaitis and Actelion and Johnson & Johnson. 
The analyses found a st:I·ong tendency for "originators" to acquire " innovators" and that 
for biotech acquisitions, big phaima has the motive of accessing both innovations and 
innovative capacity, which confüms the established hypotheses. Moreover, the selected 
theoretical integration success frameworks proved highly applicable to this type of integration 
scenario, albeit requiring some flexibility in practical use. 
The newly identified PMI SFs from best practice are Alignment & Commitment: Shai·ed 
Vision for Genuine Added Value, Autonomy & Coordination: Sti·iking the Balance, 
fudividualism & Collectivism: Best ofBoth Worlds, and Ent:I·epreneurialism & Empowe1ment: 
Path the Road to Success. These context-specific integration success factors should enable big 
phaima to derive the füll value from the biotech stait-ups' organic and unique innovative 
capabilities, while mastering the amalgamation process and acting as a catalyst for 
ent:I·epreneurial success. 
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The thesis provides a comprehensive oveiview on the subject-matter and contributes to 
closing the gap between themy and practice. The verified and newly identified PMI SFs are 
applicable for M&As between big pha1ma and biotech sta1t-ups. Further case study analyses, 
trend analyses, and in-practice testing are recommended to solidify and expand on the findings. 
As eve1y M&A is unique, a broad anay of validated post-merger integration success factors is 
required to fully suppmt companies in the integration task. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem Statement & Scope 
Merger and acquisition (M&A) is a common event in the life science sector. Big phanna, that 
is the large pharmaceutical companies which dominate the industly, has been especially active 
in unde1taking M&As, seeking new sources of competitive advantage and growth. Besides the 
ti·end for mega mergers in this sector, big pharma companies have also been making targeted 
acquisitions that specifically suppo1t their research and development (R&D) activities (Bansal 
et al., 2018; Ernst & Young, 2019). Originating novel drngs is a core focus of big pharrna, 
evidenced by a cumulative R&D investment of nearly USD 70 billion in 2018 from the top 10 
spenders among big pha1ma. The drng market, however, is no longer dominated by classical 
chemical pha1maceuticals. fu fact, biophaimaceuticals derived from biotechnology claimed 
53% of the worldwide drng sales in 2018 (EvaluatePhaima, 2019). Thus, big pharma has staited 
to expand its expe1tise in biotechnology over the years. The main actors in the biotechnology 
industly, however, are biotechs, typically small- to mid-size life science companies with a 
dedicated focus on biotechnology. These biotechs have also been increasingly successful at 
innovating novel drngs (Pategou, 2019). Of the new US drng approvals in 2018, 49% were 
originated by biotechs (Geilinger & Leo, 2019). Hence, there has also been a ti·end for big 
pha1ma acquiring biotech sta1t-ups, that is entrepreneurial ventures in early to late growth stages 
often financed by venture capital (VC) (Booth, 2020; Geilinger et al., 2020; KPMG, 2020). The 
long-terrn benefits of such acquisitions, however, are only realised if big pharma effectively 
capitalises on the biotechs' R&D capabilities .. As it is the case with all M&As, the simple 
purchase of a company does not suffice to turn it into a success. In fact, post-merger integration 
(PMI) is a key aspect of M&A and one of the most decisive phases for deriving the expected 
value from the acquisition. However, in practice, many M&As fail due to faults in the PMI 
phase (Bergamin & Braun, 2018; Ernst & Young, 201 8; Schweizer, 2016). 
The focus of this bachelor thesis lies on the post-merger integration of Swiss biotech 
start-ups into big pharrna companies. Switzerland is one ofthe world's biotech hubs, especially 
strong in medical biotechnology, which flourishes through the roughly 312 Swiss-based 
biotechs, many ofwhich have organised into clusters such as the Bio-Technopark in Schlieren, 
Zurich. Moreover, the Swiss biotech hub has w itnessed the emergence of many promising and 
successful stait-ups, supported by the strong network of leading academia, big phaima, and 
venture capitalists in the region as well as through the accessibility of highly qualified human 
capital and a resilient financial sector (Swiss Biotech, 2020; Switzerland Global Enterprise, 
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2019). Hence, the Swiss market for biotech acquisitions by big pharma provides an ideal 
population for the research scope of this bachelor thesis. 
1.2 Aim, Research Question, & Hypotheses 
Tue aim of this bachelor thesis is to investigate scope-specific success factors and best practices 
for the integration of Swiss biotech stait-ups into big pharma companies. This paper, therefore, 
tries to find practical evidence in suppo1t of established integration success frameworks 
prescribed by academics and industly scholars. Moreover, the paper aims at contt-ibuting to 
closing the gap between theo1y and practice in PMI research by expanding the theoretical 
success fonnulas with additional scope-specific PMI success factors (SFs) based on observed 
best practices that are not fully accounted for by the theory. 
This paper tt·ies to answer the following main reseai·ch question: 
What are success factors in the post-merger integration of Swiss biotech stait-up into big 
phaima? 
To accomplish this, the research question is further divided into three sub-questions: 
1. Is the generic integration success framework prescribed by Bergamin and Braun (2018) 
applicable to the scope? 
2. Is the industty-specific integration success framework prescribed by Schweizer (2005b) 
applicable to the scope? 
3. Can fu1ther scope-specific success factors be identified on the basis of best practice 
observations? 
To answer the research question, a qualitative case study approach will be used relying 
on info1mation gathered through desk research and interviews. Moreover, this paper will test 
three hypotheses on scope-specific M&A tt·ends and motives, which will help to provide some 
context for the case studies and research findings. Consequently, this paper will also undertake 
a high-level trend analysis of "big pharma acquires Swiss biotech" using historical data on 
M&A transactions and desk research findings. 
In line with the observations of Kmmann Pa1tners (2017) on past M&A activity in the 
phaima industly, Hl will be tested for M&As between Swiss biotechs and big phaima: 
Hl : There is a high tendency for "Originators" ( archetype of pharma) to acquire 
"Innovators" ( developing new molecules) 
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Using Schweizer's (2005b) propositions on M&A motives, on the basis of which he constmcted 
his industry-specific integration themy, H2 and H3 have been fonnulated with slight 
adaptations and will be controlled for the selected PMI case studies: 
H2: When acquiring biotechs, the sho1t-te1m motive of big phaima tends tobe the improvement 
of market positions by accessing the biotech's innovations. 
H3 : When acquiring biotechs, the long-te1m motive of big phaima tends tobe the suppo1t of 
the overall growth strategy by accessing the biotech's innovative capacity. 
1.3 Outline 
This bachelor thesis is stmctured into seven finther chapters. Chapter 2 will provide a review 
of the theo1y on M&A based on the most relevant literature, with paiticular focus on post-
merger integration. The chapter will end with a detailed introduction to the integration theo1y 
of Bergan1in and Braun (2018), which constitutes the generic integration success framework. 
Chapter 3 will first provide an overview of the pharrnaceutical and biotechnology industries 
with focus on industry characteristics, classifications, challenges, and trends. Secondly, the 
chapter will explain the need for inter-industly collaboration, with particular focus on M&As 
and underlying buyer and target motivations. The chapter will end with a detailed inti·oduction 
to the integration theo1y of Schweizer (2005b ), which constitutes the industly-specific 
integration success framework. Subsequent to the establishment of the theoretical foundation 
for this thesis, Chapter 4 will provide a detailed research methodology and end with the 
presentation of a consolidated PMI SFs framework, which will serve as a guidance for the case 
studies and allow for the assessment of the applicability of the integration success frameworks 
prescribed in the theo1y. Chapter 5 will present the ti·end analysis on the Swiss biotech 
acquisitions by big phaima between 2005 and 2019. The focus of the ti·end analysis will be on 
which big phaima company type acquires which Swiss biotech company type and for what 
strategic purpose. Chapter 6 will present the case study analysis on scope-specific PMI SFs 
based on three selected M&A cases. Tue focus ofthe case study analysis will be M&A context, 
integration sti·ategy, integration management, and value creation. Each case study will end with 
a case assessment in which the applicability of the consolidated PMI SFs framework is 
examined, and the obse1ved best practices are highlighted. Chapter 7 will provide a discussion 
of the research findings on M&A trends and motives, theoretical integration success 
frameworks applicability, gap analysis between themy and practice, and, finally, additional 
PMI SFs based on best practice obse1vations. Chapter 8 will present the conclusion, including 
research contribution, limitations, and fmther areas of reseai·ch. 
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2 Mergers and Acquisitions 
Mergers and Acquisitions describe a group of op erational co1porate restructuring activities that 
follow a friendly tak:eover decision (DePamphilis, 2019). 
M&A 
i\Ierger C onsolidation Acquistion 
Figure 1: Merger and Acquisition Types. Adapted from DePamphilis (2019, p. 21). 
An acquisition is a co1porate event where "a company tak:es a controlling interest in another 
fum, a legal subsidiary of another firm, or selected assets of another fnm" (DePamphilis, 2019, 
p. 21). Acquisitions can thus tak:e the fo1m of either share or asset deals. In M&A te1minology, 
the purchasing company is called the "acquirer" or "buyer", whereas the acquired company is 
refen-ed to as the "target". Tue acquisition itself classifies as a " transaction" or "deal". Mergers 
differentiate from acquisitions in that they usuaUy involve two companies of equal size fusing 
together, which often marks the legal extinction of one company's existence. As for 
consolidations, they distinguish themselves from acquisitions and mergers in that the combined 
companies are transf01med into a completely new legal entity (DePamphilis, 2019). For the 
benefit of reducing complexity, this paper will predominantly use the te1ms M&A and 
acquisition interchangeably. 
2.1 The Underlying Rationale 
Tue underlying rationale of an M&A as a corporate restrncturing activity can be found in a 
company's strategy for revitalisation and growth and its decision to explore either existing or 
new sources for this (Galavotti, 2019). According to Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), there are 
three distinct paths to c01porate renewal that a company can tak:e: strengthen its domain, expand 
its domain, or explore new domains. Hence, w hen the need for c01p orate renewal emerges, a 
company might be required to develop new resources and capabilities to realise its strategy. 
Hereby, the choice between organic and inorganic growth presents itself. In contrast to general 
perception, acquiring the required asset bases might be preferable to developing them intemally. 
This is foremost due to the fact that some resour,ces are rare and not easily imitable. Considering 
the cost and time impact that organic growth generally entails, acquisitions can be a cheaper 
and faster means for obtaining new resources and capabilities (Galavotti, 2019). 
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Acquisitions, therefore, can be considered an inst:mment for achieving corporate 
renewal, and the M&A motive can often be traced back to the general strategic direction of a 
company (Galavotti, 2019). 
2.2 Tue Ptupose ofM&A 
Tue main pmpose of an M&A is the creation of value. Accordingly, the imperative for value-
adding M&As is the generation and exploitation of synergistic effects, which result from the 
combination of two companies (Galavotti, 2019) . This can be visualised in a function where 
the value of the combined companies exceeds the cumulative value of the individual companies: 
Company 
- valueA 
Figure 2: Value Creation through M&A. Adaptedfrom Galavotti (2019, p. 92). 
Tue specific motives for companies to engage in M&As are plentiful. Some general 
M&A motives centre around sales synergies (e.g. increased market power, greater market 
coverage, accelerated revenue growth), cost synergies ( e.g. economies of scale, economies of 
scope, complementary asset bases), financial synergies (e.g. increased leverage, lower cost of 
capital), diversification, resomce redeployment, and strategic realignment (DePamphilis, 2019; 
Galavotti, 2019; Haleblian et al., 2009). 
2.3 The M&A Process 
M&As do not just encompass the acquisition event itself, where one company obtains the legal 
ownership of another company, but they involve an ruray of activities that need tobe performed 
in order to plan and implement the acquisition. This series of activities forms the M&A process. 
Generally, the M&A process can be structmed into three periods: pre-acquisition, acquisition, 
and post-acquisition. Tue pre-acquisition period includes all preparat01y activities that lead up 
to the acquisition, while the post-acquisition period focuses on the subsequent implementation 
(Müller-Stewens et al., 2016). For the pmpose of defining the most imp01tant stages in an M&A 




Figure 3: The M&A Process. Adaptedfrom Bergamin & Braun (2018,p. 3). 
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From a buyer perspective, a eompany may develop the need for eorporate renewal and deeide 
to explore the possibility of an M&A. Based on its eorporate strategy, it devises an aequisition 
plan in whieh it clearly defines its M&A objectives in te1m s of value ereation. Subsequently, 
the eompany begins to smvey the market for potential target companies and establishes eontaet. 
lt progresses to thoroughly sereen the identified target(s), eonducting due diligenee and ente1ing 
into negotiations. The deal closing includes the signing of a legal eontraet that substantiates the 
M&A, a suecessful ownership transfer, and the fulfilment of impending regulat01y obligations. 
Thereafter, the integration ofthe target eommenees. Tue goal of PMI is the aetual realisation of 
the identified value-adding potential (Bergamin & Braun, 2018; Müller-Stewens et al., 2016). 
Aceording to Bergamin and Braun (2018), the phases of strategy development and post-
merger integration are most decisive for the ultimate sueeess of an M&A. In the initial planning 
phase, the value-adding potential of an acquisition is dete1mined and the strategy to seeure said 
value is fo1mulated. The PMI phase, on the other hand, eonsists of the strategie measures 
implemented to derive the identified value from the M&A. Conclusively, M&As that fail to 
deliver on value-adding expeetations usually underperfo1m in these two phases (Bergamin & 
Braun, 2018; DePamphilis, 2011). 
2.4 Tue Post-Merger Integration Phase 
2.4.1 Integration Strategies 
Tue PMI phase direetly contributes to the success of an M&A. Companies are not only faeed 
with the pressure of generating returns on investments from synergy exploitation, but they also 
have to taekle the human, eultural, and organisational aspects of an integration. lt is, thus, 
erneial for a eompany to f 01mulate and implement the right integration strategy for an M&A. 
A highly aeeredited typology for integration strategies is the one established by 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991). Tue authors dassify integration approaehes aeeording to two 
dimensions. The first dimension assesses the need for strategie interdependenee between 
aequirer and target by identifying the degree of resouree and eapability transfer required for 
synergy exploitation. The second dimension assesses the level of organisational autonomy that 
needs to be granted to the aequired eompany by investigating the extent to whieh the target can 
be integrated without risking the loss of those valuable resources and eapabilities that cannot 
be transfened (Galavotti, 2019; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Aeeording to these dimensions, 
four different types of integration approaeh are defined: 
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Low Stra gic Intcrdeyendeoce Hagh 
Fig11re 4: Integration Approaches Matrix. Adapted from Galavotti (2019, p. 112). 
Preservation strategies provide the highest level of organisational autonomy to the acquired 
company through limited integration. Tue st:rategic interdependenee between the eompanies is 
minimal, and the primaiy foeus lies on the proteetion of target-speeific eapabilities. Tue 
absorption approaeh aims at synergy exploitation by füll integration of the aequired eompany 
into the new parent company. Tue need to prese1v e the tai·get's autonomy is minimal. Tue third 
type of integration strategy applies to M&As that require high levels of both strategie 
interdependence and target autonomy. Symbiosis, thus, takes the middle ground and prescribes 
a balanee between prese1ving the target' s unique eapabilities and exploiting available 
synergistie effeets to effeetively ereate value. A holding strategy aeeounts for aequisitions, for 
example eonglomerate M&As, where both st:rategie interdependenee and target autonomy 
requirements are low. Hence, it usually does not entail any integration effo1ts (Angwin, 2012; 
Bergamin & Braun, 2018; Galavotti, 2019). 
2.4.2 Steps within the Framework of an Integrntion Projeet 
P111 is arguably one of the most complex and critical phases of the entire M&A process. The 
previous section outlined four types of integration strategies that can be chosen based on the 
respective M&A context. 
Integration management, on the other band, eonsists of more than just choosing a 
suitable integration st:rategy. In the post-acquisition stage, managers are put under enonnous 
pressure to deliver the desired M&A benefits within resomce, time, and cost constraints. 
Moreover, the integration team has the challenging task to manage the vai·ious expectations and 
needs of all affected stakeholders. Thus, this pa1tieular phase requires "a sustainable and fine-
tuned integration management" that tackles PMI issues, takes rapid decisions, and paths the 
way for performance transformation (Bergainin & Braun, 2018, p. 33). Bergamin and Braun 
outline five essential steps in the management of an integration project: 
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Management .. Align Management and Staff Address the Merger on an Operative Level 
Figure 5: steps within the Framework of an Integration Project. Adapted from Bergamin & Braun (2018, p. 6). 
For eaeh of these steps, the authors define guiding prineiples as well as sueeess faetors and 
pitfalls whieh should be eonsidered when managing an integration projeet. 
2.4.2.1 Outline Vision and Kick-start the Integration Project 
Tue first key step in an integration projeet is to fmmulate a elear vision and to develop a plan 
for aehieving the desired future state. This needs to happen well before the closing of the M&A 
in order to have a targeted eourse of action onee the PMI phase begins. Early strategie planning 
is erneial for the sueeess of the entire integration projeet (Bergamin & Braun, 2018). Figure 6 
summarises the guiding prineiples, sueeess faetors, and pitfalls for this step: 
Cleary Outline Your Vision and Organise the Integration Project 
Guid ing Principles 
Devise an Integration Plan at an Early 
Stage and Outline a Clear Vision 
Leading-Edge Enterprises Put Their 
Leader Frist 
lnvolving the Corporate Management 
is lmportant, but not Enough 
Suecessful Companies Capitaliseon 
Previous Integration Planning Experience 
Success Factor 
Stringent and Systcmatic 
Implementation Thanks to 
Coachi11g 
Pitfalls 
Integration Ma11ager with 
the llight Pedigree, but not 
from the Same Stable 
Side Plots Are Dis trncting 
Figure 6: step 1 of an Integration Project. Own Creation, Based on Bergamin & Braun (2018,pp. 7-12). 
Tue main imperative is to reeognise the impmianee of proper strategie preparation, effeetive 
leadership, clear aeeountability, and speedy but infmmed deeision-making in the light of 
unce1tainty. Companies should eommunieate a sense of direction to their employees and other 
stakeholders in order to minimise the sentiment of ambiguity and avoid an operational 
"nilvana." Bergamin and Braun (2018) fu11her emphasise the eentral role of promoters, nan1ely 
the leading figures ofthe respective eompanies and the M&A deal in general. The involvement 
of promoters, both in the integration planning and subsequent management, fosters company-
wide eommitment to the projeet and the "new" company. Moreover, it is equally impo1tant to 
eneourage operative key personnel to pa1tieipate in the integration projeet for resonanee on all 
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hierarchical levels. Tue authors describe this as "[ w ]in the heaiis and minds" (Bergamin & 
Braun, 2018, p. 8). Integration management is in many ways a learning process, and capitalising 
on previous M&A experience can help in mastering the prepai·ation task. Consultative guidance 
may also be of great advantage considering the complexity of an integration project. Both the 
top management and the integration team can benefit from accessing a broad variety of extemal 
and intemal expe11ise. Finally, it is necessa1y for the integration management to keep a clear 
focus and follow stringent priorities when undertaking the integration effmis (Bergamin & 
Braun, 2018). 
2.4.2.2 Ensure Effectiveness of Future Organisation 
Tue second step in the integration process revolves around the issue of safeguarding operative 
activities after a completed M&A (see Figure 7). Bergamin and Braun (2018, p. 12) advocate 
that " [i]n order to secure smooth operations, the two organizations have to properly merge and 
focus their exploitation of synergies on genuine value drivers." 
Secure the Future Organisation's Efficacy 
Guiding Principles 
~ eading-Edge Companies Will not 
Content Themselves with Mere 
"'Docking" 
, Scc-ure Business Operations :md 
' Highlight Additional Potential 






Lack ofTransparency for a 
Prolon1,>ed ofTime 
Period 
Figure 7: Step 2 of an Integration Project. Own Creation, Based on Bergamin & Braun (2018, pp. 12-16). 
According to Bergamin and Braun (2018), an acquirer should develop an integration strategy 
that fits the situation at hand and not pursue a simple "docking" of the companies just for the 
benefit of ease. To tmly exploit the value-adding potential of an M&A, managers are advised 
to look beyond cost synergies and explore other value-adding oppmtunities as well. Growth 
and knowledge synergies, in pa11icular, constitute impo11ant sources of value. It is fmiher 
imperative to fornmlate a mutual strategic mission and develop organisationally as well as 
psychologically into a fused entity. In te1ms of stakeholder management, Bergamin and Braun 
(2018) prescribe transparency and open communication, especially between acquirer and tai·get, 
concerning the integration strategy and the integration progress. Information baniers between 
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acquirer and target often dist01t integration activities and might become a serious issue if 
problems go unnoticed for too long (Bergamin & Braun, 2018). 
2.4.2.3 Appoint the Management Team 
The third step in an integration project is a timely and film appointment of the official 
management team for the merged companies (see Figure 8), preferably even before the closing 
of the M&A. This contributes to the creation of a stable foundation for the PMI phase and the 
avoidance of ambiguity (Bergamin & Braun, 2018). 
Appoint tbe Management Team 
Guiding Principles 
Appoin1 Top Managcmcrll and Opcra1ivc 
Management 
Dispatch Operalive Key Figures into 
' Both Di.rection s 
Leading-Edgc En1erprises Keep Key 
1 / Employees Loyal 10 1he Company over j- __.,,L the Long Run 
Succcss Factor 
A Hohs<k AOP•oo•h l 
Pitfall 
op Management Keep 
emsclves to Thcmsclvcs 
Figure 8: Step 3 of an Integration Project. Own Creation, Based on Bergamin & Braun (2018, pp. 16-18). 
While corporate management appointment is undoubtedly irnportant, organisational hierarchies 
and responsibilities in general should be reviewed and reaffnmed on operative and functional 
levels. To finther support amalgamation and knowledge transfer in the post-acquisition 
environment, companies are encouraged to facilitate an exchange of key personnel. 
Furthermore, the retention of key personnel and leadership figures is highly crncial for a 
company's long-term success, and integration efforts should thus concentrate on gaining 
employee commitment and winning the loyalty of promoters. Bergamin and Braun (2018) also 
point out that companies are most successful when they take a holistic approach to corporate 
restrncturing, personnel redeployment, and inter-organisational collaboration. They argue that 
this enables the proper circulation ofknowledge and supp01is integration on a functional level. 
Limiting personnel and knowledge exchange only to the top-level management can quickly 
become a pitfall for the acquisition as the taken integration measures might not have sufficient 
reach (Bergamin & Braun, 2018). 
2.4.2.4 Align Management and Stajf 
The fourih step in the organisation of an integration project regards the alignment of both 
management and staffto the vision ofbecoming a new entity (see Figure 9). Inspiring profound 
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behavioural change among employees is decisive for the achievement of the desired 
organisational transfo1mation through the integration process (Bergamin & Braun, 2018). 
One Team, One Goal 
Gui<ling Principles 
Savvy and Successful Acquirers 
Train Thcir Stalf 
Leadiog-Edge Companies Adapl 
and Orient lnccntivc Schcmcs lo 
Their Target 
Pitfall 
E1tive Systems Gradually] Lose Their Appeal 
Figure 9: Step 4 of an Integration Project. OWn Creation, Based on Bergamin & Braun (2018, pp. 19-21). 
Bergamin and Braun (2018) emphasise the benefit of employee training for creating a readiness 
to cope with the changes and issues resulting from an M&A. They fmiher state that "[ a] 
company can only be integrated successfully, if its integration effmis are backed by its 
employees" (2018, p . 19). To facilitate employee commitment, it is thus highly recommendable 
to reward integration effmis by aligning the company's incentive schemes. If not adjusted to 
the situation, incentives might fail to generate the necessa1y motivation for driving ahead the 
integration project. Finally, prolonging the initiation phase should be considered in order to 
allow sufficient time for the integration team to devise a sound plan with precise integration 
measures, quantified objectives, and good mitigation strategies (Bergamin & Braun, 2018). 
2.4.2.5 Address the Merger on an Operative Level 
Tue operative implementation of the integration fo1ms the fifth and final key step of the 
integration process (see Figure 10). Once the preparatmy activities in terms of integration and 
organisational transformation have been completed, the focus shifts to the realisation of the 
transition in the day-to-day operations. According to Bergamin and Braun (2018), it is essential 
to devise an action plan which already adequately accounts for functional unit integration in the 
strategy fo1mulation phase. Moreover, sufficient suppo1i to the operative management should 
be provided in order to enable the successful implementation of integration measures (Bergamin 
& Braun, 2018). 
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Join Forces on an Operative Level 
Guid ing Principles 
( ~ tcgration Projects: A Chance to 
lmprove Operative Processes 
IT ls a Powerfül Tool for Operative 
Amalgamation 
( Leading-Edge Enterprises Do not 
>-~ nsolidate Operative lJnits at All Cosl 
Success Factor 
1 Amalgamation, bul not at All '-, 
Cost 
Pitfall 
Focus 011 Technical Details 
Figure 10: Step 5 of an Integration Project. Own Creation, Basea on Bergamin & Braun (2018,pp. 22-23). 
Tue first principle for this step mandates that the transfo1mation brought about by integration 
offers ample oppo1tunities for improvement in general, be it of processes, strnctures, or 
behavioural pattems. Migrating or reconfiguring the IT systems can, for instance, assist the 
organisational integration on an operative level. Bergamin and Braun (2018) fmther advocate 
that during the planning of operations integration, it is fundamental to consider the 
pa1ticularities of the transaction and the companies involved. In some cases, it might be 
advisable to delay consolidation activities and first focus solely on the acquired company in 
order to create the right conditions for the PML Bergamin and Braun (2018) also state that füll 
absorption is not the right strategy for all M&As. In cases where, for example, localisation is 
key or entrepreneurial spirit is strong, acquirers tend to be more successful when allowing the 
target company to remain somewhat autonomous. During the integration of operative activities, 
it is futther impmtant for the integration management to focus on the bigger picture. Integration 
measures and arising challenges should always be dealt with in a prioritised manner to enable 
a focused and smooth integration process (Bergamin & Braun, 2018). 
2.5 Generic Integration Success Framework 
On the basis of the described integration project steps, Bergamin and Braun (2018) developed 
two interconnected concepts for PMI success. Firstly, the authors identified "Five Factors that 
Make or Break an Integration Project". Subsequently, they devised the "Perfo1mance 
Transfo1mation Concept" that builds upon these factors. These two theoretical concepts 
establish the generic integration success framework, which will be tested for practical 
applicability in the case study analysis on scope-specific PMI SFs. 
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2.5.1 Five Factors that Make or Break an Integration Project 
Figure 11 illustrates the five factors that make or break an integration project as proposed by 
Bergamin and Braun (2018). 
The first factor accounts for the obsernation that leading figures can greatly influence 
the integration process and the ensuing 
success of the integration. Charismatic 
personalities, family-business owners, or 
entrepreneurial founders hold strong 
positions in the organisation and the minds 
of employees. If leading figures from the 
acquired company are engaged and 









3) Expoit the 
Momentumof 
Change 
be a tlue gateway to integration success. As Figure 11: Five Factors that Make or Break an Integration 
Project. Adapted from Bergamin & Braun (2018, p. 24). for the acquirer, the involvement of top 
executives with previous M&A expe1ience or promoters that drove the preceding M&A process 
can have a ve1y positive impact. An unfavourable management constellation, on the other hand, 
is rather disadvantageous for the integration management. The integration team might be faced 
with leading figures that have difficulty to adapt to the new organisational stlucture, such as 
enti·epreneurial owners or politically privileged managers (Bergamin & Braun, 2018). 
Synergy exploitation, the second factor, emphasises the impmtance of value creation 
through integration beyond mere financial considerations. Successful integration effo1ts cenu-e 
around the realisation of new market potential and corporate growth. Especially the facilitation 
ofknowledge transfer and innovation can cont1ibute to the achievement of integration success. 
Tue acquirer should carefully consider which synergy positions have tlue value-adding 
potential and find an appropriate balance in the integration strategy as both under- and over-
exploitation produce suboptimal outcomes. Bergamin and Braun (2018, p. 27) argue that a 
symbiotic integration approach has generally proven successful in practice "where autonomy 
can pa1tially be retained and mutual dependencies can be put to use at the same time." 
The third factor follows the paradigm of exploiting the momentum of change. As 
integration by itself should akeady elicit transfo1mative change in an organisation, this 
momentum can be used well by managers of the acquiring company to tackle other persisting 
issues which are brought to light by the M&A. Exploiting the situational opportunity to 
Francy Grnbenmann 13 
Phanna Post-Merger Integration- Success Factors aind Best Practices in the Integration ofSwiss Biotech 
Sta1t-ups 
restructure the entire organisation and reaffirm the strategic direction might create finther value 
and add to the success of integration eff01ts (Bergamin & Braun, 2018). 
The availability of resources is another decisive factor that determines the success of the 
PMI phase. The resource needs of an integration project should be wisely calculated, accounted 
for, and disclosed to the involved paities. A prolongation of the initiation phase, for instance, 
is recommended to reduce the time pressure for the integration team and prevent any mshed or 
inadequate st:rategy preparation. Additionally, it suppo1ts a cultural approximation process 
between the key personnel of the merging companies. On a finther note, the required resources 
should be accurately budgeted and communicated so that once the integration commences, the 
required management and staff can be eff ectively mobilised. The overall goal is for the 
integration to proceed with the necessa1y attention and supp01t, while simultaneously prevent 
any dismptions to n01mal business operations due to unexpected resource needs (Bergamin & 
Braun, 2018). 
Finally, the fifth factor for successful integration is the capitalisation on project 
management expe1tise. The authors find that many concepts and instmments which oliginate 
from project management find their practical application in the govemance of the PMI phase. 
Success in integration projects is often achieved through good due diligence and the design and 
implementation ofintegration monitoling mechanisms (Bergamin & Braun, 2018). 
2.5.2 The Perfmmance Transformation Concept 
On the basis of practical observations of successful integration management, Bergamin and 
Braun (2018) established their concept for performance transfonnation, illustrated in Figure 12. 
• Institutionalise Integration Office Responsibility 
2 • Implement Perfo1111ance Transfonnation 
• Explort Growth ])yllJllllJcs 
• Take Care o!Talents 
5 • Introduce Integration Monitoring 
Figure 12: Performance Transformation Concept. Adapted from Bergamin & Braun (2018, p. 36). 
Firstly, integration management responsibilities should be appropriately defined and 
allocated to aid the realisation of the value-adding potential of the M&A. The 
institutionalisation of these responsibilities and the establishment of an approp1iate govemance 
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structure path the way to successful integration management. Bergamin and Braun (2018, p. 
38) find that the key is " to make integration responsibility a paii of the companies DNA." 
Integration responsibilities should therefore be properly accounted for in f01m of an executive 
steering committee, an integration manager, and an integration office. The integration manager 
is accountable for the overall integration success, while the integration office takes on the actual 
work related to the project execution (Bergamin & Braun, 2018). 
Secondly, the implementation of performance transfo1mation requires the prese1vation 
of existing value, the exploitation ofthe combinational synergies created by the M&A, and the 
exploration of "transformational synergies that trigger a radical change in functions, processes 
or business segments" (Bergamin & Braun, 2018, p. 42). Tue integration strategy should 
properly account for the four dimensions of perfo1mance transf01mation design, namely width 
of integration, depth of integration, areas of integration, and list of priorities (Bergamin & 
Braun, 2018). As this step of perf01mance transfo1mation is a guidance for fo1mulating a 
cohesive integration strategy, it will be explained in more detail. 
Tue first dimension, width, deals with the strategic objective of the M&A, be it to strengthen 
the core business, expand into new business areas, achieve growth targets, or realise 
restrncturation. The intended width detemlines both the specific focus of the subsequent 
integration eff01is as well as the appropriate management approach. The second dimension 
discusses different types of integration depths, which differentiate according to the degrees of 
autonomy and synergy exploitation that ai·e strntegically desired. Under consideration of the 
companies' unique situational needs, the integration follows a turnai·ound (= holding), 
prese1vative, absorptive, or symbiotic approach. Tue chosen approach should reflect the 
underlying corporate strategy and the specific M&A motives (Bergamin & Braun, 2018). These 
four integration approaches conespond with the previously introduced typology from 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991). The areas of integration need to be defined in the tllird 
dimension of perfo1mance transf01mation design. According to Bergamin and Braun (2018, p. 
45), typical areas of integration include "strategy, organization, business segments, HR and 
culhire, range of products and supplier strncture, systems and processes such as taxes and 
legislation." fu this respect, the authors argue that two different types of synergies should be 
targeted along the vai·ious areas of integration. Combinational synergy exploitation often occurs 
in the form of classical strategic measures, such as economies of scale, wllile transfo1mational 
synergies are more complex and have to be created by revolutiorlising the way the acquirer does 
its business. Finally, the fomih dimension addresses the need to strncture the integration 
objectives into a !ist of priorities. The executive management and the integration team further 
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have to evaluate whether a strict enforcement or open democracy better serves to achieve the 
individual integration objectives. All fom dimensions should be considered and attuned in order 
to derive a performance transfo1mation concept that is in line with the company' s strategy of 
diversification or focus (Bergamin & Braun, 2018). 
Exploiting growth dynamics is the third imperative in the concept. The meaning is to 
not only focus on intemal company matters, but also to scrntinise the reactions of customers 
and markets to the integration. The goal is to send positive signals, stimulate demand, and offer 
new value propositions. A company can, for example, profit from streamlining business 
portfolios or exploring cross-selling opportunities. Thus, performance transformation requires 
consistent customer focus, both in value creation and market communication, in order to deliver 
corporate growth (Bergamin & Braun, 2018). 
Fomthly, talent management can prove to be an impo1tant tool for achieving 
perfo1mance transfo1mation, especially for the planning of management constellations. For the 
acquirer, it is impo1tant to have a wide talent pool in case that critical resomces are needed in 
the light of an integration project. For the target, new talents might be excellent candidates for 
a redeployment into the parent organisation and thereby enable the desired knowledge transfer 
(Bergamin & Braun, 2018). 
The fifth and final imperative of the performance transformation concept is the 
integration monitoring system. Equipped with the right support infrastrncture, the integration 
management and the team can take a systematic approach to steering ahead the integration 
process. Examples of monitoring mechanisms include integration scorecards or roadmaps, 
opportunity and risk management, and post-merger audits (Bergamin & Braun, 2018). 
3 Inter-Industry M&A: Pharmaceutical & Biotechnology 
Chapter 3 .1 introduces the pharmaceutical industry, presenting an industty player classification 
framework for big phaima as well as the industry challenges and tt·ends that concem reseai·ch-
based big phaima. Chapter 3 .2 intr·oduces the biotechnology industty, presenting definitions for 
medical biotechnology and the characteristics of companies active in the industry. Chapter 3.3 
elaborates on the need for cooperation between biotech stait-ups and big pharma, highlighting 
the respective M&A motives. Chapter 3 .4 explains the hybrid integration approach by 
Schweizer (2005b) that constitutes the industty-specific integration success framework which 
will be tested for practical applicability in the case study analysis on scope-specific PMI SFs. 
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3 .1 Pharmaceutical IndustJ.y 
Deriving its origins from the chemical industJ.y, the pha1maceutical business has long 
established itself as a separate key industJ.y in health care. Moreover, pharmaceuticals make up 
an impmtant product segment of the life sciences sector. The other major life sciences product 
groups are plant protection agents, animal medicines, vitamins and fine chemicals, and 
speciality chemicals. Even though phaimaceuticals build the core of the phaimaceutical 
industJ.y, phaimaceutical companies, especially big phaima, are also highly active in other life 
sciences product segments (Gassmann et al., 2018). 
According to Gassmann et al. (2018, pp. 18-19), "[p]haimaceutical products ai·e defined 
as substances or mixtures of substances, which are meant for use in the recognition, prevention 
or treatment of diseases or for some other medical purposes regarding influences on the human 
organism." The product pmtfolio of a typical phaimaceutical company primarily consists of 
pha1maceuticals, but can also include companion diagnostics or medical devices. Moreover, 
industJ.y players tend to specialise in ce1tain therapeutic areas (e.g. oncology, cardiovascular) 
for which they develop phaimaceuticals (Gassmann et al., 2018). 
An impo1tant distinction in the phaimaceutical business concems drng classifications. 
Generally, one can distinguish between two types of drngs, namely prescription drngs and non-
prescription drngs. While the purchase ofthe fo1mer is regulated, the latter does not require any 
prior approval and can be bought "over-the-counter," which is why they ai·e commonly refeITed 
to as OTC drngs. A fmther distinction is made between patented and generic drngs. When novel 
drngs are developed and approved by regulators, they receive patent protection, which prohibits 
the manufacturing and sale of replications by other companies for a ce1tain period of time. Upon 
patent expiration, however, other companies can purchase a license that allows them to imitate 
the original drngs and commercialise the copies, the so-called "generics." Generic drngs usually 
are of equal quality but much lower-priced than the original versions. Patented drngs are either 
traditional, chemically synthesised phannaceuticals or genetically manufactured 
biophaimaceuticals, so-called "biologics." The copy of a biological medical product, however, 
is distinctively classified as a biosimilar and not as a generic drng. Finally, one can also classify 
drngs according to their marketability. The te1m "blockbuster" is used for drngs that achieve 
more than USD 1 billion in sales per year. They are typically high-selling patented novel drugs 
that target common disease areas. 01phan drngs, on the other hand, ai·e drngs which "tai·get rare 
medical conditions with usually ve1y low patient populations" (Gassmann et al., 2018, p. 19). 
The development of 01phan drngs is actively encouraged by govemments and incentive is given 
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by longer patent protection. Finally, a speciality drug is developed for rare disease areas, for 
which the treatment becomes increasingly complex and, thus, expensive. Speciality drugs are 
those drug treatments that cost more than USD 600 per month. Fmt her drug classifications do 
of course exist, however, the aforementioned types are amongst the most impo1tant ones 
(Gassmann et al., 2018). 
The global phaimaceutical industly has historically offered a ve1y profitable business 
environment with a multitude of companies joining the competition to benefit from the 
attractive revenue potential and profit mai·gins. The established and fully integrated big phaima 
companies have long achieved industly dominance and taken centre stage as global drug 
developers. Still, many other players are also successfully active in the industiy, often 
specialising on individual value or supply chain components, such as raw material 
manufacturing, R&D, marketing, or distribution (Bradfield & El-Sayed, 2009). 
Figure 13 provides an overview of the phaim aceutical value chain as well as the drug 
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Figure 13: Value Chain & Drug Discove,y Process. Own Creation, Based on Deloitte (2019), EUPATI (2015), FDA (2018). 
3 .1.1 The Four Strategie Archetypes 
Tue Swiss M&A consulting agency Kmmann Partners (2016) established a model which allows 
the categorisation of phaim aceutical industly players into four distinct archetypes according to 
their sti·ategic orientation and value propositions. This model will later be used for the ti·end 
analysis in Chapter 5 as it is especially useful to classify big phaim a. Tue "4 Strategie 
Archetypes of Pha1m a Companies" model is depicted in Figure 14: 
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Figure 14: 4 Strategie Archetypes of Pharma Companies, (Kurmann Partners, 2016). 
The four archetypes and their characteristics are broadly explained as follows. 
O1iginators, as the name already denotes, specialise in the discove1y, development, and 
commercialisation of novel treatments. The core competency of this archetype lies in selecting 
and suppo1ting the most promising R&D projects to spur innovation and repeatedly bring new 
drngs to the market. Originators are the poster child of big phaima in that they are R&D-
focused, big in size, and globally active. These giants also excel at clinical testing, patenting, 
and lobbying for beneficial regulations and reimbursement. M&As am typically undertaken for 
accessing extemal innovation and innovative capacity. Gilead, Roche, Merck, and Novartis can 
be associated with this archetype (Bohner, 2017; Leutenegger & Bieri, 2016). 
OTC / Consumer Health companies specialise in the development and sale of OTC 
drngs, mostly generics or me-too drngs (similar versions to novel drngs, but no copies), and 
target a ve1y broad consumer audience. Films of this archetype typically hold relatively high 
market shares in the segments they se1ve and have a diversified and lai·ge product portfolio. 
Their core competencies lie in the marketing and distribution of "consumer products with 
medical claim" (Leutenegger & Bieri, 2016, p . 11). Cost-efficiency, affordability, and brand 
recognition are the main profit drivers for this industly archetype. Big pharma companies that 
identify as OTC / Consumer Health companies ai·e Johnson & Johnson, GlaxoSmithK.line, 
Bayer, and Reckitt Benckiser. The archetype's most prominent M&A motive is to increase in 
size through consolidation (Bohner, 2017; Leutenegger & Bieri, 2016). 
Point-of-Call Specialists are highly specialised companies that operate in a selective 
number of segments in which they achieved medical excellence. Companies of this archetype 
tend to follow the str·ategy of product extension in that they "provide comprehensive solutions 
for an indication or therapeutic area" which go beyond drngs, such as diagnostics and devices 
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(Leutenegger & Bieri, 2016, p. 11). Point-of-Call Specialists show superiority in portfolio and 
network management. When undertaking M&As, this archetype often tries to support its 
competitive advantage and achieve market dominance in its focus segment. Novo Nordisk, 
Alexion, Sobi, Merz, and Leo are exan1ples of this archetype (Bohner, 2017; Leutenegger & 
Bieli, 2016). 
Low-Cost Providers (LCPs) follow a clear cost-leadership strategy and typically 
specialise in the fields of generics and biosimilars. By offering "quality products at low prices", 
LCPs pose a direct threat to Originators once the latter' s dmgs face patent expiiy (Leutenegger 
& Bieri, 2016, p. 10). Replicating the composition of off-patent dmgs allows LCPs to 
significantly streamline theiI· R&D activities and bring price-competitive alternatives to the 
market. Companies of this archetype excel at various kinds ofvalue chain optimisations. LCPs 
usually are huge in size and hold strong competitive positions in each market they serve. M&As 
by this archetype are often driven by consolidation needs. Examples ofLCPs are Teva, Lupin, 
Sandoz, and Mylan (Bohner, 2017; Leutenegger & Bieli, 2016). 
3 .1 . 2 The Industly Challenges 
The once flourishing phannaceutical industly has faced a multitude of challenges compounding 
over the years, which not only put many big pham1a companies to the test, but also inaugurated 
several shifts in the industly. 
One of the most prominent challenges is the heavy decline in R&D productivity. While 
most pharmaceutical companies have increased their investments in R&D, the output in new 
molecular entities (NMEs) often falls shmi of expectations. This phenomenon can be explained 
by looking at the various interlinked factors iinpacting either side of the R&D input/output ratio. 
In te1ms of expenditures, the cost of developing a new dmg from early discove1y to 
commercialisation has risen and nowadays can even exceed the one-billion-dollar mark 
(Gassmann et al. , 2018; Khanna, 2012). Moreover, there is a considerable risk associated with 
phaimaceutical R&D due to the high attrition rate of potential dmg candidates dming the 
discoveiy process, especially in pre-clinical and clinical trial phases when already considerable 
amounts of funds have been committed to the projects. The reasons for premature dismissal are 
often efficacy and safety issues, resulting in an average success rate of less than 5 per cent 
(Schuhnlacher, Gassmann, et al., 2016). Another cmcial factor impacting R&D productivity is 
the extensive amount oftime requiI·ed from initial discove1y to approval by the Food and Dmg 
Administi·ation (FDA) and European Medicines Agency (EMA), as well as to the market 
launch. The time horizon of a pha1maceutical R&D project can even reach up to 15 years in the 
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new millennium, which amplifies the uncertainty towards R&D cost recovery (Bradfield & El-
Sayed, 2009). Finally, the task of dmg discove1y and clinical development have become 
increasingly complex and require high commitments in resources and technology (Gassmann 
et al., 2008, 201 8). Hence, the issues of R&D productivity add pressure for big phanna to 
deliver on the retum on investment and growth targets. 
Another key industly challenge that magnifies the productivity problematic is the 
increased need for new dmg candidates with blockbuster potential in the R&D pipeline. Most 
research-based big pharma companies have historically been dependent on blockbuster dmgs 
in their revenue positions (Bradfield & El-Sayed, 2009). However, the development of such 
high-selling dmgs has become a rather difficult growth su-ategy to sustain over time. Big 
pha1ma companies have, thus, increasingly focused on disease areas of potential emerging 
blockbuster markets with smaller target segments but a "high level ofunmet therapeutic need," 
such as oncology (Gassmann et al., 2008, p. 9). The R&D pipelines of big pha1ma, however, 
had difficulty in producing the required innovative breakthroughs in the past which could 
balance the described increase in R&D expenditures (Kumar, 2012). In fact, the last decade 
witnessed numerous patent expirations that put big pha1ma under even more revenue pressure. 
As this issue continues, big pharma companies are struggling to develop new drngs in their 
pipelines that can sufficiently offset tumover cuts caused by patent expiry as well as satisfy 
their ambitious growth targets. Consequently, the indusu-y players have sta1ted to diversify and 
shift their sti·ategic focus towards developing speciality or orphan dmgs, often 
biopha1maceuticals, which promise sufficient revenue potential (Gassmann et al., 2018; 
Khanna, 2012; Schuhmacher, Gassmann, et al., 2016). 
The high level of rivahy which is present in the industly is a fmther challenge. Research-
based big phaima companies face a great pressure to sustain their competitive advantage by 
continuously developing new innovative dmgs with superior clinical profiles and tirnely 
bringing them to the market. Moreover, the threat of generics and me-too dmgs is keeping these 
big pharma companies on their toes and forces them to invest highly in R&D as well as 
marketing for market share protection. In addition, the overall industly is challenged by 
expanding govemment regulations that aim at reducing healthcare expenditmes in light of the 
ageing population. Litigation cases on, for instance, negative side-effects or non-confo1m 
marketing practices, which also accumulated over the years and prompted regulative scmtiny 
(Gassmann et al., 2018; Khanna, 2012). 
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These industly challenges contl"ibute to a more critical perception of big pha1ma's 
u-aditional R&D model and have led many industly players to adapt their sti·ategies in recent 
years, evident in the industiy trends presented in the next section. 
3 .1. 3 The Industiy Trends 
The ti·aditional phaimaceutical business has been changing over time. Some of the most 
impo1tant ti·ends relate to shifts in market dynamics, scientific and technological advancements, 
and business model transf01mations. 
According to Gautam and Xiaogang (2016, p. 379), the industiy witnessed four 
important dynamical shifts between 1995 and 2015, namely "massive to lean", "hubs to 
hotspots", "primaiy-light, speciality-heavy", and "east to west" . Firstly, the authors obse1ve 
that while big phaima first pursued consolidation with the aim of becoming "massive" and 
diversified to counteract industiy challenges, the later decade saw big phaima companies 
streamline their activities to a more "leaner and focused" business model, unde1taking 
divestitures from non-core business areas as well as sti·ategically justified acquisitions (Gautam 
& Xiaogang, 2016, p. 380). Secondly, big phaima companies staited to u-ansition from a 
proliferation of research hubs, a result of the heavy M&A activity, towards centi·alising R&D 
activities in the most innovative hotspots of the world with the aim of benefiting from 
concenti-ated knowledge. The third u-end has already been mentioned in the previous section 
and describes how phaimaceutical companies shifted their focus from the traditional source of 
blockbusters, namely "primaiy cai·e, small-molecule therapies" towards the emerging 
"speciality and biologic medicines" (Gautam & Xiaogang, 2016, p. 382). Interestingly, many 
big phaima companies opted for acquisitions to enter the biotechnology field and thereby 
achieved balanced po1tfolios between prima1y care and speciality products in 2015. Finally, the 
last trend highlighted by Gautam and Xiaogang (2016) is of geographical nature. The authors 
observe that while in 2005, revenues in the industly were mostly derived from westem 
developed counti·ies, the subsequent decade showed rapid mai·ket growth in the East, with China 
becoming a key market for pharmaceutical products. Moreover, pharmaceutical players from 
emerging markets have also gained on competüiveness, and Shanghai has joined the ranks of 
key innovation hotspots for global pha1maceutical R&D (Gautam & Xiaogang, 2016). 
Tmning the focus to more cmTent ti·ends, the pharmaceutical industiy has also been 
greatly impacted by scientific and technological breakthroughs. Commencing with the progress 
in biotechnology, the advances in vai·ious scientific fields have revolutionised the task of drng 
discove1y and development. Digitalisation, on the other hand, has also been ti·ansforming the 
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healthcare indusb.y. Novel technologies and methodologies in chemical and biological sciences 
as well as data-driven disciplines, such as bioinformatics, high-throughput screening, a1tificial 
intelligence, and big data, have emerged over the years. Not only do these advances improve 
the identification and testing of potential drng targets, but they also suppo1t the transition 
towards personalised medicine in health care (Gassmann et al. , 2018; Gautam & Xiaogang, 
2016; Jacobsen & We1theimer, 2010). 
Another ti·end in the pha1maceutical industiy is the disaggregation ofvalue chains, with 
big pharma becoming increasingly agile and collaborative. The industiy giants realised that in 
order to deal with the growing complexity of R&D, they needed to streamline their portfolio 
management and leverage the innovative knowledge and technologies which are generated 
extemally. A ti-ansition towards open innovation and agility has been enabled by the likes of 
R&D resb.ucturing, outsourcing, in- and out-licensing, M&As, public-private paitnerships with 
academia or other companies, venture funds, innovation camps, crowdsourcing, open source 
innovation, and viltual R&D. The trend towai·ds open innovation does not only suppo1t R&D 
efficiency, but is also likely to ti·igger changes to the general business model of big phaima 
(Gassmann et al., 2018; Khanna, 2012; Schuhmacher, Gassmann, et al., 2016). 
Consulting agencies predict that the traditional business model of phaimaceutical 
companies will change fundamentally in the future. Rejuvenated innovation, especially in the 
fields of genomics and immunology, in combination with the unique opportunities provided by 
big data and other advances in technology will open new pathways for pharmaceutical 
companies. With the changing health care system towards more affordable, preventative, and 
patient-centric treatment options, big phanna is thus expected to find agility through 
organisational transfo1mation (Berggren et al., 2018; Rohrbach, 2017). 
3.2 Biotechnology Indust1y 
The origins of biotechnology date back to ancient times with the emergence of practices such 
as animal domestication in 8000-4000 BC. Ever since, biotechnological progress has given way 
to major advancements in science and its application, including the evolution of fe1mentation, 
genetics, and DNA research. The rise of modern biotechnology in 1977 marked the beginning 
of a new area and brought enmmous benefits to human life and the society at large. 
Biotechnology as a key industiy was bi.Ithed in the 1980s as the first biotechnological products 
were invented and marketed by "scientists tumed enti·epreneurs." The company Genentech is 
considered the pioneer of modern biotechnology due to its invention ofhuman insulin (Bhatia, 
2018; Evens & Kaitin, 2015). 
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3 .2.1 The Ali of Biotechnology 
Bhatia (2018, p. 1) defines biotechnology as "[t]he utilization of biological processes, 
organisms or systems to produce products that are anticipated to improve human lives." 
Splitting the term into the distinct paiis "bio" and "technology", one derives that biotechnology 
encompasses "a set of techniques that ai·e employed to manipulate living organisms, or utilize 
biological agents or their components, to produce useful products/se1vices" (Bhatia, 2018, p. 
3). The discipline of biotechnology applies to and overlaps with many other fields of science, 
such as biochemistry, chemical biology, molecular biology, microbiology, cell biology, 
genetics, immunology, virology, environmental sciences, and engineering (Bhatia, 2018; Ho & 
Gibaldi, 2013; Patzelt et al., 2012). 
lt is imporiant to distinguish between four different areas of biotechnology, namely 
"red", "white/grey", "green", and "blue." The area of red biotechnology concentrates on human 
health care and is, thus, commonly termed medical biotechnology. Industrial white/grey 
biotechnology refers to the development of indusn-ial products (e.g. biofuels, chemicals, 
phaimaceuticals) using biological material and processes. The remaining two areas consist of 
agricultural green biotechnology and marine/aquatic blue biotechnology (Bhatia, 2018; Patzelt 
et al., 2012; Tyagi et al. , 2018). While all areas of biotechnology are impor1ant fields for life 
sciences, the focus of this paper lies on medical biotechnology. 
According to Pham (2018, p. 449), medical biotechnology involves "the application of 
biotechnology tools for producing medical products that can be used for the diagnosis, 
prevention, and treatment of diseases." Its utilisation has benefited health care in various ways, 
Bathia ai·gues, "from making medicines more effective in terms of cost and efficiency, to 
tackling one ofthe most difficult branches of medicine, cming genetic diseases" (2018, p. 28). 
Albeit the scope of medical biotechnology being vast, the major areas consist of 
biopharmaceuticals, gene therapy, pha1macogenomics, and genetic testing (Bhatia, 2018). 
Biopha1maceuticals refer to the derivation of therapeutic drugs from biological material, 
precisely from macromolecules such as proteins, DNA, or RNA. The field of gene therapy 
utilises gene manipulation and modification to diagnose and treat various diseases (e.g. cancer). 
Phaimacogenomics and genetic testing are used to analyse the genetic information of an 
individual. But while the former uses the information on genetic make-up to dete1mine drng 
responses, the latter deals with the examination of the material for identifying genetic diseases 
and disorders (Bhatia, 2018). In addition, Pham states that "[m]olecular medicine, personalized 
medicine, and regenerative medicine have branched out of medical biotechnology to generate 
a new era of healthcare science" (2018, p. 468). These branched-out fields are especially 
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impactful in transfmming the pharmaceutical industry. Examples of products developed in 
medical biotechnology include antibiotics, recombinant proteins, hybridoma and monoclonal 
antibodies (MAbs), vaccines, stem cell therapy, and tissue engineering (Pham, 2018). 
Biophaimaceuticals, that is !arge (biologic) molecule-drngs, ai·e inherently different to 
traditional phaimaceuticals, the small-molecule (chemical) drngs, and arguably more efficient 
and stable in their utilisation for treatment indications. The drng discove1y and development 
process in biotechnology, albeit being indeed more complex, is also more targeted, 
comprehensive, and innovative than the traditional phaimaceutical methodology (Ho & 
Gibaldi, 2013; Powell, 1996). The scientific breakthroughs in modern medical biotechnology 
and commercialisation thereof, however, would not have happened without the innovative and 
dedicated biotechs which have emerged since the 1970s (Evens & Kaitin, 2015). 
3.2.2 The Commercialisation ofBiotechnology 
Tue rise of the modern biotechnology industly was accompanied by the bilih of numerous 
enti·epreneurial companies, striving to commercialise theil· biotechnological innovations. 
Powell (1996, p. 199) finds that "[t]he science underlying biotech has its origins in university 
laboratories and research institutes." Despite science and business typically being separate 
disciplines, the field of biotechnology witnessed many scientists becoming entrepreneurially 
active upon making a valuable discove1y. This behaviour gave way to the fmmation ofbiotech 
start-ups led by so-called "scientist-entrepreneurs" and financially backed by VC investors 
(Patzelt et al., 2012; Powell, 1996). 
The identity of these founders also impacted the corporate culture and business model 
of the typical biotech staii-up. On the one hand, the enti·epreneurial spil·it and academic 
background of the founders made the biotech companies primarily science-driven and adopt a 
team-based and Jean organisational stiucture that minors a university research environment, 
which nmiures innovation. Moreover, the desil·e to bring about scientific progress also led the 
companies venture into niche segments, evident by the increase of new orphan and speciality 
drngs by biotechs over the years. On the other hand, the founders ' research-focus and potential 
need for additional business expeiiise translated into an openness for collaboration. This also 
explains why the biotech industly has adopted a. network stiu cture and supports regional duster 
formation. Moreover, enti·epreneurial biotech ventures are oftentimes deemed highly risky 
unde1iakings due to the complexity, unce1iainty, longevity, and capital intensiveness underlying 
the research in biotechnology. Thus, establishing paiinerships with universities, venture 
capitalists, consultancy agencies, law fnms, and big pha1ma have become increasingly 
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impmiant for biotech staii-ups (Evens & Kaitin, 2015; Patzelt et al., 2012; Powell, 1996; 
Schweizer, 2014; Tyagi et al., 2018). 
Companies which are nowadays active in the biotechnology industly can be categorised 
into three distinct types, based on their focus on biotechnology. Entrepreneurial Life Sciences 
Companies (ELISCOs) encompass the typical entrepreneurial small or mid-sized companies 
which solely specialise in biotechnology (e.g. biotech staii-ups). Extended Core Companies, 
albeit also being small or mid-sized, do not exclusively operate in biotechnology but attribute 
more than 50% of their revenues to it. Finally, lai·ge (pharmaceutical) companies are the 
established industly players which are significantly involved in biotechnology, but also ve1y 
active in other life sciences segments (e.g. big pha1ma) (Patzelt et al., 2012). 
In te1ms of business models, one can further differentiate between three kinds of 
company archetypes. Product-oriented biotechs discover, develop, and commercialise 
biotechnological products such as biophaimaceuticals. Se1vice-oriented biotechs develop and 
commercialise platfo1m technologies which suppo1i other companies in their R&D activities. 
Hybrid biotechs, a mixed archetype, develop own biotechnological products, but also license 
proprieta1y platfmm technologies to other companies (Patzelt et al. , 2012; Tyagi et al., 2018). 
3.3 The Need for Cooperation: M&A Motives 
The discove1y of novel drngs for therapeutic areas of unmet medical need is of growing 
impo1iance for the competitiveness and prosperity of research-based big phaima. The 
u-aditional R&D model of the phaimaceutical industly, however, has not proven sustainable in 
light of persisting industly challenges (Schuhmacher, Gassmann, et al. , 2016). As a result, big 
phaima companies have long expanded their focus beyond corporate boundaries in their attempt 
to rejuvenate innovation and stand the pace with scientific and technological progress. 
ConcmTent to a general disaggregation ofthe pha1maceutical value chain, R&D in particular is 
being reshaped by the increasingly collaborative behaviour of big phaima, biotechs, and 
academia (Schuhmacher, Rinder, et al., 2016). 
The rise of biotechnology has fundamentally changed the aii of drng discove1y and is 
even considered a competency-destroying evolution from a classical phaimaceutical company' s 
perspective (Schweizer, 2005a). Albeit having largely missed out on the new science when it 
first emerged, the undisputable value of biotechnological innovations has woken the interest of 
big pha1ma over the last decades. By collaborating with biotechs, big pha1ma aims at in1proving 
R&D efficiency and boosting innovation through extemal knowledge soming (Amir-Aslani & 
Megarbane, 2007; Lange & Wagner, 2019). While big phaima is obviously attl'acted to the 
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product pipelines, cutting-edge technologies, and superior innovativeness of small biotech 
companies, the desire to fonn alliances is not one-sided. The pa1inership with big phanna is a 
means for biotechs to gain a footing in the industly, establish network relationships, and receive 
the necessaiy suppo1t for fmther business development. This is especially trne for early-growth 
biotech stait-ups, which have not developed into fully integrated companies and thus tend to 
favour cooperation over direct competition (Gassmann et al., 2018; Khanna, 2012; Patzelt et 
al., 2007). 
The collaboration between big phaima and biotechs can occur in various fmms. The 
choice on palinership mode and scope is highly dependent on the context and corporate 
sti·ategies. Some typical examples, however, can be highlighted. Young biotech stait-ups, for 
instance, are oftentimes suppmted by big pharma in their early endeavours through research 
alliances or corporate venture funding. When research findings turn into promising early-stage 
products or technologies, big phaima usually tries to enter into licensing agreements with 
biotechs to access intellectual prope1ty. Co-development/co-commercialisation, paitial 
acquisitions with pipeline exclusivity, or full-fledged M&As are more committed paiinership 
modes, which big pha1ma uses when targeting a biotech's late-stage products and superior R&D 
capabilities (Amir-Aslani & Megarbane, 2007; Gassmann et al., 2018; Khanna, 2012). 
Compliant with a general ti·end towards consolidation in the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industries, big phaima has increasingly opted to outright acquire innovative 
small biotechs. This trend has been encouraged by a downwai·d adjustrnent in biotech company 
valuations, which were historically inflated, making M&A an even more attl'active growth 
option. Researchers have also observed that after a ce1tain threshold, an increasing number of 
strategic alliances has a negative eff ect on R&D output and should thus be complemented by 
M&As (Schweizer, 2005a, 2014). Moreover, the acquisition of a company can facilitate a 
degree of collaboration and knowledge transfer hai·dly achievable in any contract-based setting 
(Lange & Wagner, 2019). Consequently, big pharma companies often unde1take acquisitions 
that support their core business ai·ea and have the potential to make the pharmaceutical company 
more innovative (Schweizer, 2005a). lt has also been found that prior alliance paiiners are likely 
to enter into M&As if their corporate strategies align, and that a pre-acquisition alliance can 
benefit both the post-merger integration as well as the subsequent innovation performance (Al-
Laham et al., 2010; Lange & Wagner, 2019). 
The above raises the question on what specifically motivates phaimaceutical companies 
in the pursuit of biotech acquisitions. The topic has been covered in academic research and 
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much of the general M&A motives have been mentioned, in paiiicular, cost and knowledge 
synergies, excess capacity, and growth ambitions (Omaghi, 2009; Rossi et al., 2015). However, 
more interesting are motives unique to the M&A between big pharma and biotech staii-ups. 
Gassmann et al. (2018, p. 3 7) provide a comprehensive list of M&A drives for big phaima, 
which include the "[ c ]ompensation of revenues losses by blockbuster patent expirations, [ t ]he 
explosion of technology-based treatment innovations and core competencies, [t]he need to fill 
R&D pipeline gaps, [ t ]he aim to access strategically impmiant IP [ intellectual property]." 
Additionally, Schweizer and zu Knyphausen-Aufsess (2008, p. 142) highlight that biotech 
acquisitions might enable big phaima "to create intemally a research environment that fosters 
the kind of innovation and discove1y necessaiy to survive in the long 1un." 
Respectively, one needs to investigate the reasons why biotech sta1i-ups enter into 
M&As with big pharma. The majority of biotechs are private entrepreneurial ventures that are 
primai·ily specialised in R&D or R&D technologies for niche markets. Most of these companies 
are still in early product development stages and highly dependent on VC, capital markets, and 
the pha1maceutical industry for financing their cost-intensive research projects. The biotech 
industry has seen only a few companies gain on critical mass and tr-ansfo1m into fully integrated 
drng developers, such as Amgen, Biogen, or Genentech. Due to the high risk and long 
investment horizon associated with biotech R&D projects, the companies oftentimes stru ggle 
to secure the necessa1y funding required to fully develop and commercialise their innovations. 
An initial public offering (IPO) is in most cases only a viable option for biotechs if their 
innovations are already in the close-to-commercialisation stage. Thus, being acquired by big 
pha1ma might become an attr'active exit strategy for both VC investors and company owners, 
as it guarantees stability and financial relief (Amir-Aslani & Megarbane, 2007; Jacobsen & 
We1iheimer, 2010; Rossi et al., 2015). Besides the dire need for capital, biotech stari-ups 
usually also lack the infrastructure, regulatmy expe1iise, and the marketing skill set necessa1y 
to successfully progress their drng candidates past the translational phase and into the consumer 
market. Considering the high attr'ition rate of drug targets from biotechs in the clinical phases, 
an acquisition by big phaima would allow them to focus on what they do best, namely research, 
while also increasing the chances that their innovative ideas ai·e fully realised (Schuhmacher, 
Rinder, et al., 2016). Moreover, biotechs can become extremely valuable research units for big 
phaima and might find new R&D tasks arise outside previous focus areas (Khanna, 2012; Lange 
& Wagner, 2019). Finally, for biotechs which originate as university spin-offs, the ultimate exit 
via M&A might already be programmed from the stali, as some scientist-entr·epreneurs 
Francy Grnbenmann 28 
Phanna Post-Merger Integration- Success Factors aind Best Practices in the Integration ofSwiss Biotech 
Sta1t-ups 
potentially see the company more as a project than a long-te1m business engagement 
(Haeussler, 2007). 
Considering the manifold motives which prompt big phaima and biotech sta1t-ups to 
join forces in the f 01m of an M&A, one realises the high expectations big pha1ma attaches to 
such deals and which are to be realised in the PMI phase. Schweizer (2005b) ai·gues that these 
motives can be summarised into sho1t- and long-te1m orientations, which need to be 
individually addressed for the design of an integration strategy: 
Proposition la. When acquiring biotechnology fnms, phaimaceutical companies 
tend to pursue the sh01t-te1m motive of improving their market positions by filling 
their R&D pipelines and gaining potential blockbusters. 
Proposition 1 b. When acquiring biotechnology firms, phaimaceutical companies 
tend to pursue the long-te1m motive of supporting their overall growth strategies by 
accessing biotechnology know-how and technologies (Schweizer, 2005b, p. 159). 
3.4 Industry-Specific Integration Success Framework 
Tue central importance of successful integration management also applies in the context of 
M&As between pha1maceutical and biotech companies. Even more so considering that 
innovations and, more irnpo1tantly, innovative capabilities are the primary value targets in such 
acquisitions. To accomplish this feat, the idiosyncrasies of the industries, the underlying 
motives, and the involved company types need to be fully accounted for by the integration 
strategy. Neglecting the complexity of the situation could lead to suboptimal or undesired 
integration outcomes and ultimately turn the M&A into a failure (Schweizer, 2012). 
Encouraged by this train of thought, Schweizer (2005b) developed a hybrid integration 
approach framework that is tailored to the needs oflarge pharmaceutical fnms (e.g. big pharma) 
which acquire small biotechs (e.g. biotech start-ups). By following this hybrid approach, the 
integration strategy accommodates "simultaneous sho1t- and long-te1m motives/orientations 
and segmentation at a different pace across different value chain components" (Schweizer, 
2005b, p. 1051). Schweizer (2005b) also finds that the application of this industly-specific 
hybrid framework promotes M&A success. 
The rationale behind Schweizer' s (2005b) hybrid framework can be explained under the 
consideration of cultural, human, and organisational integration aspects. Firstly, M&As 
between small biotechs and large pharmaceutical companies are subject to cultural integration 
issues. However, the source of such issues is more ascribed to differences in organisational than 
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national culture. Considering the entrepreneurial spirit and lean organisation of biotechs, 
traditional big pha1ma companies could not stand in bigger contrast (Schweizer, 2012). The 
integration issue of the cultural aspect rnns deeper than merely having to bridge the gap in 
national and co1porate cultures. In fact, the entrepreneurial spirit and c01porate culture is 
oftentimes considered "an inherent prut of the capabilities of biotech companies" (Schweizer, 
2005b, p. 1070). Consequently, the innovative capacity of a biotech is closely interlinked with 
its specific "biotech culture". Large pha1maceutical companies need to consider this aspect in 
their integration planning and realise the potential negative consequences of füll absorption. 
Schweizer (2005b) fu1ther highlights that in most cases, the biotech' s culture changes from 
entrepreneurial to research-driven with increasing degree of integration. 
This shift in the biotech' s culture also has an impact on the commitment of target 
company employees. For the human aspect of integration, Schweizer (2012, p. 649) highlights 
that "[ e ]specially in biotechnology M&As, the integration process creates value by preserving, 
transfening, and applying the tacit knowledge and know-how of employees from the biotech." 
Therefore, any resulting employee tumover might generate a loss of innovation-critical biotech 
capabilities. He fuither notes that the most valuable human capital is provided by employees 
involved in the R&D processes. As the biotech culture arguably becomes more research-driven 
after the integration, the standing of the acquired company' s key R&D personnel increases, 
which benefits their retention. This might also explain why oftentimes R&D people remain with 
the company in the post-acquisition phase, whilst most executive managers decide to leave. 
Still, phrumaceutical companies are best commanded to promote the retention of key R&D 
personnel as weil as of top managers in order to foster knowledge transfer and, thereby, value 
creation (Schweizer, 2005b, 2012; Schweizer & Patzelt, 2012). Elaborating on Schweizer' s 
(2005b) statement, one might also consider the entrepreneurial founders of a biotech as key 
R&D personnel as they were oftentimes the inventors of the original products or technologies. 
Finally, integration issues also need to be addressed on an organisational level. 
Schweizer (2012, p. 650) states that the dilemma which phrumaceutical companies face is that 
while the acquired biotech needs to be integrated to some degree in order to exploit synergies, 
this should not come at the cost of"ha1ming their innovative capabilities." Moreover, the short-
and long-te1m motives that prompted the biotech' s acquisition need tobe addressed differently 
on organisational levels. In this respect, the knowledge transfer which is facilitated through the 
integration has to be explained in more detail. Schweizer (2005b, 2012) herein distinguishes 
between "biotech know-how" and "biotech knowledge." The fo1mer refers to the scientific and 
tactic know-how that f01ms the biotech' s research capabilities and innovative engine. The latter, 
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on the other hand, describes inf01mation located in the biotech company or, more precisely, the 
innovative findings such as drng targets or technologies which resulted from the biotech's 
R&D. While in most cases a transfer of biotech knowledge occurs between the target and the 
acquirer in the post-integration phase, a transfer of biotech know-how is often not even 
attempted. This is due to the fact that the specific biotech know-how is ve1y deeply rooted in 
the company's culture, people, and organisation and cannot easily be absorbed by another 
company without causing value destrnction (Schweizer, 2005a; Schweizer & zu Knyphausen-
Aufsess, 2008). Thus, Schweizer denotes (2005b, 2012) that while phaimaceutical companies 
need to receive the accumulated biotech knowledge in order to leverage technologies and 
fm1her the development and commercialisation of potential drng targets to achieve their short-
te1m motives, they simultaneously need to protect the specific biotech know-how embedded in 
the company in order to foster long-te1m innovation and growth. As a result, the integration 
approach on an organisational level needs to simultaneously combine the principles of 
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Figure 15: Post-Acquisition Integration Framework: Toward a Hybrid Approach, (Schweizer, 2005b, p. 1067). 
Schweizer' s (2005b) integration framework prescribes the use of (I) a rapid absorption 
approach for non-R&D-related value chain components and (II) a slow prese1vation strategy 
for the R&D-related components. 
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Such hybrid anangements successfully tacl<le the aforementioned integration issues in 
that they allow the concunent achievement of a biotech knowledge transfer and a biotech know-
how protection. Consequently, the acquired biotech should remain largely autonomous and 
independent in their R&D activities as these constitute the company's core competencies. The 
succeeding value chain components, however, lie in the area of expe1tise of the phaimaceutical 
company and should thus be fully absorbed. These components usually comprise late-stage 
clinical testing and regulat01y approval as weil as sales and marketing. The same applies to 
supp01ting functions such as IT, Human Resources (HR), or Finance as they are typically more 
advanced and established in the large phaimaceutical company. Schweizer (2005b, p. 1061) 
fmther ai·gues that "the degree of autonomy [ . . . ] granted differs in each acquisition according 
to the identified competencies of the biotech company involved." Thus, the more specific 
biotech know-how exists in the target, the higher is its independence after the acquisition. Based 
on this rationale, large pha1maceutical companies even go as far as to transform the biotechs 
into centres of excellence when they recognise R&D superiority (Schweizer, 2005a, 2005b ). 
4 Research Methodology 
Tue previous chapters gave introductions to the broader the01y ofM&A (Ch. 2), with emphasis 
on the PMI phase (Ch. 2.4), and to the subject ofM&A in the phaimaceutical and biotechnology 
industries (Ch. 3.3). Moreover, the industly contexts were given with focus on challenges, 
ti·ends, and company characteristics (Ch. 3). The paper fu1ther highlighted the need and motives 
for M&As in general (Ch. 2.1 and 2.2) as well as specifically in the context of biotech 
acquisitions bybig phaima (Ch. 3.3). Finally, Chapter 2.5 and Chapter 3.5 presented the generic 
and industly-specific integration success frameworks based on the theories of Bergamin and 
Braun (2018) and Schweizer (2005b). 
To investigate the PMI SFs for biotech start-up acquisitions by big pha1ma, a multi-
layered approach will be applied both in te1ms of research scope and research method. Chapter 
4.1 presents the methodology for the trend analysis and Chapter 4.2 the one for the PMI analysis 
of selected case studies. While the case study analysis on PMI SFs remains the main focus of 
this paper, the preliminaiy high-level ti·end analysis will help to situate the cases and findings 
in the broader context ofM&As between big pha1ma and biotechs. 
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4 .1 Methodology for the Trend Analysis 
For the trend analysis, the focus of research will be on M&As which involved Swiss biotechs 
and big pharrna between 2005 and 2019. The goal is to identify pattems in the acquisition of 
Swiss biotechs by big phaima. Tue result of this analysis will be used to test the first hypothesis 
(Hl), namely whether there is a strong tendency for "Originators" to acquire "Innovators". 
4.1.1 M&A Transaction Identification 
In a first step, the M&A transactions which qualify for the broader research scope of this paper 
(buyer: big phaima / target: Swiss biotech) were identified. Herein, the paper limits the scope 
to the top 20 big pha1ma companies in terms of 2019 revenues (Sagonowsky, 2020). Table 1 
provides an overview of the ranking of these top 20 pha1ma companies. 
Rank 1-5 Rank 6- 10 Rankll-15 RanklS-20 
1. Johnson & Johnson 6. GlaxoSmithKline 11. Bristol Myers Squibb 16. Boehringer Ingelheim 
2. Roche 7. Sanofi 12. AstraZeneca 17. Novo Nordisk 
3. Plizer 8. AbbVie 13.Amgen 18. Teva Pharmaceutical 
Industries 
4. Novartis 9. Takeda 14. Gilead Sciences 19. Allergan 
5. Merck & Co. 10. Bayer 15. Eli Lilly 20. Biogen 
Table 1: The Top 20 Pharma Companies by 2019 Revenue. 0\1lln Creation, Based on Sagonowsk:y (2020). 
Subsequently, the historical data on M&A transactions between the biotechnology and 
phaimaceutical sectors was retrieved from the latest HBM Partners' "Pharma / Biotech M&A 
Transactions 2005-2019" excel report (HBM Partners, 2020b). In order to identify transactions 
which involved Swiss biotechs as target and big pharma companies as buyer, the following 
filters were applied: (1) Target Country = Switzerland, (2) Acquisition Type= Company Sale, 
(3) Buyer = Top 20 Phanna Companies. The filtering resulted in a set of eleven transactions 
which occmTed between 2005 and 2019 and qualified for the predefined broader scope. These 
eleven M&As also constitute the data set for the high-level trend analysis in Chapter 5. An 
overview of the transactions can be found in appendix 10 .1. 
lt is important to highlight that for the trend analysis in Chapter 5, the data was not 
filtered for start-up companies as these were identified in the comse of the analysis and, 
therefore, could not be prematurely dete1mined. 
4.1.2 M&A Classification Procedme 
To generate findings for the trend analysis, a high-level desk research was conducted on the 
buyer, the target, and the acquisition motive. In particulai·, the following analyses were made: 
1. A buyer classification based on business segments/therapeutic areas (Appendix 10.2) 
• Result: strategic archetype classification according to the model ofKunnann Paitners (2016) 
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2. A target classification based on VC funding, value proposition, platf01m technology, product pottfolio, 
pipeline maturity, and acquisition motive from a buyer perspective (Appendix 10.3) 
• Result: target identity (R&D-focused or fülly integrated), statt -up identity (VC funding), and target 
strategic archetype (Innovator) based 011 own inferences 
3. A concluding transaction classification conceming buyer/target archetype constellations and key pmpose of 
the M&A from a buyer perspective (Appendix 10.4) 
• Result 1: transaction categ01ies based on buyer/target archetypes ( who buys whom?) 
• Result 2: key M&A pmpose within each transaction catego1y based on the impact of the M&A on 
the respective buyer's business segments, therapeutic areas, and value chain 
Tue desk research findings which were used to make the trend analysis are provided in the 
appendixes 10.2 and 10.3. 
4.2 Methodology for the Case Study Analysis 
For the practical examination, the focus of research will be na1rnwed down to three selected 
PMI cases of Swiss biotech start-up acquisitions by big pha1ma. The aim is to test the theoretical 
integration success frameworks (Ch. 2.5 and Ch. 3.4) in these practical examinations. 
Moreover, this paper attempts to identify additional scope-specific PMI SFs through the 
analysis of best practices that are not fully accounted for by the theoretical success frameworks. 
The results of the case studies will help in answering the main research question, namely 
what the success factors in the post-merger integration ofbiotech strut-ups into big pharm a are. 
Finally, the case studies will also test the second and third hypotheses, namely whether big 
phruma companies acquire biotech start-ups with the short-term motive to improve market 
positions by accessing the biotechs' innovations (H2) and the long-term motive to suppmt their 
overall growth strategy by accessing the biotechs' innovative capacities (H3). 
4.2.1 Case Study Selection 
From eleven M&A transactions that qualified for the broader research scope of this paper, three 
were selected for the case study analysis on PMI SFs. These companies had to fit the smaller 
research scope in that they qualified as a start -up (buyer: big phruma / target: Swiss biotech 
start -up). The selected M&A cases were proposed by Christoph Bieri , an expert in pharma 
M&A and managing partner at Kmmann Partners. The recommended cases proved very 
suitable for the study and were therefore adopted. 
Tue selected M&As for the case study analysis on PMI SFs are: 
• GlycAtt Biotechnology AG and Roche (2005) 
• ESBATech AG and Akon / Novattis (2009/2010) 
• Actelion Ltd. and Johnson & Johnson (2017) 
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These M&As form a representative and well-balanced sample for the PMI analysis due to the 
individual constellations in target company type, buyer archetype, M&A context and motives, 
and post-acquisition outcome. This will become apparent in the course of the trend analysis in 
Chapter 5 and the practical examination in Chapter 6. 
4.2.2 Desk Research and Interviews 
Tue chosen research approach is a combination of desk research and inte1views. The desk 
research focused primarily on press releases and newspaper/joumal a1ticles as well as company 
websites, rep01ts, and publications. This research type was unde1taken first and was mostly 
completed prior to the inte1view phase. The interviews constituted the essential second pait of 
the research . They were especially imp01tant for the qualitative nature of the study and the 
generally limited inf01mation publicly available on PMI, especially in the case of private and 
small company acquisitions. Hence, interviews with at least one representative of each tai·get 
company were conducted. 
The choice of inte1v iewing representatives of the target companies, given that they 
remained with the company after the M&A, makes sense for three main reasons. Firstly, target 
company representatives which were involved in the PMI phase are better identifiable than 
those from the buyer 's side. Secondly, the target's founders or executives most likely have 
comprehensive knowledge on the biotech's situation before, during, and after the acquisition. 
Thirdly, target company representatives are well-suited to judge the quality of the PMI phase 
as they were directly affected by the applied integration strategies and management techniques. 
Table 2 provides an inte1view ove1view, while the transcriptions can be found in appendix 10.5. 
Interview Partne1· Infonnation 
Name Target 
Dr. Pablo GlycArt 
Umafia 








ESBATech Co-Founder, Chief 
Executive Officer+, 
Head 





Head ofResearch, Roche Glycart AG 
Head Cancer Immunotherapy Discovery, 
Roche Innovation Center Zurich 
Partner Pureos Bioventures 
Executive Chairman CDR-Life Inc. 
President Swiss Biotech Association 
President/Owner LCID Consulting 
CEO Mabylon AG 
EVP & CBDO, Allschwil Site Head, 
Barbe1is 
Nicholas 
Franco President & Chief Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd 
Business Development 
Officer (EVP & CBDO) 
*until M&A **until 2016 (left company) ***until 2006 (left company) 
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The inte1view partners were identified after a preliminaiy desk research and contacted 
via email. Due to the cunent coronavirns pandemic, the inte1views could not take place as an 
in-person meeting and, thus, had to be done in a telephone, videoconference, or written fo1mat. 
For conducting the inte1views, except in the case of Actelion, a semi-strnctured 
approach was applied in that the questions were pre-drafted but deviated if the conversation 
required it. The semi-strnctmed inte1viewing technique is especially well-suited for a 
qualitative data collection due to its flexibility (Miles & Gilbe1t, 2005). In the case of Actelion, 
a written questionnaire was provided to the inte1v iewee as this was the prefe1rnd fmmat for the 
company. All inte1view questions were individually tailored to the inte1view fmmat, the 
specific context of the M&A as well as the infollmation gaps identified dming the desk research 
phase. Therefore, the questions are case-specific and differ to some extent. 
The oral inte1v iews were transcribed from audio recordings, but the sentence stmcture 
and grammatical e1rnrs were adjusted in some cases and gap fillers, such as "uhm", were 
omitted, given that the meaning of the statement was thereby not affected. This allowed to 
improve the textual flow and reading experience of the transcribed inte1views. 
4.2.3 Practical Examination Procedme 
Tue practical examination of each PMI case study will be divided into three paits: Contextual 
Analysis, Post-Merger Integration Analysis, and Case Assessment: PMI SFs. 
The contextual analysis will first provide an ove1view of the target company's histmy 
and situation up to the point of acquisition, then elaborate on the transaction and the specific 
M&A motives ofboth target and buyer, and finally present infmmation on what happened with 
the target company after the integration. The post-merger integration analysis will separately 
discuss the integration strategy, the integration management, and the value creation resulting 
from the integration. This analysis will be guided by the consolidated PMI SFs framework 
derived from theory, which is presented in the next section. The post-merger integration 
analysis will directly interpret the desk research and inte1view findings and confnm or negate 
the fulfilment of the individual PMI SFs. Conclusively, a case assessment on the basis of this 
consolidated PMI SFs framework will be made to validate the applicability of the generic and 
industiy-specific integration success frameworks to the scope. Moreover, best practices will be 
highlighted which could qualify as newly identified scope-specific PMI SFs. The individual 
case studies are presented in Chapter 6. The discussion of the findings from the ti·end analysis 
and the case study analysis takes place in Chapter 7. 
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4.2.4 Consolidated PMI SFs Framework for Practical Examination 
A consolidated framework was created for the case assessment, which encompasses the PMI 
SFs from the theoretical integration success frameworks introduced in Chapter 2.5 and 3.4: 
A. Five Factors that Make or Break an Integration Project (Bergamin & Braun, 2018) 
B. Perfonnance Transfonnation Concept (Berga.mim & Braw1, 2018) 
C. Hybrid Integration Approach Framework (Schw eizer, 2005b) 
Table 3 depicts the consolidated framework which will be tested in the case studies. lt assigns 
the generic (A & B) and the industiy -specific (C) PMI SFs to the three defined dimensions of 
the post-merger integration analysis. 
lnteg.-ation Strateg)' 
Generic PM/ SFs 
Appropriatc Dcpth oflntcgration (part of 
hnplemcnt Performance Transformation) 
lndustry-Specific PM/ SFs 
Realisation of the Hybrid Integration 
Approach across Different Value Chain 
Activities and Functions (R&D vs. Non-
R&D): 
• R&D: Research, Clinical Devclopmcnt 
( until Regulatory Approval) 
• Non-R&D: from Regulatory Approval 
onwards, Sales & Marketing 




Research & Devclopmcnt: Limited to No C 
Integration 
• Preservation Approach: Higb Degree of 
Autooomy to R&D-Related Portion 
• No Transfer ofBiotcch Know-How 
Regulatory Approval/Sales & Marketing + C 
Supporting Functions: Full lntegration 
• Absorption Approach: Control of Pharma 
over Non-R&D-Related Portion, Transfer 
ofBiotech Knowledge 
lntf.>gration l\'Ian agement 





A vailability of 
Resources 















Exploit the Momentum ofCl,ange 
Exploit Growth Dynamics 
Indusny-Specific PMI SFs 
Achievement of Short-Term Motive: 
lnnm,-ations for Boosting Market 
Position by Knowledge Transfer 
Achievement ofLong-term Motive: 
Innovative Capacity for Boosting 
Growth by Know-How Prescrvation 
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5 Trend Analysis: The Swiss Market for Biotech Acquisitions 
According to the recently published data by HBM Paiiners (2020b), 1,109 M&A transactions 
between the phannaceutical and the biotechnology sector were recorded for the time period of 
2005 to 2019. Thereof, 981 were company sales and 128 were asset or division deals. A total 
of 40 transactions were recorded with Switzerland as the target's countiy, 34 of which were 
company sales and 6 of which were asset or division deals. 
Considering only the u-ansactions that involved the top 20 big pham1a companies as 
buyer (Sagonowsky, 2020), 13 M&As with Switzerland as the target's countiy can be 
identified. Excluding asset and division deals, which concerned the Novaitis and 
GlaxoSmithK.line asset swap in 2014 and their joint venture deal in 2018, eleven company sale 
u-ansactions remain for the u-end analysis. One of these M&A was an indirect Swiss biotech 
purchase by big phanna, as the target (ESBATech) was first purchased by a non-big phaima, 
non-biotech company (Alcon), which in turn was later on fully acquired by a big phruma 
company (Novaitis). An overview ofthe selected ti·ansactions, including the c01Tesponding deal 
info1mation provided by the HBM Paiiners dataset, can be found in appendix 10.1. 
Table 4 depicts the eleven M&As and presents the most important deal infonnation. 
This inf01mation is based on the original HBM Paiiners dataset, with slight c01Tections for 
identified inconsistencies (see Appendix 10.1 ). Tue table fuither includes some findings from 
the target and buyer classifications which can be found in appendix 10.2 and 10.3, respectively. 
In te1ms of tai·get identity, the differentiation between R&D-focused and fully integrated 
companies is primru·ily made on the basis of their value chain coverage. Moreover, companies 
with a single commercial product are also considered primaiily R&D-focused if they offered 
the product in only a ve1y limited number of geographic mru·kets (Fumaphann) or sold the 
option to produce and commercialise the product to an extemal paitner (Speedel). For the 
classification of the buyer's sti·ategic archetype, the model by Kmmann Paiiners was applied. 
Ac.quisition Swiss Target Buyer 
Year 
2005 GlycArt Roche 
2006 Fumaphaan Biogenidee 
2008 Speedel Novartis 
2010 ESBATech (part of Novartis 
Alcon) 
> 2009 ESBATech Alcon 
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2014 OncoEtrux Merck&Co. 375 Private R&D-focused Originator 




2017 Actelion Johnson& 30,000 Public Fully Integrated OTC / Consumer 
Johnson Health 
2019 Therachon Pti.zer 810 Private R&D-focused Originator 




2019 Ama1 Therapeutics Boehringer 366 Private R&D-focused Originator 
Ingelheim 
Table 4: Swiss Biotech Acquisitions by Big Pharma (2005 - 2019). Own Creation, Partially Based on HBM Partners (2020b). 
Tue table shows that the majority of M&As was unde1iaken by Originators, as six out of eleven 
deals can clearly be identified for this strategic archetype. Moreover, if only the innovative 
phannaceuticals division of Pfizer is considered, then this buyer also classifies as Originator, 
which increases the number of deals for this archetype to seven. Finally, all biotech acquisitions 
by Originators involved targets wh.ich are R&D-focused companies. 
The remaining four M&As can be associated with OTC / Consumer Health companies. 
However, the analysis found evidence that two of the three companies classified under this 
strategic archetype have transitioned or are transitioning towards the Originator business model, 
as both Takeda and GlaxoSinithK.line (GSK) have changed their strategies over the years and 
started to concentrate on the R&D of innovative medicines. This trend is fmther supported by 
recordings of pmifolio divestments from these companies conceming non-Originator business 
segments (see appendix 10.2). In te1ms of target identity, OTC / Consumer Health companies 
purchased R&D-focused as well as fully integrated biotech companies. GSK was the buyer in 
both R&D-focused biotech acquisitions accounted for by the OTC / Consumer Health 
archetype. 
Table 5 provides a more detailed ove1view of the Swiss biotechs which were acquired 
by big phaima. The infmmation used to analyse and classify the target companies can be found 
in appendix 10. 3. 
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Biotech Ta1·get Stage of Business Model Start-Up 
Company Lead (Product and/01· Qualifiet· 
Product Platfonn) (VC Funding) 
GlycArt Preclinical Hybrid VC-backed 
Fumaphann Market Product-Oriented -
Speedel Market Product-Oriented Initially VC-
backed 
-
ESBATech Phase 1 Hybrid VC-backed 
Nycomed Market Product-Oriented -
- -Okairos Phase 2 Hybrid VC-backed 
OncoEthix Phase 1 Product-Oriented VC-backed 
GlycoVaxyn Phase 1 Hybrid VC-backed 
Actelion Market Product-Oriented Initially 
VC-backed 
Therachon Phase 1 Product-Oriented VC-backed 
Amal Preclinical Hybrid VC-backed 
Therapeutics 
l 1111ovato1· Qualifier 
(Value Chain Focus: 
R&D) 
R&D 
R&D + Market 
-R&D 
R&D 




-R&D + Market 
R&D 
R&D 
Table 5: Swiss Biotech Targets ofBig Pharma M&As (2005 - 2019). Own Creation. 















Five out of eleven Swiss biotechs acquired by big phaima had a hybrid business model in that 
they possessed both a platfo1m technology and product candidates in the R&D pipeline. The 
other six biotechs were mainly product-oriented, and no inf 01mation was found on any special 
proprietary technology. In regard to start-up identification, nine companies are reported to have 
had VC funding in the past, whereof seven were still VC-backed at the time of acquisition. The 
classification of Innovators was made on the basis of value chain focus. A distinction between 
value chain focus and value chain coverage has to be made in this respect. In order to qualify 
as an Innovator, this paper argues that R&D should be one ofthe core strengths ofthe company 
and it should be known as the originators of its innovations. Therefore, Innovators can include 
fully integrated companies, but they exclude companies which primarily fill their R&D 
pipelines through extemal partnering. Consequently, Nycomed, which is heavily specialised in 
manufacturing, marketing, and sales and rep01iedly focuses on in-licensing and collaboration 
in its R&D, does not clearly classify as an Innovator (see appendix 10.3). Conclusively, only 
ten of the acquired biotechs can be considered Innovators. 
The following tables provide an overview of the identified three transaction categories, 
namely "Originator acquires Innovator", "OTC / Consumer Health acquires Innovator", and 
"OTC / Consumer Health acquires Manufacturing & Sales Expe1t." 
Additionally, to provide some explanation for the trend in biotech M&As, a high-level 
analysis on the strategic purpose of the acquisition was made. Firstly, the most impo1tant 
statements on M&A motives were collected and can be found in appendix 10.3. Secondly, an 
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analysis of the acquisitions' impact on business segmellts, therapeutic areas, value chain 
expertise, and geographic market coverage was made Oll the basis of informatioll presellted in 
appelldix 10.2 and 10.3. Tue ove1v iew of this analysis is found in appelldix 10.4. 
• Boehringer Amal Therapeutics (Stru1-up) 
Product-Ol'iented Ta1·get 
• Novartis (Alcon) ESBATech (Sta11-up) ---• Biogen Fumapharm 
• Novartis Speedel (Sta1t -up) 
• Merck & OncoEthix (Start-up) 
• Pfizer Therachon (Stai1-up) 
Key Purpose: M&A to strengtben R&D in core business segment & core tberapeutic area 
Table 6: M&As in the Originator Acquires Innovator Category. Own Creation. 
For six out of the seven M&As in this catego1y , the analysis showed that the overall motive of 
Originators to acquire Innovators is to strellgthell the R&D expertise and pipelines in the core 
business segmellt of pharmaceuticals. Moreover, there is a clear trelld of acquiring an Innovator 
that specialises in the priority therapeutic area of the respective O1iginator (e.g. OllCOlogy). 
In the case of Nova1tis and ESBATech, the transactioll can definitely be seell as a 
strellgthening of Novaitis' R&D expertise and pipeline for the core phannaceutical business 
segmellt. However, as this was an indirect acquisitioll, it is impmtant to elaborate Oll the specific 
purposes of both M&As individually . Alcoll, a Point-of-Call Specialist for eye cai·e, acquired 
ESBAT ech in order to strellgthell its R&D expe1tise and pipeline in the pharmaceutical business 
segmellt of ophthalmology. For Novaitis, the acquisitioll of Alcoll was rather a means of 
diversificatioll as the deal concemed a noll-core therapeutic area of Novaitis and added two 
llew ophthalmic business segments outside of phaimaceuticals to the big pharma company. 
Hyb1id Tuget • GlaxoSmithK.line - Okai.ros (Start-up) 
• GlaxoSmithK.line - GlycoVaxyn (Start-up) 
Key Purpose: M&A to strengtben R&D in core business segment & core tberapeutic. area 
Product-Oriented Ta1·get • Johnson & Johnson-Actelion (initially a Start-up) 
Key Purpose: M&A to expand francbise portfolio in co1·e business segment with new tberapeutic 
area 
Table 7: M&As in the OTC / Consumer Health Acquires Innovator Category. Own Creation. 
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The strategic purpose of the Innovator acquisitions by GSK is equal to the one of Originators, 
which might further provide evidence for the company's archetype transition. GSK acquired 
both companies to strengthen its R&D expertise and pipeline in its priority business segment of 
prophylactic and therapeutic vaccines. The acquisitions were especially attractive for GSK due 
to the proprietruy technologies the biotechs had developed. 
For Johnson & Johnson, a classical example of the OTC / Consumer Health archetype, the main 
pw-pose of the acquisition was to expand its pharmaceutical business segment by adding a sixth 
therapeutic area. Acquiring Actelion's strong pulmonruy a1terial hype1tension franchise, 
therefore, allowed the big pha1ma company to diversify its phrumaceutical rum. However, as 
the acquisition excluded eru·Iy-stage R&D assets, which were spun-off into a new company, the 
strategic fit is more given from a market than from an R&D perspective. 
Key Pm-pose: To optimise the value chain and expand ma1·ket reach of new co1-e business 
segment for various therapeutic areas 
Table 8: M&As in the OTC / Cons11mer Health Acquires Mamifacturing & Sa/es Expert Category. Own Creation. 
In the case of Takeda, the key purpose of the M&A was to optimise its value chain activities, 
especially in te1ms of manufacturing and commercialisation, as well as to strengthen its mru·ket 
presence in Emope and emerging mru-kets. T akeda benefits from Nycomed' s expe1tise in later-
stage value chain steps in that its new priority business segment of pharmaceuticals is suppo1ted 
by improved production and commercialisation capabilities. 
As mentioned m Chapter 4, the M&A transactions of Roche/GlycAlt, 
N ovaitis/ESBA Tech, and Johnson & Johnson/ Actelion were selected for the case study analysis 
on PMI SFs. This case study selection is highly representative of the aforementioned trends in 
that it includes two hybrid R&D-focused biotechs which were directly (GlycArt) or indirectly 
(ESBATech) acquired by an Originator archetype. Albeit adding a level of complexity to the 
analysis when studying an indirect M&A, it also adds more relevance to the PMI analysis as 
M&As oftentimes occm in rather difficult context settings. Moreover, the case study of 
Actelion will allow to evaluate potential differences in PMI SFs between young R&D-focused 
hybrid biotech companies and matme product-oriented fully integrated biotechs as well as 
between the archetypes of Originator and OTC / Consumer Health as buyers. T ogether, these 
M&As fo1m a well-balanced sample for the case study analysis on PMI SFs. 
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6 Case Study Analysis: Post-Merger Integration Success Factors 
This chapter presents the case study analysis for GylcAit and Roche (Ch. 6.1 ), ESBATech and 
Alcon/Novartis (Ch. 6.2), and Actelion and Johnson & Johnson (Ch. 6.3). 
6.1 GlycA.It Biotechnology AG and Roche 
6.1.1 Contextual Analysis 
6.1.1.1 Pre-Acquisition Context 
GlycAlt Biotechnology AG (hencefo1th "Glycart"), a privately held Swiss biotech sta1t-up, 
originated as a spin-off from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in 2001 after its 
founders, Pablo Umafia (CSO) and Joel Jean-Mairet (CEO), had competed in the 
ETH/McKinsey business plan competition in 2000 and successfully attracted VC investments. 
Until 2005, the Schlieren-based company had gone through several financing rounds (total 
capital raised: CHF 23 million) and grown from three to approximately 30 employees (Johnson, 
2018; Swiss Broadcasting Corporation, 2005). 
Glyca1t specialised in the field of monoclonal antibodies with particular focus on their 
therapeutic application in oncology. The company had developed a proprietaiy technology 
platform , GlycoMAb, which allowed the genetic engineering of antibodies and enhanced their 
efficacy in stimulating the immune system and attacking T-cells (Wessel, 2005; William Reed, 
2005). Glyca1t used its technology to develop its own GlycoMAb-enhanced new generation of 
antibodies (Global Life Science Ventures, 2005). The company had several drug candidates in 
the pipeline, including its lead compounds GAl0l (anti-CD201) and GA201 (anti-EGFR), both 
in the preclinical stage at the point of acquisition (Umafia, 2020). 
The Swiss biotech start-up was mostly focused on R&D. lt had paitnered with Lonza 
Group AG for the contract manufactu1ing of the production cell lines of its antibodies. Besides 
advancing its own drng pipeline, Glycart also collaborated with academia and biotech/pharma 
companies on extemal R&D projects, providing its expertise and technology to help test and 
improve the potency and efficacy of other drug candidates (Gilde Healthcare, n.d.; Umafia, 
2020). For instance, in late 2004, the company entered into a technology licensing agreement 
and R&D partnership with F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG (hencefo1th "Roche") (LUMITOS, 
2004; Wessel, 2005). As most of the research collaborations of Glycart were on early stage 
R&D projects, which often generate only a limited revenue inflow, the company majorly relied 
on its VC funding for financing its corporate and drug discove1y activities (Umafia, 2020). 
1 Indication of molecules targeted by drngs is given for identification pmposes, but will not be medically explained. 
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6.1.1.2 Acquisition: Deal and Motive 
The acquisition of Glycart by Roche for a price of CHF 235 million in cash was announced on 
19 July 2005 and completed shortly afterwards. The deal was the result of a trade sale process 
with 16 suitors, which had originally been kicked-offby an unsolicited bid from another pharma 
company (Johnson, 2018; Roche, 2005; Umafia, 2020). The acquisition agreement included a 
two-year trial period with temporary contracts for all Glycart employees (Umafia, 2020). 
Former Glycart CEO Jean-Mairet decided to leave the company upon acquisition to pursue new 
opportunities, such as founding the biotech VC firm Ysios Capital in 2008 (Johnson, 2018). 
Pablo Umafia (2020, Appendix 10.5.1) reveals that "[f]rom the very sta1t ofthe company 
we thought that an M&A was one of the exit options." The unsolicited third-party offer, 
however, was actually what triggered Glycart to screen the market for potential buyers. Roche, 
as a global leader in oncology, biopharmaceuticals, and antibodies, tumed out as the perfect 
strategic fit for the biotech start-up. In fact, Roche had somewhat of a monopoly in the anti-
CD20 antibody market with its first-in-class product MabThera/Rituxan. As Glycart's GAIOI 
was a second generation anti-CD20 antibody, which at some point would advance into the 
clinical phase where it would be compar·ed to MabThera as standard of eure, the pa1tnership 
with Roche was a logical move. Moreover, Roche's overall philosophy and commitment to 
R&D made it an attractive suitor for Glycart (Umafia, 2020). Upon the M&A announcement, 
Jean-Mairet (as cited in Roche, 2005) stated, "Roche's outstanding capabilities in 
biopha1maceutical R&D, manufacturing and commercialisation will give our product 
candidates and technologies an excellent opportunity to realise their füll potential." 
According to Wessel (2005), Roche's motivation to participate in the auction process 
was "to secure exclusive rights to the antibody-boosting technology." The strategic advantages 
of GlycoMAb from a business perspective are manifold, including therapeutic window 
expansion, attrition mitigation, life cycle management, and product profitability (Swiss Biotech 
Association, 2019a). Roche's then-CEO Franz Humer (as cited in Roche, 2005) stated, "we are 
excited about this significant addition of cutting-edge technology to our R&D organization." 
Moreover, Roche also gained access to Glycart' s antibody pipeline, in particular GAI 0 1, which 
was one of the most promising next generation anti-CD20 drng candidates at that time, 
potentially even superior to MabThera. Umafia mentions GAI0I as a major driver ofthe M&A 
from Roche 's perspective (Umafia, 2020) . In more general terms, Humer (as cited in Roche, 
2005) stated, "[t]his acquisition is an excellent strategic fit with our Therapeutic Protein 
Initiative and our focus on developing clinically differentiated proteins and antibodies for areas 
of unmet medical need, such as oncology." Recognising early the value potential of Glycart, 
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Roche acquired the preclinical-stage company with all its employees as a long-term strategy to 
strengthen its drng pipeline and R&D capabilities in the priority areas of therapeutic antibodies 
and oncology (Roche, n.d.-c; Wessel, 2005). Hence, both sho1t- and long-te1m M&A motives 
are given for Roche's acquisition of Glycait. 
6.1.1.3 Post-Acquisition Context 
Nowadays, Roche Glycart AG operates as an innovation centre and centre of excellence within 
the Roche Pharnia Research and Early Development (pRED) organisation (Roche, n.d.-a). To 
foster diversity and innovation, Roche maintains a network of R&D centres located across the 
globe. The pRED organisation is one of the three separate R&D units of Roche, next to 
Genentech Research and Development (gRED) and Chugai (Roche, n.d.-e). The pRED unit is 
staffed with more than 2,200 scientists and consists of seven autonomous Roche Innovation 
Centers, one of which is the Roche Innovation Center Zurich (RICZ), namely Roche Glycart 
(Roche, n.d.-f). The Schlieren-based RICZ is headed by Pablo Umafia and has grown to over 
180 employees, occupying a 1 0-sto1y reseai·ch complex. The majority of the Glycart employees 
report into the global functions of Lai·ge Molecule Research and Oncology Discovery. RICZ is 
a core biotechnology site and antibody/protein engineering powerhouse for Roche and has also 
become the Center of Excellence for Cancer Immunotherapy (Roche, n.d.-a). 
GlycoMab remains as one of the key antibody engineering technologies of Glycait and 
the company's lead candidate GAl0l (Obinutuzumab, labelled RG7159 by Roche) was 
successfully launched to the market (Umafia, 2020). After the clinical trial phase under Roche, 
Obinutuzumab was approved in 2013 by the FDA andin 2014 by the EMA for the treatment of 
Chronic lymphocytic leukaemia (EMA, n.d.; HBM Partners, 2020a). The FDA granted 
Obinutuzumab the approval under priority review, orphan drng status, and, as the first drng 
ever, under the breakthrough therapy designation (HBM Pa1tners, 2020a). Obinutuzumab has 
since been approved for the treatment of folliculai· lymphoma and is cunently in clinical 
development for two additional indications, lupus nephritis and frontline indolent non-
Hodgkin's lymphoma. Obinutuzumab is sold as a prescription drng under the trade name 
Gazyva/Gazyvaro in more than 70 countries (Roche, n.d.-b, 2020). At the point of FDA 
approval, Gazyva was forecasted to achieve peak sales of USD 1. 7 billion, therefore having 
blockbuster potential (HBM Paitners, 2020a). While the so-far generated revenue from Gazyva 
is falling short of this expectation, Roche is anticipating further sales growth in the future, 
especially through the new treatment indication for lupus (Miller, 2019; P. Taylor, 2018). 
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6.1.2 Post-Merger Integration Analysis 
6.1.2.1 Integration Strategy 
Roche's approach to strncturing its R&D activities anns for differentiation and 
innovation by encouraging diversity in science, autonomy, and empoweim ent, but also 
collaboration and knowledge sharing (Humer, 2006; Roche, n.d.-d). This philosophy also finds 
reflection in Roche 's approach to post-merger integration (Aiolfi, 2013). Similar as in other 
M&As, Roche tried to integrate Glycait in a way that allowed for an optimum balance between 
independence and coordination (Umafia, 2020). 
The organisational integration of Glycart transpired to some extent in stages. Initially, 
the company was placed under a two-yeai· trial period. At the beginning of this period, Glycart 
prin1arily focused on its existing drng candidates, platform technology, and molecular biology 
research with the goal of speedily advancing its projects into the clinical-stage and facilitating 
the knowledge transfer to the related R&D functions in Roche. Besides furthering its own R&D, 
Glyca1t began to support on Roche' s other antibody projects with its GlycoMAb technology. 
In addition, Glyca1t capitalised on its expe1tise in protein engineering and became the in-house 
provider of this technology service within Roche. Thereby, Glyca1t became fully integrated into 
the pRED function for Oncology Discovery as well as the Therapeutic Protein Organisation, 
nowadays called Large Molecule Research. After the initial trial-period, Glyca1t sought to 
significantly broaden its therapeutic approaches and expertise, which fostered its gradual 
development into a dedicated Centre of Excellence for Cancer Immunotherapy within pRED 
(Umafia, 2020). 
The pRED unit covers the discovery and preclinical phase as well as the initial two 
clinical phases of the drng discovery process, fuat is early research to clinical proof of concept 
(PoC) (Roche, n.d.-e). As Glyait was already mainly focused on preclinical R&D before the 
M&A, the company perfectly matched the value chain focus of pRED. Moreover, due to the 
company's existing expertise in protein engineering, it also provided a strong fit with Roche ' s 
Large Molecule Research organisation (Umafia, 2020). 
As Glycart did not have own expert ise or capabilities in the value chain steps of late-
clinical development, manufacturing, and marketing and sales, these areas of work were 
fulfilled by Roche upon acquisition. In term s of supporting functions, Glycart largely kept its 
local management for finance, IT, and HR. For HR, the initial serv ice, which Glyca1t consulted 
from an extemal provider prior to the M&A, was maintained for some time to smooth the 
transition into Roche's HR and establish an intemal local HR manager. However, all these 
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employees were fully embedded in Roche' s global support function organisations, thereby 
operating as localised counterpa1ts with double repmting lines (Umafia, 2020). 
In line with Roche's R&D philosophy, Glycart was granted a high level of operational 
autonomy and, therefore, established as a self-contained innovation centre and, later, as a centre 
of excellence. Umafia's leadership was maintained and all employees remained located in 
Schlieren, thereby protecting pre-established relationships and the modus operandi within the 
company. Moreover, Glycart was given a high degree of independence, which allowed it to 
retain its entrepreneurial spirit and biotech culture (Umafia, 2020). Consequently, the biotech 
know-how was not only preserved, but also allowed to flourish and expand. 
To facilitate knowledge transfer, Glycait started to closely interact with other parts of 
Roche from the ve1y beginning. Its employees quickly became pa1t of global joint research 
teams, collaborating with the other innovation centres and R&D functions across the globe. 
Moreover, Glyca1t employees remained involved in later-stage value chain steps to fu1ther 
suppo1t knowledge sharing. Similarly, employees from other global pRED functions were co-
located with Glycait to facilitate an improved collaboration. Finally, Roche and Glycait 
employees had the possibility of redeployment in both directions (Umafia, 2020). These 
measures not only enabled knowledge transfer, but also aided in the process of cultural 
approximation and identification with Roche as a parent organisation. 
Conclusively, Glycait was integrated as an autonomous and self-contained innovation 
centre to preserve its biotech know-how and culture, while operating veiy interactively with 
other paits of Roche to facilitate proper knowledge transfer and amalgamation, especially as 
Glyca1t broadened its research breadth and strengthened its expe1tise in immunotherapy. 
6.1.2.2 Integration Management 
Tue integration planning commenced in the later stages of the negotiation phase, once it became 
ce1tain that Roche was the prefened suitor and that the companies would enter into an M&A 
agreement. Before the closing of the acquisition, a high-level integration strategy was 
fo1m ulated, covering broader-te1m aspects, such as the trial period, the organisational 
integration, the ways of working within Roche, and the future task ai·eas of Glycait. After the 
acquisition agreement was signed, an immediate planning of all the detailed integration aspects 
occmTed (Umafia, 2020). Hence, early strategic preparation for the integration phase was given. 
For the integration management, a dedicated integration taskforce compromising both 
Glyca1t and Roche representatives was fo1med to coordinate all aspects of the integration. The 
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integration responsibilities were clearly assigned and both parties were involved as equal 
partners. Some of Glyca1t' s pre-acquisition collaboration contacts from Roche, which already 
took pait in the due diligence, joined the integration taskforce (Umaila, 2020). From Roche' s 
side, the integration management was especially supported by the involvement of a key figure, 
namely the head of R&D at Roche. According to Umaila (2020), he was ve1y committed to 
Roche' s philosophy of maintaining diversity and achieving a balance between independence 
and coordination. He therefore ensured a clear vision and alignment in the top management on 
what the spirit of Glycart's integration should be. He also provided Umafia with direct access 
to him and helped in resolving issues during the integration phase (Umaila, 2020). Moreover, 
Umafia' s retention and engagement in the integration planning and management arguably 
ensured the suppo1t of the target's key promoter. Conclusively, the integration management 
allowed for the involvement of leading figures from both companies and the integration 
responsibilities were clearly assigned and institutionalised. 
The integration process was managed with proper progress monitoring and complete 
transparency. The integration on both the st:rategic as well as operative level proceeded 
according to plan and without major challenges. Regular repmts had tobe given to govemance 
bodies in Roche for progress tracking. The overall alignment at the top level and clear 
communication of a shai·ed vision for Glycait's role within Roche fostered commitment and 
clarity towards the integration plan as well as a swift resolution of potential integration 
roadblocks. Talent management and knowledge transfer were especially enabled through the 
collaborative nature during the integration management as well as more generally through the 
creation of global joint teams and the redeployment opportunities within Roche (Umaila, 2020). 
The strategic decision to stipulate a two-year trial period was arguably also 
advantageous for the integration management. On the one hand, it hindered any disrnption to 
Glycart's day-to-day operations and facilitated a focused and prioritised team effo1t on project 
advancement. On the other hand, it provided both paities with the time and room to become 
acquainted, recognise additional synergies, and develop ideas for Glycart' s future role in the 
company. Despite having the potential of causing unceliainty among Glycaii employees, 
Roche's transparent and committed behaviour mitigated this risk early on (Umaila, 2020). In 
addition, it arguably also suppo1ted the integration monitoring in that it established some form 
of timeline, milestones, and post-acquisition review. Therefore, the prolonging of the 
integration process through this trial period benefited resource management and project 
monitoring. 
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Shortly after the trial period, Glyca1t proposed a plan to expand its research operations 
and diversify its expe1tise in cancer immunotherapy. This gave way to the organic growth and 
fmther integration of Glyca1t within Roche' s R&D organisation. This process was mainly 
driven by Glycart, but strongly facilitated by Roche' s management, which displayed openness 
and suppo1t towards the company ' s ideas and ambitions (Umafia, 2020). Umafia (2020) states 
that "at the high level, there was always this vision of making the most of the collaboration." 
6.1.2.3 Value Creation 
Tue acquisition of Glyca1t by Roche offered plenty of sources for value creation, which were 
exploited during the post-merger integration phase. 
Tue combination of the two companies provided already synergistic effects purely on 
the basis of value chain management. By integrating Glycart as an innovation centre, the 
company could continue to focus on its core competencies in R&D, while benefiting from 
Roche' s complementaiy and superior expertise in the value chain steps of clinical development, 
manufactming, and marketing and sales (Umafia, 2020). Moreover, Glycait' s R&D efforts were 
fmther supported by an improved access to funding, infrastrnctme, and supplementaiy 
knowledge within Roche. Through the combined value chain expe1tise, the success probability 
and eventual market potential of Glycait' s drng discovery programs were enhanced. The 
addition of Glyca1t' s innovation prowess also raised Roche' s chances of finding new promising 
drng candidates for its R&D pipeline (Uma.fia, 2020). This, in turn, could potentially offset 
some of the big phaima's productivity and overcapacity issues. When focusing only on R&D, 
the addition of Glycart' s experiise, technologies, and serv ices also benefited other projects of 
Roche, especially due to the collaborative nature of Roche's R&D organisation, which actively 
promotes knowledge shai-ing and cross-feriilisation of ideas (Umafia, 2020). Hence, the overall 
innovation power of Roche's R&D organisation was increased. In sum, the combinational 
synergy potential of the acquisition was exploited through an optimal division of work based 
on the respective value chain expertise and a culture of collaboration in R&D. 
Moreover, the integration of Glycait as a new pRED Innovation Center and Center of 
Excellence for Cancer Immunotherapy further expanded Roche' s capabilities in biotechnology 
and to some degree transfmmed its approach to oncology research and drng development 
(Umafia, 2020). The transfo1m ation began with the application of the GlycoMab technology for 
other R&D projects and increased through Glycait's in-house provision of the protein-
engineering service and particularly through its expanding expertise in cancer immunotherapy. 
According to Uma.fia (2020), "at that time the cancer immunotherapy field was just staiting to 
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emerge, but today, it is one of the hortest areas in the field." The transfonnation is further 
reflected in Glycart' s contribution to Roche's pRED pipeline. Umaiia (2020) highlights that 
"within the pRED pai1 of the organisation, which is one third of the organisation, cancer 
immunotherapy has a major part of the oncology po11folio, and we are mainly responsible for 
that." He fu11her elaborates that "a lot of the strategy and the drng candidates cmTently in the 
pipeline for cancer immunotherapy have been born out of this original effort from Glyca11." 
Consequently, transfmmative synergies between the companies were also successfully 
explored. 
In addition, Glyca11's expansion in R&D expertise allowed the company to grow its 
employee base by a factor of six. Moreover, through Roche's support of Glycart' s 
entrepreneurial endeavours, the company was able to develop into a designated centre of 
excellence (Umaiia, 2020). Umaiia (2020) states, "it has been a huge catalyst. Being pa11 of 
Roche has allowed us to grow tremendously and to pursue new ideas." This growth was 
facilitated through Glyca11's dual integration into pRED and the Large Molecule Research 
organisation, the establishment of global joint teams, the achievement of an optimum balance 
between collaboration and autonomy as well as the strategic alignment on exploiting the füll 
value potential of the M&A (Umaiia, 2020). The integration of Glyca1t also created new 
customer value in that the combined eff011s that allow "to bring meaningful new potential 
treatment options for patients in need" (Umaiia, 2020). Especially due to Roche's philosophy 
of diversity in R&D, the combined companies have increased their innovative capacity and 
therefore better chances to develop new research ideas which could result in differentiated novel 
treatments. 
Conclusively, synergies and growth dynamics were effectively exploited. Moreover, 
any value destrnction and impailment of organisational eff ectiveness was successfully avoided 
by integrating Glycart as separate R&D site, granting it autonomy in its R&D activities, 
prese1ving its biotech know-how and culture, and nmturing its entrepreneurial spi.rit. Moreover, 
by fostering a strategic alignment among the top management on Glycart' s mission and the 
ilnp011ance of preserving its innovativeness, the biotech stai1-up managed to maintain its 
independence and distinctiveness throughout several R&D reorganisations and discussions on 
a potential consolidation with Roche's Basel site (Umaiia, 2020). 
Finally, the integration of Glycar1 enabled Roche to achieve its sho11-te1m M&A motive 
( access innovations of Glycar1) and long-te1m M&A motive ( access innovative capacity 
of Glycar1). 
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6. 1.3 Case Assessment: Post-Merger Integration Success Factors 
The analysis revealed that nearly all PMI SFs were present in the case of Glyca1t and Roche: 
Appropriate Depth oflntegration (B) Leading Figures (A) 
H)brid Integration Approach according to Value · tutionalise Integiation Office 
Chain Segmentation: R&D vs Non-R&D (C) Responsibility(B) --·--------------> Discove,y to PoC (R&D 1/2) Availability ofResources (A) 
> PoC to Regulatory Approval (R&D 2/2) - Take Care ofTalents (B) 
Syoergy Exploitation (A) 
Implement Perfomiance Transfomiation (B) 
1 IExpioit the Momentum of Change (A) 
Exploit Grnwth Dynamics (B) 
--·----------------------------------------+--+- --------1---+-- -----------+---i 
> Manufacturing, Marketing/Sales (Non-R&D) Proj ect Management(A} 
~- -~::·;~ons (Non-R&D) 1--=··,Introduce Integration Monitoring (B) 
Preservation Strategy in R&D: Biotech Autonomy 1 
& Know-How Protection (C) 
Absotption Strategyin Non-R&D: Control of 
Phamia & Knowledge Transfer (C) 
Tbeoretical Integration Success Frameworks: 
(A) Five Factors that Malre or Break an Integration Project (Bergamo & Braun, 201&) 
(B) Performance Transformation Concept (Bergamo & Braun, 2018) 
(C) Hybrid Integration Approach Framework (Schweizer, 2005b) 
Achievemen! ofShort-TmnMotive: Innovations 
Knowledge Transfer (C) 
1
- Achievemen! ofl.ong-Tean Motive: Innovative 
Capaity by Know-How Preservation (C) 
applied 
- partially applied 
X mtapplied 
Table 9: Consolidated PMI SFs FrameworkAssessment: GlycArt and Roche. Own Creation. 
The two moderating aspects of the hybrid integration approach framework are that the 
later-stage R&D activities were fully controlled by Roche and that Glycait retained its localised 
support function management. However, these are only small deviations from the prototypical 
value chain segmentation proposed by Schweizer (2005b ), which, by design, allows adaptations 
according to the context of the M&A and the know-how of the biotech company. In sum, the 
post-merger integration of Glyca1t into Roche can be considered exempla1y andin line with the 
prescribed themy, which has ce1tainly pathed the way to the successful outcome of the M&A. 
In addition, other important best practices that have greatly contributed to the success 
of the post-merger integration could be identified through the case study. These factors have 
been touched upon in the theory , but are not fully accounted for by the theoretical PMI SFs 
which were reviewed. Firstly, Glyca1t and Roche have early on aligned and committed to a 
shared vision on genuine value exploration by the protection of diversity in research, which was 
maintained dming and after the integration phase as well as demonstrated and reaffnmed on 
top management levels. Secondly, the integration of Glycart into Roche has achieved an 
optimum balance between autonomy and coordination as well as individualism and 
collectivism. This was facilitated by allowing Glycait to retain its independence and cultural 
distinctness, while also creating opportunities for collaboration and cultural amalgamation. 
Thirdly, Roche 's openness towards new value propositions not only preserved Glycait' s spirit, 
but actively encouraged and nmtured its entrepreneurialism, making the integration a catalyst 
for growth and new value creation. Finally, the case study also finds strong evidence for the 
need of early strategic preparation. 
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6.2 ESBATech AG and Alcon/Novartis 
6.2.1 Contextual Analysis 
6.2.1.1 Pre-Acquisition Context 
ESBATech AG (henceforth "ESBATech"), a privately held Swiss biotech start-up, originated 
as a spin-off from the Institute of Molecular Biology of the University of Zurich in 1998 after 
its founders, Dominik Escher (CEO), Adrian Escher (CFO), and Alcide Barberis (CSO), had 
competed in the ETH/McKinsey business plan competition of the same year (Escher & 
Barberis, 2000). Until 2008, the Zurich-based company had received the Commission for 
Technology and Innovation (CTD Sta1i-Up Label, gone through several financing rounds (total 
capital raised: CHF 88.5 million), moved its location to Schlieren, and grown from six to 
approximately 50 employees (Barberis, 2018; Escher, 2011; NZZ, 2009). 
ESBATech specialised in the field of "yeast-based functional genomics and drng 
discove1y" from target identification to lead optimisation for various therapeutic applications 
(Escher & Barberis, 2000, p. 173). The company had developed several platfo1m technologies 
for functional genomics and lead generation. ESBATech's approach of using its yeast-based 
technology platforms for screening potential target genes allowed a rapid and reliable 
identification and validation of stable and effective lead compounds (Escher & Barberis, 2000). 
Over time, ESBATech staried to increasingly concentrate on the drng development of its highly 
stable and soluble fully human single-chain antibody fragments, which were selected using its 
proprietary single-chain antibody frameworks (Barberis, 2018; LUMITOS, n.d.). fu 2002, 
ESBATech therefore decided to split its business operations into two units (antibody program 
and small molecule program) and, in 2006, to spin-off its small molecule unit into a separ·ate 
company, Oncalis AG, led by Alcide Barberis. ESBATech hencefmth focused on antibody drng 
development in the fields of ophthalmology, rheumatology, and respiratmy diseases (Barberis, 
2018, 2020; ESBATech, 2006). The company had several drug candidates in the preclinical and 
clinical pipeline, including its lead comounds ESBA105 (anti-TNF-alpha), ESBA1008 (anti-
VEGF), and ESBA903 ( anti-VEGF) (Escher, 2011; Monis, 2008). 
ESBATech was completely focused on R&D. In 1999, it had entered into an early 
research collaboration with Roche for the validation of a potential target gene in Alzheimer's 
disease, which was completed in 2001. Thereafter, the company decided to concentrate its 
efforts on its own proprietary R&D portfolio and did not pursue any fuither collaborations. 
Thus, ESBATech did not generate any revenues at the point of acquisition and relied on its VC 
funding for financing its cmporate and drng discovery activities (Escher, 2020). 
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6.2.1.2 Acquisition: Deal and Motive 
The acquisition of ESBATech by Alcon, Inc. (hencef011h "Alcon") for a price of USD 150 
million in cash and an additional contingent payment ofup to USD 439 million was announced 
on 13 September 2009 and completed sho11ly afterwards. The acquisition agreement included 
the rights to ESBATech' s technology for application in ophthalmology, while non-ophthalmic 
rights were retained by ESBATech' s shareholders and spun-off into a new company, Delenex 
Therapeutics AG, which was acquired by Cell Medica in 2016. Upon acquisition, Dominik 
Escher remained as head ofESBATech and substantially all of the company ' s employees joined 
Alcon (Alcon, 2009b; Barberis, 2018; Escher, 2011). At the time of ESBATech' s acquisition, 
Alcon was owned by Nestle SA with a 52% majority controlling-interest and Novai1is AG 
(hencefo11h ' 'Novai1is") with a 25% minority stake (NZZ, 2009). 
Dominik Escher (2020, Appendix 10.5 .2) reveals that "the acquisition was driven by 
our financial need." In 2009, ESBATech was advancing three drng candidates through clinical 
development for which it required additional capital (Barberis, 2020; Escher, 2020). The 
biotech stai1-up had already been affected by an unfavourable investment climate during its 
prior financing rounds (2001 and 2006) due to the events of 9/11 and the tech bubble hurst. 
Similarly, in 2009, the repercussions ofthe financial crisis compromised the company 's original 
plan of an IPO and pushed it to screen the market for a potential buyer (Escher, 2020). Escher 
(2020) adds that " [ w ]e, on purpose, only wanted to do a trade sale with a franchise deal." While 
evoking the interest of multiple potential buyers, Alcon provided the best strategic fit for the 
company and the proposed transaction strncture owing to its specialisation in ophthalmology 
and global leadership in the eye disease market (Bai·beris, 2020; Escher, 2020). Upon M&A 
announcement, Escher (as cited in Alcon, 2009b) stated, "[a]ll of us at ESBATech are excited 
to join with Alcon to advance this technology fmther and to develop products to treat serious 
eye diseases so that more patients can see better." 
Alcon' s then-CEO Kevin Buehler (as cited in Alcon, 2009b) stated, "[t]his acquisition 
is part of our ongoing strategy to enhance access to multiple sources of technologies and 
compounds that bolster our total research platfonn in supp011 of innovative products to treat 
eye disease." The acquisition of ESBATech gave Alcon access to the company ' s technology 
platfonns, its ophthalmic R&D pipeline as well as its expe11ise in biotechnology. In 
combination with Alcon' s own expertise and capabilities in clinical development and 
commercialisation, the acquisition was anticipated to solidify Alcon' s leadership in 
ophthalmology (Alcon, 2009b; Barberis, 2020; Escher, 2020). Buehler (as cited in Alcon, 
2009b) fmther indicated that the ESBATech team "will become the foundation of Alcon's 
Francy Grnbenmann 53 
Phanna Post-Merger Integration- Success Factors aind Best Practices in the Integration ofSwiss Biotech 
Sta1t-ups 
biologics capability in the füture." Escher (2020) confinns that Alcon "had no biologics [ .. . ] 
and they had to move into that field because it was a huge growing field in eye diseases." 
Alcon's business segments at that time were Surgical, Phaimaceuticals, and Consumer (Alcon, 
2009a). In this respect, Escher (2020) elaborates that "in the phaima sector, which, from a 
financial point of view, was the most impo1tant one for Alcon, they completely lacked 
innovation." Additionally, the M&A with ESBATech allowed Alcon to exploit the füll potential 
of its collaboration with AstraZeneca on screening the latter's drng libraries (Alcon, 2009a). 
On 15 December 2010, Novartis announced that it had agreed to a merger with Alcon, 
by which it would acquire the remaining 23% of Alcon's outstanding shai·es for USD 12.9 
billion, having already acquired Nestle's 77% majority stake in 2008/2010 for a cumulative 
amount of USD 38.7 billion. The acquisition of Alcon' s füll ownership was completed on 8 
April 2011. Through this event, ESBATech transitioned from "ESBATech, an Alcon 
Biomedical Research Unit" to "ESBATech, a Novaitis company" (Novartis, 2010b, 2012, 
2013). 
The acquisition of Alcon was in line with Novaitis' strategy of diversification. Novaitis' 
then-CEO Daniel Vasella (as cited in Nova1tis , 2010a) stated, "[t]he addition of Alcon will 
strategically strengthen our healthcare po1tfolio and our position in eye care, a sector with 
dynamic growth [ . .. ]. lt will also allow us to strengthen innovation power by combining R&D 
eff01ts and grow our global market presence thanks to our complementaiy product p01tfolios." 
Buehler ( as cited in Nova1tis, 201 Oe, p. 1 ), who remained as the leader of the new Alcon division 
within Nova1tis, added that "[t]he combination of Alcon's deep understanding of the eye care 
specialty and the broad expe1tise and scale of Novaitis will address viitually all key ai·eas of 
eye care and position the Alcon business unit for faster growth." After the merger, Buehler ( as 
cited in Thomson Financial & ASC, 2011) stated that both Alcon and Novaitis see ESBATech 
as an opp01tunity to provide "a way to improve upon Lucentis clinical perfo1mance" as well as 
"to get between three and five fragments each yeai· against targeted areas." Lucentis is an anti-
VEGF antibody blockbusters drng for age-related maculai· degeneration (AMD) that Novaitis 
in-licenses from Genentech (Thomson Financial & ASC, 2011). Hence, both sh01t- and long-
te1m M&A motives are given for Alcon as weil as Nova1tis. 
6.2.1.3 Post-Acquisition Context 
Nowadays, ESBATech, a Novaitis Company LLC, is pa1t of the Novaitis Institutes of 
BioMedical Research (NIBR) . Novaitis maintains two R&D units, NIBR (drng discove1y) and 
Global Drng Development ( clinical development/pipeline po1tfolio management). The 
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remaining cross-divisional organisational units of the company are Nova1tis Technical 
Operations (manufacturing) and Nova1tis Business Se1vices (supp01t functions). Besides NIBR, 
Nova1tis conducts research at the Novaitis Institute for Tropical Diseases, the Friedrich 
Miescher Institute for Biomedical Research, and the Genomics Institute of Nova1tis Research 
Foundation (Nova1tis, n.d.-a, 2020). 
Until 2015, NIBR consisted of several R&D sites located in Switzerland, the United 
States, Singapore, and China. In October 2016, however, Novaitis decided for a new strategic 
plan in order to create a more unified and centralised research group within NIBR, establishing 
Basel (CH) and Cambridge (US) as consolidated centres of excellence. The decision for 
strategic redirection resulted from James Bradner' s appointment as new president of NIBR. 
Today, the NIBR unit is staffed with approximately 6,000 employees and has five research 
locations, nainely Basel, Cambridge, East Hanover (US), Eme1yville (US), and Shanghai 
(China) (Novartis, n.d.-b, 2017; Swiss Broadcasting Corporation, 2016). 
In early 2016, Dominik Escher resigned from his position as head ofESBATech in order 
to pursue new oppo1tunities (Escher, 2020). Later that year, Novaitis (2017, p. 58) announced 
as pait of its reorganisation plan "to close ESBATech, a biologics group in Schlieren, 
Switzerland, subject to all appropriate consultation." The consolidation of ESBATech into 
Nova1tis' Basel research site included a layoff of 73 ESBATech employees as weil as an 
increased tumover with employees deciding to pursue new opp01tunities outside of Novaitis 
(Escher, 2020; Miller, 2016). According to Escher (2020), only two ESBATech employees have 
remained with Novaitis to this date, while the operations of ESBATech, including its 
proprietaiy technology and drng candidate po1tfolio, are continued by NIBR in Basel. 
Moreover, on 28 Febrna1y 2019, Novaitis announced the spin-off of its Alcon division. As of 
8 April 2019, Alcon becaine once again a public entity with focus on only two franchises, 
Surgical and Vision Care. Nova1tis, on the other hand, kept the ophthabnic pha1maceuticals 
p01tfolio as pa1t of its Novaitis Innovative Medicine Division, which included ESBATech's 
drng candidate pipeline (Alcon, 2019; Novartis, 2020). 
ESBATech's lead candidate ESBA1008 (Brolucizumab, labelled RTH258 by Novartis) 
was successfully launched to the market (Escher, 2011; Novaitis, 2020). After the remaining 
clinical trial under Alcon and Novartis, Brolucizumab was approved in 2019 by the FDA and 
in 2020 by the EMA for the treatment of wet AMD (EMA, 2020; FDA, 2019). The FDA granted 
Brolucizumab the approval on the first cycle of review as a novel drng without special 
designations (FDA, 2020). Brolucizumab is cunently in clinical phase 3 for three additional 
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indications: diabetic macular edema, retinal vein occlusion, and diabetic retinopathy. 
Brolucizumab is sold as a prescription drug under the brand name Beovu (Nova1tis, 2019). 
Before its approval, Beovu was ranked among the ten most valuable R&D projects based on 
net present value and forecasted to achieve sales of USD 1.3 billion in 2024, therefore having 
blockbuster potential (EvaluatePha1m a, 2019). At the end of 2019, the product generated USD 
35 million in sales , having been on the U.S. market for only four months (Novrutis, 2020). 
6.2.2 Post-Merger Integration Analysis 
6.2.2.1 Integration Strategy 
In 2009, Alcon pursued different strategies to boost its R&D capabilities, including external 
knowledge sourcing and targeted acquisitions. Alcon's R&D organisation was staffed with 
approximately 1,800 employees and centrally operated from Fort W01th, Texas. Alcon's 
approach to structuring its research activities followed the concept of centres of excellence with 
respective focus on the business segments of pha1maceuticals, surgical, and consumer products 
(Alcon, 2009a, 2009c). According to Escher (2020), Alcon's ophthalmic phrum aceutical 
research team consisted of 120 scientists based in Fo1t Wort h. 
Upon acquisition, ESBATech became a Biomedical Research Unit of Alcon and was 
fully embedded in the Alcon R&D organisation. As Alcon did not possess own biotechnology 
capabilities, ESBATech became the company's principal biologics site. The company 
continued to focus on its existing R&D p01tfolio and research activities, applying its single-
chain antibody framework technology for the development of ophthalmic pham1aceuticals. 
ESBA Tech ' s core competency lay in the early-stage value chain steps. Hence, upon acquisition 
by Alcon, the company continued to manage the initial parts of the drug discovery process for 
its product candidates, from early research to clinical PoC. As ESBATech only had limited 
capabilities in clinical development, Alcon was responsible for the later-stage value chain steps, 
from clinical phase 2b to commercialisation. In regard to supporting functions, ESBATech 
adopted the systems and processes of Alcon (Barberis, 2020; Escher, 2020). 
The organisational integration of ESBATech into Alcon was designed to support and 
safeguard the biotech's ongoing operations as well as to sustain its long-term innovative 
capacity. Consequently, ESBATech was granted a high level of operational autonomy and 
established as a self-contained Biomedical Research Unit. Escher's leadership was maintained, 
and all employees remained located in Schlieren, thereby protecting pre-established 
relationships and the modus operandi within the company. By keeping ESBATech at a1ms-
length and providing it with great independence, the retention of the company's entrepreneurial 
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spirit and local biotech culture was ensured (Barberis, 2020; Escher, 2020). This was especially 
beneficial due to the dramatic cultural differences between Alcon' s traditional phaima R&D 
organisation in Texas and the Swiss biotech stalt-up. Moreover, under Alcon, ESBATech grew 
its employee base to approximately 85 researchers (Escher, 2020). Consequently, the biotech 
know-how was preserved and potentially even expanded. 
To leverage knowledge synergies, Alcon promoted cross-functional collaboration in its 
R&D organisation (Alcon, 2019). In the case ofESBATech, several mechanisms ofknowledge 
transfer were applied. Escher joined the global R&D leadership team of Alcon and was in 
constant contact with the central research facility in Fort Worth. Moreover, to suppmi 
ESBATech in its clinical trials, an Alcon employee was relocated to Schlieren for a two-yeai· 
period. This person further served as a link to the clinical development teams at Alcon, whose 
resources and capabilities ESBATech was free to access (Escher, 2020). Consequently, 
knowledge transfer was enabled. 
In 2011, ESBATech became a subsidiaiy ofNovaitis through the latter's merger with 
Alcon. Hence, ESBATech, as a legal entity, was integrated into Nova11is Phaima Switzerland 
(Escher, 2020). The merger fu1ther included the embedding of Alcon's pha1maceutical R&D 
operations into NIBR. As a result, Alcon's ophthalmology disease research group as well as 
ESBA Tech were integrated into the ophthalmology division of NIBR, which comprised 
roughly 30 employees at that time (Escher, 2020; Nova1iis, 2013). According to Escher (2020), 
the strategy was to create "an organisation where all the different parts were continuing to do 
research and were equally distributed." Under Novariis, ESBATech continued to work on its 
own antibody programs using its proprieta1y technology. Moreover, ESBATech's value chain 
coverage perfectly matched the one of NIBR, which is responsible for the initial pa11s of the 
drng discovery process within Novariis, that is early research to clinical PoC. Therefore, 
ESBATech's focus on early R&D was maintained. The value chain activities of late-clinical 
development, manufacturing, and marketing and sales were taken over by Novaiiis. In regard 
to supporting functions (IT, HR, Finance), ESBATech fully adopted systems and processes of 
Nova1iis, but kept its local HR manager (EscheT, 2020). 
After the M&A with Nova1iis, ESBATech remained under Escher's leadership and was 
operated as a self-contained NIBR research location in Schlieren, thereby protecting pre-
established relationships. With ESBATech becoming a Swiss subsidiary of Novariis, Escher 
further joined the executive management of Nova1iis Pha1ma Switzerland (Escher, 2020). 
Nova1iis' overall integration strategy, however, aimed for füll control (Barberis, 2020). Escher 
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(2020) highlights that "Novartis had a culture to really completely integrate and make 
eveiything flat. " Hence, ESBATech was granted only limited operational autonomy and could 
not keep its modus operandi and entrepreneurial spirit. This resulted in an increased tumover 
within ESBATech after the M&A (Barbelis, 2020; Escher, 2020). Consequently, the biotech 
culture as well as specific know-how was not successfully prese1ved. Knowledge transfer, on 
the other hand, was enabled to some extent through the redeployment opportunities at Novaitis, 
whereby some people of ESBATech temporarily joined other research groups within NIBR. 
Conclusively, Alcon integrated ESBATech as an autonomous and self-contained R&D 
unit to preserve its biotech know-how and culture, while facilitating knowledge transfer 
opp01tunities for the advancement of ESBATech's drng candidate pipeline. Novaitis, on the 
other hand, maintained ESBATech as a self-contained R&D unit, but pursued a degree of 
integration that hindered the prese1vation of the company's biotech know-how and culture in 
the long rnn. According to Escher (2020), ESBATech was well embedded within Nova1tis in 
2016. Tue consolidation of ESBATech' s operations into Nova1tis ' R&D unit in Basel, however, 
did not resonate well with the employees and resulted in an unexpected tumover (Barberis, 
2020; Escher, 2020). With only a handful of ESBATech employees transfen-ing to Basel, the 
reorganisation caused a loss of ESBATech's biotech know-how and culture, the source of its 
innovativeness. 
6.2.2.2 Integration Management 
Tue integration planning with Alcon was initiated ve1y eai·ly in the M&A process, with 
ESBA Tech making proactive proposals on how to integrate into Alcon already at the beginning 
of the negotiation phase. A concrete PMI business plan was then drafted during the due 
diligence and in place well before the signing of the M&A. Besides detailing the strategy for 
the integration, the business plan also plotted a steady future growth for ESBA Tech in 
conjunction with a sizable investment from Alcon for optimisations ofESBATech's R&D. Both 
Alcon and ESBATech had aligned early on a shared vision. In the case ofNovartis, on the other 
hand, the integration planning with Alcon failed to account for ESBATech, and the Swiss 
biotech had to eventually drive the process once the takeover was completed (Escher, 2020). 
Escher (2020) states, "we felt as being in the vacuum." Hence, early strategic preparation is 
given in the case of Alcon, but not in the case ofNovaitis. 
The integration of ESBATech into Alcon was managed in a ve1y organised and 
committed manner, with a dedicated integration team in place and staffed by representatives of 
both pa1ties (Escher, 2020). Leading figures from ESBATech and Alcon were involved early 
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on and continued to support the integration during the whole process. Escher (2020) emphasises 
that Alcon was ve1y motivated to successfully integrate the company and that they "had the füll 
attention from all the management levels." This is fmther exemplified by the early visit of the 
whole executive team of Alcon to ESBATech' s facility in Schlieren in order to host a combined 
town hall. With Nova1tis, on the other hand, the integration management trnnspired in an 
improvised manner and was initiated and driven by ESBATech (Escher, 2020). Escher (2020) 
states, ' 'we had to proactively approach Novartis hundreds of times probably to navigate our 
ways through the integration." Moreover, Escher (2020) explains that the issue was a lack of 
support and alignment in the top management level, as the decision for the M&A with Alcon 
was mainly driven by Daniel Vasella. Escher (2020) elaborates that, as a result, "it was pushed 
down into all the different divisions and functions, and people were not convinced about that 
acquisition." Moreover, Novaitis' then-CEO Joseph Jimenez only visited ESBATech after two 
yeai·s once the company had delivered significant R&D successes, while there was no visit from 
the president of NIBR, Mark Fishman at that time. Eventually, the integration management also 
involved the heads ofNIBR ophthalmology and Alcon (Escher, 2020). Escher' s retention and 
proactive engagement in the management of both integration projects was pivotal and secured 
the suppmt of a key promoter from the target company. Conclusively, for the integration 
management with Alcon, responsibilities were clearly assigned and institutionalised, and the 
project was suppo1ted by leading figures. With Nova1tis, in contrast, there was no clarity on 
integration responsibilities and the process was mainly steered by ESBATech. 
Both resource management and integration monitoring were applied in the case of 
ESBATech' s integration into Alcon. According to Escher (2020), ESBATech and Alcon were 
equally committed to successfully master the integration without disrnpting the biotech' s 
ongoing operations. The prepai·ed business plan accounted for several stages of integration and 
progress was diligently monitored (Escher, 2020). In contrast, the integration of ESBA Tech 
into Novartis was neither prepared nor monitored. Escher (2020) points out that ' 'Novaitis has 
done a couple of acquisitions and I think they probably leamed from how poorly the Alcon 
acquisition was done. [ . .. ] But such integrations are always really difficult, except if you are 
extremely motivated, as Alcon was, then you spend time, money, and energy on that." In both 
cases, Escher as the head of ESBATech joined existing management constellations, and 
oppo1tunities for personnel redeployment were created, thereby facilitating knowledge transfer 
(Escher, 2020). In sum, the integration with Alcon accounted for effective resource 
management and progress monitoring, whereas the one with Novaitis underperfo1med in both 
areas. 
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6.2.2.3 Value Creation 
The acquisition of ESBATech by Alcon and later by Novaitis offered plenty of sources for 
value creation, which were partially exploited during the post-merger integration phase. 
In both integration cases, the combination of the companies ah-eady provided synergistic 
effects purely on the basis ofvalue chain management. By integrating ESBATech as an early 
research site, the company could continue to focus on its core competencies in R&D, while 
benefiting from Alcon's and Nova1tis' complementaiy and superior expe1tise in the value chain 
steps of late-clinical development, manufacturing, and marketing and sales. Moreover, 
ESBATech's R&D effmts were supported by an improved access to capital and resources 
within Alcon and Nova1tis (Escher, 2020). The addition of ESBATech's innovation prowess 
also raised Alcon's and Novaitis' chances of finding new promising drng candidates for the 
R&D pipeline, which could potentially offset some of the productivity issues. According to 
Escher (2020), especially Alcon's R&D organisation had been unsuccessful at generating new 
innovative drngs for its phaimaceutical business segment. In regard to Alcon, Escher (2020) 
states that ESBATech had "a ve1y privileged position in the leadership team. [ ... ] [A]ll our 
programs were approved and went through the pipeline extremely smoothly." ESBATech also 
strengthened the R&D capabilities of Nova1tis. According to Escher (2020), ESBATech ha 
been "contributing 18% of all the biological proof of concepts [ . .. ] of the complete Novaitis 
pipeline since its inception." Given that ESBATech consisted of 90 employees at that time, in 
contrast to the 6,000 NIBR employees, this was quite a sizable achievement (Escher, 2020). 
Hence, the overall innovation power of Alcon's and Nova1tis' R&D was increased, and the 
combinational synergy potential of the M&A was paitially exploited through an optimal 
division of work based on the respective value chain expertise of the companies. 
Neve1theless, Escher (2020) reveals that the two integrations slowed down the 
advancement ofBeovu by approximately two years. According to Escher (2020), ifESBATech 
had managed to go public, then Beovu would have been launched much eai·lier for a smaller 
indication and would most probably have succeeded in the market without the platform of a big 
pha1ma company. Escher (2020) explains that "it is probably a bit special in ophthalmology 
[ ... ] [b ]ut if you can really position your product sma1tly and in a good indication and show 
that it is superior to eve1ything out there, then it goes by its own." This moderates the findings 
on synergy exploitation. 
There is also some evidence found for transfo1mational synergy exploration. For Alcon, 
the addition ofESBATech enabled the company to enter the field ofbiotechnology (Barbe1is, 
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2020; Escher, 2020). Similarly, ESBATech's integration improved on Novartis' existing 
capabilities in biotechnology, evidenced by the contribution to Novartis' biologics pipeline 
(Escher, 2020). Hence, transfo1mative synergies were mainly derived from the integration of 
ESBATech's unique biotech know-how, but were not fully exploited. 
Under Alcon, ESBATech realised some of its business plan and grew its employee base 
by roughly 30 employees (Escher, 2020). Moreover, as paii ofthe agreed business plan, Alcon 
made a significant investment into ESBATech to optimise and automate some paiis of the 
research activities (Escher, 2020). This business plan, however, was not fu1iher pursued in this 
way under Nova1iis. Moreover, in 2016, an opportunity for growth and additional value creation 
was missed by Nova1iis. Escher (2020) reveals that he was contacted by Bradner before the 
announcement of the company' s relocation and proposed to him "that ESBATech could be used 
as a unit which has special expe1iise for so-called difficult proteins or non-alternative protein 
fo1mats. And he feit it is a ve1y good idea, but obviously the board had already decided." 
In sum, the integration of ESBATech into Novartis and the subsequent collaboration 
failed in realising the füll value potential of the acquisition. In fact, it could even be seen as a 
destrnction of ESBATech's pre-acquisition value (Barberis, 2020; Escher, 2020). Novaitis' 
approach to the integration ofESBATech did not resonate well with the employees and changed 
the culture and modus operandi of the entrepreneurial biotech. Moreover, Novartis' behaviour 
towards ESBATech during the PMI phase might have contributed to the lack of cultural 
approximation and strategic alignment between the companies. As a result, employee turnover 
started to increase, especiaUy after the closing of ESBATech 's facility in Schlieren. Escher 
(2020) indicates that "[i]t was a complete destmction of all the know-how, which they were not 
anticipating at that range." This might also imply that Novaitis did not fully comprehend the 
needs and values of ESBATech's employees. Escher (2020) concludes that "[i]f you make 
eve1ything flat and integrate completely, as in the case ofNovartis, I think that never goes well. 
You lose the spirit, the people, and the innovation." Barberis (2020, Appendix 10.5 .3) confnms 
that "the specific know-how and the technology got lost or is at least not as active as it used to 
be." The main customer value derived from the M&A to this date seems to be Beovu, but 
whether Novartis manages to generate more innovation from ESBATech's technology in the 
future remains to be seen. Conclusively, the exploitation of growth dynamics was initiated 
during the integration into Alcon, but not continued by Novaiiis. The M&A motive 
achievement for Alcon was intenupted by the merger with Novaitis. While the sho1i-te1m 
motive of accessing ESBATech's innovations was realised by Nova1iis, the long-te1m motive 
of accessing ESBATech's innovative capacity was not achieved. 
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6.2.3 Case Assessment: Post-Merger Integration Success Factors 
The analysis revealed that most PMI SFs were present in the case of ESBATech and Alcon, 
whilst only a few were found in the case ofESBATech and Novaitis. 
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Similar to the case study of Glycait and Roche, the realisation of the hybrid integration 
approach is slightly moderated through the absorption of ESBATech's later-stage R&D 
activities, but othe1wise given. While Alcon implemented the prese1vation strategy for R&D, 
Nova1tis aimed for füll control without consideration for the biotech know-how ofESBATech. 
Moreover, while ESBATech's integration into Alcon was successfül andin line with the SFs 
for integration management, the subsequent integration into Nova1iis did hardly comply with 
the PMI SFs in this dimension and only pa1tially fülfilled the SFs on leading figures and taking 
care of talents. Finally, both PMI cases moderately applied the PMI SFs for value creation, 
especially conceming proper synergy exploitation and füll capitalisation on the specific biotech 
know-how ofESBATech. In sum, the integration ofESBATech into Alcon was successfül and 
mostly in line with the prescribed theo1y, while the integration ofESBATech into Novaitis was 
unsuccessfül, which certainly can be attributed to the missed application of the PMI SFs. 
Several additional factors can be identified which have led to integration success or 
failure, namely a (lack of) strategic alignment and commitment to exploiting the füll value 
potential of the M&A and maintaining diversity in research as well as a (lack of) early strategic 
preparation. Moreover, the faulty PMI by Novartis can be associated with overlooking the 
dissonance ofESBATech with the limitation of its independence, autonomy, and individualism, 
neglecting to create a sense of "togethemess" for bridging cultural differences, and neglecting 
the entrepreneurial spirit of ESBATech and its employees. Interestingly, both Escher (2020) 
and Bai·beris (2020) have referenced Roche and Glyca1t as a PMI success st01y. 
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6.3 Actelion Ltd. and Johnson & Johnson 
6.3.1 Contextual Analysis 
6.3.1.1 Pre-Acquisition Context 
Actelion Ltd. (hencefor1h "Actelion"), a publicly held Swiss biotech company, originated as a 
spin-off from Roche in 1997 after its founders, Jean-Paul Clozel (CEO), Martine Clozel (CSO), 
Walter Fischli, and Thomas Widmann, decided to leave their former employer in order to 
continue the drug development of endothelin receptor antagonists (ERA), targeted at the 
treatment of pulmonary arierial hyper1ension (P AH). ERA was first discovered by Martine 
Clozel in the mid-1980s. Andre J. Muller joined the team as a fi:fth founding member. Until 
1998, the Swiss biotech start-up had completed a financing round, which included a syndicate 
of venture capitalists, and established its location in Allschwil, Basel. As the previous R&D 
work was done under Roche, Actelion had to initially in-license its drng compounds. In 2000, 
the company decided to underiake an IPO at the Swiss Stock Exchange and was valued at CHF 
1.2 billion. A year· later, the company's first product, Tracleer, was launched to the market 
(Cohen, n.d.). By 2017, Actelion had become a mature biopharmaceutical holding company 
with CHF 2.412 billion in annual sales, making it Europe's largest biotech. As of Febrnary 
2017, the company had a market capitalisation of CHF 27 .6 billion. Remaining headquaiiered 
in Allschwil, under its principal subsidiary Actelion Phaimaceuticals Ltd., the company ftniher 
operated intemationally through 30 affiliates (Actelion, 2017c; Alantra, 2017). 
Actelion specialised in the field of orphan and speciality drngs for the treatment of rai·e 
diseases. lts drng discovery mainly focused on new chemical entities, G-protein coupled 
receptors (GPCRs), aspa1iic proteinases and other enzymes, anti-invectives, and ion channels. 
Actelion had become a worldwide leader in the treatment of P AH. The company had a 
comprehensive PAH franchise tending to all stages of the disease, with pariicular focus on the 
treatment pathways of Endothelin and Prostacyclin. Actelion's PAH portfolio included 
Tracleer, Opsumit, Uptravi, Veletri, and Ventavis. Actelion also had a small speciality pmifolio 
consisting ofValchlor and Zavesca. Tue company 's products were sold worldwide in more than 
50 markets. As of 2017, the company had ten new drng compounds in the pipeline for P AH and 
other therapeutic areas as well as several programs on supplementary indications for Opsumit 
and Uptravi (Actelion, 2017a; Alantra, 2017). 
Actelion was a fully integrated company with a total of 2,644 employees covering all 
imp011ant value chain steps and supporiing functions, namely drng discovery (388 employees), 
clinical development (452 employees), mar·keting and sales (1,443 employees), and corporate 
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functions (341 employees). The company strnctured its business operations into a drng 
discove1y organisation, a development organisation, and a speciality commercial organisation. 
The majority of its R&D activities were ca1Tied out intemally in a centralised research centre 
in Allschwil. For global distribution, marketing, and sales activities, Actelion relied on its 30 
subsidia1ies as well as partner networks for additional market reach. For manufacturing, 
Actelion acted as a vütual biotech in that it outsourced the process to third-party providers, 
namely contract manufacturing organisations (CMOs). Moreover, the company engaged in 
licensing, targeted acquisitions, and strategic partnerships in order to leverage extemal expertise 
and innovation (Actelion, 2017a, 2017b). According to Actelion (2017a, p. 9), it had "become 
a new kind of biophannaceutical company: one that blends biotech's innovation, speed and 
flexibility with big pharma's operating discipline and excellence in execution." 
6.3.1.2 Acquisition: Deal and Motive 
The acquisition of Actelion by an indirect subsidiaiy of Johnson & Johnson (henceforth "J&J"), 
nainely Janssen Holding GmbH (hencefo1th "J anssen"), for a price of USD 30 billion in cash 
was announced on 26 Januaiy 2017. The purchase price represented a 23% preinium (Johnson 
& Johnson & Actelion, n.d.). The deal was the result of exclusive negotiations between the 
pm1ies, which officially commenced in November 2016 (Quest-France, 2016). 
The acquisition agreement included a demerger of Actelion's R&D organisation and 
pipeline into a new subsidiary, R&D NewCo, which was tobe spun-off before the closing of 
the M&A. Accordingly, J&J would only acquire Actelion's commercial organisation and 
related functions, the marketed products, the prograins for supplementaiy indications and 
derivatives of in-mai·ket compounds, and two speciality clinical-stage drng candidates 
(Cadozolid & Ponesünod). R&D NewCo was incorporated as Idorsia Ltd. (hencefo1th 
"Idorsia") on 2 March 2017. Prior to the completion of the M&A, Idorsia shares were 
distributed to existing Actelion shai·eholders. The acquisition agreement further included 
revenue sharing and IP-cross-licensing agreements between Idorsia and Actelion as well as 
collaboration and service agreements between Idorsia and J&J. On 16 June 2017, J&J 
completed the maj01ity shareholding acquisition of Actelion through a public tender offer. 
ConcmTently, Idorsia was spun-off from Actelion and listed on the Swiss Stock Exchange. 
Idorsia was staffed with over 600 employees, had nine drng candidates in the pipeline, and 
maintained its research facilities in co-location with Actelion's headqua1ter operations in 
Allschwil. The company further bad CHF 1 billion in cash, whereof CHF 580 million were 
provided through a conve1tible loan from Cilag Holding AG, a subsidiaiy of J&J. By a paitial 
conversion ofthe loan, J&J received a 9.9% minority stake in Idorsia (Actelion, 2017e; Alantra, 
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2017; Idorsia, 2020a; Johnson & Johnson & Actelion, n.d.). The M&A was followed by a 
squeeze-out of Actelion's minority shareholders on 25 October 2017 and a delisting of the 
company's shares on 7 November 2016 (Actelion, n.d.-c). Upon closing, Actelion' s f01mer 
board and top management left the company and were replaced by a new board with Ludo 
Ooms as Chailman and Jane Gliffiths as Global Head of Actelion (Actelion, 2017d, 2017f). 
Actelion bad been the subject of unsolicited offers several times over the course of its 
history, but consistently rejected the bidders (Quest-France, 2016). Actelion' s CEO Jean-Paul 
Clozel (2016) stated, "I am convinced that we would be less innovative if we were integrated 
within another company." However, he also revealed that "[i]t is very difficult to continually 
innovate in the field of P AH at the same pace - hence our shift towards other therapeutic areas" 
(Clozel, 2016). In the end, it was the unique deal stmcture that convinced Actelion's 
shareholders and management, especially Clozel, due to the "mutually-beneficial nature" 
(Clozel, 2017). Clozel (2017) added that "[t]here was no value destmction. lt is tme that I have 
always claimed I would never sell, but in fine, we didn't sell the company, we were bought. 
J&J made a fair offer that Actelion could not refuse." Through the deal strncture, Clozel could 
maintain Actelion's innovation engine and set out to write another start-up success st01y with 
Idorsia. Jean-PieITe Gamier (as cited in Johnson & Johnson & Actelion, 2017), Chairman of 
Actelion, confirmed that the deal offered unique value in that "shareholders can monetize their 
holdings in Actelion at a highly attractive cash price [ . . . ], while at the same time retaining a 
significant stake in the future potential upside of Actelion's earlier stage pipeline." 
J&J CEO Alex Gorsky (as cited in Johnson & Johnson & Actelion, 2017) stated, 
" [a]dding Actelion's portfolio to our already strong Janssen Pharmaceuticals business is a 
unique opportunity for us to expand our portfolio with leading, differentiated in-market 
medicines and promising late-stage products. We expect to leverage our established global 
presence and commercial strength to accelerate growth and patient access to these important 
therapies." Facing productivity challenges and patent expirations, J&J was eager to settle a deal 
which could provide sufficient revenue growth for its pharmaceutical arm (Crow & Atkins, 
2017). J&J's Pharma Chairman Joacquin Duato (2017) stated, "Actelion will become a new 
growth engine for Johnson & Johnson, immediately improving our sales growth, operating 
margins and earnings per share (EPS)." The M&A also supported J&J's strategy of 
diversification. Through the M&A with Actelion, P AH dir·ectly becan1e the sixth therapeutic 
area of Janssen, with an existing lucrative product portfolio and an established market presence 
through the specialised commercial organisation (Johnson & Johnson, 2017a). According to the 
press release, the deal stmcture would "provide Johnson & Johnson flexibility to accelerate 
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investment in its industly-leading, innovative pipeline to drive additional growth" (Johnson & 
Johnson & Actelion, 2017). Moreover, J&J secured potential financial retums on its 
shareholding in ldorsia and access to certain pipeline programs (Johnson & Johnson & Actelion, 
2017). Thus, the short-term motive is given, and the long-te1m motive might also be present. 
6.3.1.3 Post-Acquisition Context 
Nowadays, Actelion Ltd., a Janssen Phaim aceutical Company of Johnson & Johnson, is pait of 
J&J's Phaimaceuticals division. This division is made up of the Janssen family of companies 
and has six therapeutic areas: cardiovascular and metabolism, immunology, infectious diseases 
and vaccines, neurosciences, oncology, and pulmonaiy hype1tension (PH) (Johnson & Johnson, 
2017b, 2020a). Within Janssen, Actelion is mainly responsible for the PH portfolio with its 
existing P AH franchise. The speciality product Zavesca is still managed by Actelion but 
belongs to the cai·diovascular & metabolism po1tfolio of Janssen. The speciality product 
Valchlor has become pa1t of the oncology portfolio of Janssen but is no longer managed by 
Actelion as the worldwide marketing rights for the product were sold to another company in 
2018 (Actelion, n.d.-b; Janssen, n.d.-a; Verdict Media, 2018). In 2019, the PH po1tfolio of J&J 
achieved USD 2.673 billion in sales, thereby contributing 6.22% to the company's total 
phaimaceutical business sales (Johnson & Johnson, 2020a; Johnson & Johnson & Actelion, 
n.d.). Janssen's late-stage clinical pipeline for PH consists of Actelion's f01mer programs on 
supplementa1y indications for Opsumit and Upti·avi. Of the acquired late-stage speciality drug 
candidates, Ponesimod is in the neuroscience pipeline and cmTently in regisu-ation, while the 
Cadazolid program was stopped (Johnson & Johnson, 2020b; N. P. Taylor, 2018). 
Actelion' s headquaiters remain in Allschwil, under its principal subsidiaiy Actelion 
Phaimaceuticals Ltd. Actelion has also become pa1t of the Switzerland division of Janssen 
(Actelion, 2017 c; Johnson & Johnson, 2017b ). Both Ludo Ooms and Jane Griffiths have retired 
from their roles at Actelion, while Nicholas Franco was named Site Head of Allschwil in August 
2019 (C. Roth Griinenfelder, personal communication, 23 March 2020). As no successors for 
Ooms and Griffiths could be identified in the research, the leadership functions were 
presumably of temporaiy nature and absorbed by Janssen after the integration. While Actelion 
repo1tedly continues to operate internationally through its subsidiaries (Actelion, n.d.-a), J&J 
only lists a total of 15 subsidiaries canying Actelion in the name, which implies that some of 
the affiliates were integrated into other Janssen companies (Johnson & Johnson, 2019). Finally, 
Actelion' s next-door neighbour, Idorsia, continues tobe led by Clozel as CEO and Ganrier as 
Chaiiman. Nowadays, Idorsia is a publicly held clinical-stage biophaimaceutical stait-up with 
a market capitalisation of CHF 3 .9 billion. Moreover, the company has expanded to more than 
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800 employees and is cmTently advancing a pipeline of nine former Actelion drng candidates 
and three new additions (Idorsia, 2020a, 2020b ). 
6.3.2 Post-Merger Integration Analysis 
6.3.2.1 Integration Strategy 
For J&J, M&A is an important source of corporate growth as wel1 as a means for realising its 
strategy of diversification. Albeit tending towards sma11er acquisitions, J&J also explores 
oppo1tunities for value creation with established companies, such as Actelion (Duato, 2017; 
Gorsky, 2017). J&J integrated Actelion as a subsidiaiy into the Janssen family of companies 
and added PH as a sixth core therapeutic area to its Phaimaceuticals division (Johnson & 
Johnson, 2017b). Moreover, J&J's decentralised organisational strnctme aims for innovation 
and customer focus by promoting autonomy and responsibility among its subsidiaries. This 
philosophy also finds reflection in the company's post-merger integration strategy for Actelion 
(Gorsky, 2017). Griffiths (2018) stated, "[a]lthough J&J has acquired Actelion, we want to 
retain our distinctness, while integrating Actelion tobe pait of Janssen and J&J." 
Actelion' s home base in Allschwil was maintained and "designated as the headqua1ters 
for research, sales and business development" for the PH therapeutic area, thereby centralising 
strategic and administrative operations (Ooms, 2019). Preserving the location also allowed J&J 
to establish a presence in the biotech and big phaima hub Basel (Griffiths, 2018; Ooms, 2019). 
According to Griffiths (2018), the customer-facing groups of Actelion were largely retained as 
they were, while minimal rep01ting line changes to Janssen subsidiaries occmTed for Actelion 
affiliates in sma11- to mid-size markets. Having entered the field of PH through the M&A, J&J 
reportedly had no overlaps with the commercial organisation of Actelion (Griffiths, 2018; 
Ooms, 2019). Griffiths (2018) stated that the goal was to "combine the scientific and customer 
intimacy ski11s of Actelion with some of the great strengths that J&J has in ce1tain ai·eas, for 
example in market access, health economics, pricing, and big data analytics." Moreover, the 
absorption of Actelion and its subsidiaries into the decentralised Janssen strncture aimed at 
prese1ving the patient-focus and pioneering spirit of the company. G1iffiths (2019) highlighted 
that J&J "acquired Actelion precisely because of that passion around patients. [ ... ] Tue rationale 
behind such a strnctme is precisely to retain that creativity and drive by concentrating team 
energies around a single effort." Nicholas Franco " (2020, Appendix 10.5.4) fmther reveals that 
" [ o ]ne of the main benefits related to the acquisition, i.e. expansion of the commercial 
availability of Actelion products via the Janssen global footprint, was initiated quickly after the 
closing." Hence, Actelion and Janssen likely shai·e the marketing and sales value chain task. 
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Franco (2020) states that "[a]ll pa1ts of Actelion' s value chain were taken over by J&J, 
except maybe the manufacturing of our products." As Actelion spun off its R&D unit prior to 
the M&A, the task was absorbed by the Janssen R&D organisation, which operates globally 
through a network of R&D locations and dedicated therapeutic area teams. For Actelion' s 
R&D, the teams for Pulmonaiy Hypertension and Cardiovascular & Metabolism are mainly 
responsible (Janssen, n.d.-c, n.d.-b). In regard to manufacturing, J&J maintained Actelion' s 
network of CMOs, while integrating Actelion ' s network management function into the J&J 
Supply Chain organisation as well as aligning it to the J&J policies and processes. All of 
Actelion' s supp01t functions were fully integrated into J&J's established functional 
organisations (Franco, 2020). Fmthermore, J&J minirnised the duplication of supp01t functions 
by cutting 75 positions within Actelion upon acquisition (Ooms, 2019). Franco (2020) indicates 
that " [ a ]n enabler of any integration is how quickly the transactional systems/processes and 
indeed the legal entities can be merged. [ . . . ] The Actelion integration actually managed to 
accomplish the merging of key systems and processes." 
Franco (2020) highlights that "[t]he Actelion strategy of being the leader in 
cai·diopulmonary diseases, mainly pulmona1y hypertension, remains unchanged until today. 
Tue ways of operating and the organizational strncture aligned itself to the J&J ways." While 
Actelion employees had to adapt to J&J's organisational structure and corporate culture, the 
transition process was well supp01ted and also offered various benefits. Firstly, Actelion was 
diversifying into other therapeutic ai·eas prior to the M&A, and through the integration into J&J, 
employees could continue to focus on their pioneering work in PAH. Secondly, J&J's size and 
culture of openness provided significant oppo1tunities for personal development. Dming the 
integration process, J&J actively encouraged employee engagement among the Actelion staff 
and facilitated personnel redeployment in both directions of the companies, thereby enabling 
cultural approximation, knowledge sharing, and know-how spillover. As both J&J and Actelion 
were very patient-focused and science-driven with innovation for transf01mational medicine as 
their mission, the cultural amalgamation was simplified and built upon these core values 
(Franco, 2020; Griffiths, 2018, 2019; Ooms, 2019). 
Due to the deal strncture, Actelion' s R&D unit was not pait of the integration. Hence, 
the integration strategy did not have to account for biotech know-how prese1vation. However, 
it can be argued that through the complete spin-off of Idorsia, the requirements of the hybrid 
integration approach framework were fulfilled in that a potential loss of biotech know-how and 
culture was completely mitigated. Moreover, as Actelion's commercial organisation was a key 
driver for the M&A, one could further argue that the customer and product know-how of 
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Actelion was preserved by maintaining its spirit and customer-intimacy model, which was 
pa1iially facilitated by granting it some degree of individualism and autonomy. 
6.3.2.2 Integration Management 
The integration planning commenced early in the M&A process and a comprehensive two-year 
integration plan was in place before the closing of the acquisition (Franco, 2020; HZ, 2019). 
Moreover, J&J stated that it capitalised on previous M&A experience by applying lessons 
leamed to the integration of Actelion, J&J's largest acquisitions to date (Gorsky, 2017). In tenns 
of strategic vision, Griffiths (2018) stated, "[ we have] approached the integration by looking at 
how we can use the size, scale, and the expertise within Janssen to help Actelion grow faster." 
The preparation phase finther aimed at mastering the complexity of the situation given by the 
simultaneous Idorsia demerger and Actelion integration planning, while mitigating the risks of 
business disrnption and uncertainty (Griffiths, 2018, 2019). Moreover, an integration team was 
formed and key employees from both Actelion and J&J were involved early in the integration 
planning (Franco, 2020). Hence, early strategic preparation for the integration phase was given. 
For the integration management, a dedicated cross-functional global integration team 
consisting of both J&J and Deloitte employees was activated upon the closing of the M&A. 
The J&J employees were temporarily assigned to the integration project and responsible for the 
integration leadership and execution, while Deloitte manpower joined the integration taskforce 
for logistical suppmi. Finally, the integration team readily identified and involved Actelion 
employees to ensure access to key infmmation and aid in the transition to the J&J systems 
(Franco, 2020). The integration management clearly institutionalised integration 
responsibilities and involved several key promoters. On the paii of J&J, Ooms took on the role 
of Global Integration Leader, Jane Shaw was tasked with the Global Integration Management 
Office Lead, and Griffiths was appointed Global Head of Actelion during the integration phase, 
and acted as a key enabler for the integration (Emmerih, 2017; Fulford, 2018; G1iffiths, 2018; 
Ooms, 2019). The integration team also engaged several target company representatives. 
Franco, who was ah-eady majorly involved in the preceding M&A process, was consulted on 
key infmmation about the company and the transaction (Franco, 2020). Moreover, Otto 
Schwarz, fo1mer Actelion COO, was retained as a senior advisor for Griffiths with the mission 
to suppori the integration and business continuity dming the first year of integration (Actelion, 
2017d). Conclusively, representatives as well as leading figures from both companies were 
actively involved in the integration management. By the end of 2019, when most of the 
integration was completed, both Griffiths and Ooms retired from their roles at Actelion, and 
only a small integration team remained to finish the project (Ooms, 2019). 
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In regard to resomce management, Franco (2020) reveals that "[a]n element of the 
success of the integration was the oversight at the highest levels of the J&J organization, 
providing quick decision-making, adaptation of the plans based on the actual situation and 
additional resources when necessaiy." In line w ith this statement, the mission ofthe integration 
management was to foster employee commitment and operational effectiveness (Griffiths, 
2018, 2019; Ooms, 2019). By fashioning professional development opp01iunities for Actelion 
employees in the new organisation, J&J provided the right conditions for employee engagement 
and cultural amalgamation. Franco, for instance, was made Allschwil Site Head towards the 
end of the integration project (Franco, 2020). According to Ooms (2019), J&J also tried to 
provide redeployment opportunities for Actelion employees which were affected by the job 
cuts. In terms of employee motivation, Griffiths (2019) pointed out that "we knew that 
successful integration would partly hinge on our ability to win over the hear1s and minds of the 
Actelion staff." Similarly, through the deployment of Griffiths and Ooms into Actelion's 
leadership and the redeployment of other J&J key employees into Actelion, it was also made 
use of J&J's talents to supp01i the integration process. The somcing of additional Deloitte 
manpower by J&J was another effective measure to guarantee resource availability. Franco 
(2020) confirms that "extremely well-supp01ied and staffed processes were put in place to ease 
the organization into the new processes/systems." 
Moreover, Franco 's (2020) statement on the project oversight also illustrates that J&J 
employed effective integration monitoring mechanisms. As mentioned, a well-designed plan 
was set in place before the closing of the acquisition, and progress was diligently monitored by 
the integration team. This is also exemplified by the ready responses on the integration progress 
given by Griffiths (2018, 2019) and Ooms (2019) in past interviews. Moreover, an integration 
survey was used to assess the effectiveness and resonance of the integration effo1ts among 
Actelion employees, providing a method for a swift detection of potential issues (Griffiths, 
2018). Griffiths (2018) elaborated that "[i]f they want certain improvements, we try to act on 
those." Finally, the integration management followed the strategy of good communication to 
ensure transparency and minimise unce1tainty among Actelion employees (Griffiths, 2018). 
6.3.2.3 Value Creation 
Besides providing diversification and growth for J&J, the acquisition of Actelion also offered 
plenty of sources for value creation, which have already been exploited during the post-merger 
integration phase and will continue to be fully realised. Ooms (2019) confümed that "[ s ]uch an 
investment is not recouped financially after two years, it takes longer. [ . .. ] Innovations for 
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patients in this therapeutic area require a long-te1m perspective." Hence, some value creation is 
still expected to manifest in the future. 
Tue combination of the two companies has provided significant synergistic effects on 
the basis of marketing and sales as well as life cycle management. Building upon Actelion' s 
specialised know-how, established reputation, and resonance with customers, J&J's global 
footprint as well as superior skills in reimbursement and market access significantly expands 
the availability and accessibility of Actelion's PAH medicines (Franco, 2020; Gorsky, 2017; 
Griffiths, 2018, 2019). This not only brings value for customers, but also provides significant 
revenue growth for J&J through an improved market penetration. Additionally, J&J's 
geographic market coverage eliminated Actelion' s need to rely on network paiiners for ce1iain 
countries, which increased profit margins on product sales (Griffiths, 2019). In te1ms of R&D, 
J&J's superior infrastrncture, resource bases, and clinical development capabilities facilitate a 
rapid advancement and successful mai·ket launch of Actelion' s late-stage drng candidates, 
paiticularly for the programs on supplementaiy indications (Franco, 2020; Gorsky, 2017; 
G1iffiths, 2019; Ooms, 2019). As a result, the combined companies can better realise additional 
therapeutic application opportunities for Actelion's PAH franchise, which not only expands 
treatment options for patients, but also enables more revenue generation in the market 
exclusivity phase of a compound 's life cycle. In addition, the profit from Actelion' s PAH 
franchise helps in alleviating some of J&J's productivity challenges and patient cliffs, while 
allowing J&J to increase investments into its R&D organisation for new drng discove1y in PH 
(BSIC, 2017; Crow & Atkins, 2017; Franco, 2020; Johnson & Johnson & Actelion, 2017; 
Ooms, 2019). Moreover, albeit not being a key value driver for the M&A, the combination of 
the two companies enabled cost savings, especially in suppo1ting functions and infrastrnctures, 
which could be realised through the elimination of duplications (Franco, 2020; G1iffiths, 2018). 
The integration of Actelion also enabled J&J to add the field of PH as a new therapeutic 
area to its Phaimaceuticals division, thereby expanding the company ' s healthcare pmtfolio and 
R&D focus, which already implies some transformation. Moreover, the integration also allowed 
the exploration of transfmmative synergies. According to Franco (2020), "[t]he Actelion 
organization has implemented the many beneficial processes of J&J, while J&J has gained a 
deeper appreciation of the customer-intimacy model at Actelion, while implementing all the 
compliance programs in place." Hence, both J&J and Actelion capitalised on the combined 
strengths and know-how by creating additional value through the optimisation of not only 
systems and processes, but also business practices (Griffiths, 2019; Ooms, 2019). 
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Moreover, the integration enabled the exploitation of growth dynamics. The integration 
of Actelion as well as the addition of PH as a major therapeutic area of Janssen enables J&J on 
its newfound quest to turn P AH into a more manageable condition and to develop superior 
solutions for a disease area of significant unmet medical need (Griffiths, 2018, 2019; Ooms, 
2019). Gorsky (2017) stated, "[ w ]e have also set ourselves the target of one day curing patients 
with PAH [ . .. ] We intend to make PAH one of our core disciplines over the next 10 years." 
J&J aims at leveraging its R&D capabilities and external partnerships in order to create new 
innovation in PH and develop the next generation of drugs for expanding Actelion's PAH 
franchise (Duato, 2017; Ooms, 2019). Moreover, besides improving product accessibility, J&J 
also makes concentrated eff 01ts into raising awareness for the condition as well as providing 
info1mation and advice to facilitate better care (Griffiths, 2019). Griffiths (2019) stated that 
Actelion and J&J also aim at "complimenting [ . .. ] treatn1ents with companion diagnostics to 
enable early detection." With the suppo1t of J&J and in line the patient-centricity strategy, 
Actelion has therefore increased its effo1ts into developing improved diagnostic options for the 
field of PH. So far, these efforts have resulted in the creation of a diagnostic app as well as a 
research collaboration between Actelion and Analytics 4Life on potential digital technologies 
for improved PH detection. Actelion and J&J also investigate new value oppmtunities derived 
from a1tificial intelligence, big data, and biomarkers, which could improve R&D, diagnostics, 
and patient care in the field of PH (Franco, 2020; Griffiths, 2019; Ooms, 2019). Consequently, 
the integration also gave way to a newfound momentum for investments into the 
transfo1mational science of PH. 
Finally, any value destrnction was successfully avoided through the spin-off of Idorsia, 
which could thereby preserve its biotech know-how and culture. This also shows that even in 
mature biotech sta1t-ups like Actelion, which was Europe's largest biotech before the 
acquisition, the spirit and modus operandi of the company are seen as a major source of 
innovativeness. Moreover, it also highlights that R&D is the critical element of concern for 
entrepreneurial biotech founders when evaluating the potential consequences of an M&A with 
big pharma. The unique deal stmcture that Actelion and J&J agreed upon is exemplaiy in that 
it serves the needs of both companies: allowing the mature and fully integrated biotech to renew 
itself and refocus on its innovation engine, while providing big phaima access to the company's 
innovative product po1tfolio and late-stage pipeline. Lastly, the maintenance of Actelion's 
customer-intimacy model also reveals oppmtunities for value preservation outside of R&D. 
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6.3.3 Case Assessment: Post-Merger Integration Success Factors 
The analysis revealed that nearly all PMI SFs were present in the case of Actelion and J&J: 
Appropriate Depth oflntegration (B) Leading Figures (A) Syoergy Exploitation (A) 
H)brid Integration Approach according to Value · tutionalise Integiation Office 
Chain Segmentation: R&D vs Non-R&D (C) Responsibility(B) Implement Perfomiance Transfomiation (B) --·---------------?_ ~ ----- ____ ,~A_v.u1_· abili_ · ·..c..ty_of_R_eso_ ur_ ces_ (--'A) ___ _the_Mo_ meotum __ o_f 
> Manuficturing. Marketing/Sales (oon-R&D) - Take Care ofTalents (B) Exploit Grnwth Oynamics (B) 
--·----------------------------------------+--+- ---------+--+-------------l--i 
> Support Functions (non-R&D) ProjectManagement(A} Achievement ofShort-TeanMotive: Innovations Knowledge Transfer (C) 
& Know-How Protection (C) tro ce Integrat,on Momtonng Capacity by Know-How Preservation (C) 
PreservationStrategyinR&D: BiotechAutooomy 1- ,In du . . . (B) 1---:-AchievementofLong-TeanMotive: Innovative 
,-----------:- -c--------------+---1 
Absotption Strategyin Non-R&D: Control of 
Phamia & Knowledge Transfer (C) 
Tbeoretical Integration Success Frameworks: 
(A) Five Factors that Malre or Break an Integration Project (Bergamo & Brallll, 201&) 
(B) Performance Transformation Concept (Bergamo & Brallll, 2018) 
(C) Hybrid Integration Approach Framework (Schweizer, 2005b) 
applied 
- partially applied 
X ootapplied 
Table 11: Consolidated PMI SFs FrameworkAssessment: Actelion and Johnson & Johnson. Own Creation. 
The two moderating aspects of the hybrid framework are the retention of the CMO 
network and the marketing/sales task-sharing between Actelion and J&J as well as the 
preservation strategy applied to Actelion's headquarter operations and customer-facing groups. 
However, as the hybrid framework proposed by Schweizer is generally directed towards "M&A 
as R&D" integration scenarios, small deviations from the01y are expected. Moreover, the deal 
strncture shows that the preservation of biotech know-how is equally important for mature and 
fully integrated biotechs, such as Actelion, as it is for young R&D-focused biotechs. Likewise, 
the preservation of the customer-intimacy model also highlights that the value proposition of 
Actelion goes beyond its R&D-specific biotech know-how. Hence, if allowing for the 
consideration of the deal strncture and non-R&D-specific know-how, the hybrid framework has 
found füll application. The moderating aspect of the long-term motive achievement is that while 
still creating opportunities for growth and future innovation, the M&A did not give J&J 
complete and direct access to Actelion's innovative capacity. In sum, the deal strncture and 
post-merger integration of Actelion into J&J can be considered exemplary andin line with the 
theoretical PMI SFs, which has pathed the way to the successful outcome of this M&A. 
In addition, other best practices have greatly contributed to the success of the post-
merger integration, namely an alignment and commitment to a shared vision on exploiting the 
trne value potential of the M&A even if it includes a spin-off, an early strategic preparation, the 
balance between autonomy and coordination as well as individualism and cultural 
amalgamation, and the maintenance of the pioneering spirit and entrepreneurial drive of the 
biotech. Hence, these best practices can be identified as additional PMI SFs. 
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7 Discussion ofFindings 
This chapter provides a discussion of the findings in order to examine the defined hypotheses, 
assess the applicability of the reviewed integration success frameworks, highlight the gap 
between theo1y and practice, and introduce the newly identified scope-specific PMI SFs. 
7.1 Phaima & Biotech M &A: Evidence for Trends & Motives 
Mergers and acquisitions have become an essential means for big phaima to achieve corporate 
renewal and growth, especially in times of industry challenges and shifting industry trends. 
Biotechs offer unique value propositions in fom1 of sophisticated novel drng compounds and 
efficient technology platf01ms, but also in te1ms of innovative capabilities derived from their 
know-how, entrepreneurial spirit, and agile modus operandi. Consequently, biotech companies 
have become a prefe1Ted M&A target for big phaima. For biotechs, especially eai·ly-growth 
start-ups, the road to maturity and profitability is long and füll ofhurdles, rendering them open 
to potential strategic pai1nerships, including M&As. 
The trend analysis on M&As with big phaima as buyer and Swiss biotech as tai·get 
showed that out of eleven transactions which occurred between 2005 and 2019, seven could be 
classified as "Originator acquires Innovator", three as "OTC/Consumer Health acquires 
Innovator", and one as "OTC/Consumer Health acquires Manufacturing & Sales Expe1i." 
However, two out of the three "OTC/Consumer Health acquires Innovator" can be associated 
with a big phaima company that is transitioning towards the Originator archetype. The strategic 
purpose of the M&As in the "Originator acquires Innovator" categ01y was to strengthen R&D 
in the big pha1ma companies' core business segment (e.g. pha1maceuticals) and core therapeutic 
area (e.g. oncology). Originators generally targeted R&D-focused privately held pre-/clinical-
stage biotech stait-ups. The case study analysis revealed that big phaima companies, especially 
Originators, which acquire biotech stait-ups, unde1take the M&A to access the biotech's cuITent 
innovations as well as its capacity for generating more innovations in the füture. 
Conclusively, the findings of the analyses show that the hypotheses, which were based 
on the propositions of Kmmann Pa11ners (2017) and Schweizer (2005b ), ai·e trne: 
H 1 : There is a high tendency for "O1iginators" to acquire "Innovators." 
H2: When acquiring biotechs, the short-te1m motive of big phaima tends tobe the 
improvement of mai·ket positions by accessing the biotech' s innovations. 
H3: When acquiring biotechs, the long-teim motive of big pha1ma tends to be the 
suppo1t of the overall growth strategy by accessing the biotech's innovative 
capacity. 
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7.2 Applicability of the Theoretical Integration Success Frameworks 
Post-merger integration is decisive for the overall success of the M&A in that it encompasses 
all activities which se1ve to facilitate the actual combination of the two companies and sets the 
scene for the future effectiveness of the combined companies. The overarching goal of the PMI 
phase is the mitigation of value destrnction, the exploitation of the value-adding potential, and 
the exploration of additional sources of value. Especially in the case of big phaima acquiring 
biotech stait-ups, a successful integration is crncial as the objects of value prese1vation, 
exploitation, and exploration are innovations (biotech knowledge) and innovative capacity 
(biotech know-how). Due to the long time-horizon of innovations in biotechnology and the 
embeddedness of innovative capacity within the biotech' s culture, people, and modus operandi, 
the impmtance of an effective integration strategy and integration management is amplified. 
Bergamin and Braun (2018) propose two interconnected generic frameworks for 
successful post-merger integration, namely the "Five Factors that Make or Break an Integration 
Project" and the "Perfo1mance Transfo1mation Concept." The authors prescribe the PMI 
success factors Leading Figures & Institutionalise Integration Office Responsibility, 
Availability ofResources & Take Care ofTalents, Project Management & Introduce Integration 
Monitoring, Synergy Exploitation & Implement Perf01mance Transformation, and Exploit the 
Momentum of Change & Exploit Growth Dynamics. The case analysis found strong evidence 
for the decisiveness of these generic PMI SFs, which validates the applicability of the two 
frameworks to the scope ofM&As between big phaima companies and biotech start-ups. 
Schweizer (2005b) proposes an industly-specific framework for successful post-merger 
integration in the context of lai·ge pha1maceutical companies acquiring small biotech 
companies, namely the "Hybrid Integration Approach Framework." Tue author prescribes a 
hybrid approach for a successful PMI, based on value chain segmentation for the simultaneous 
achievement of the sho1t- and long-te1m M&A motives: (1) a slow prese1vation sti·ategy for 
R&D value chain activities, granting the biotech autonomy without attempting a transfer of 
biotech know-how (innovative capacity) in order to achieve the long-te1m M&A motive (boost 
growth) and (2) a rapid absorption sti·ategy for non-R&D value chain activities, providing the 
phaima with conti·ol and enabling the transfer of biotech knowledge (innovations) in order to 
achieve the sh01t-te1m M&A motive (boost mai-ket position). Again, the case analysis found 
strong evidence for the decisiveness of these industly-specific PMI SFs, which validates the 
applicability of the framework to the scope of M&As between big phaima companies and 
biotech staii-ups. 
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7.3 Big Phanna & Biotech Start-ups: Success Factors in Post-Merger Integration 
7. 3 .1 Gap Analysis: Bridging Theo1y and Practice 
Tue applicability of the reviewed integration success frameworks in the case of big pha1m a 
acquiring biotech sta1t-ups is validated. However, there still is a need for additional elaborations 
in order to effectively bridge the gap between themy and practice. 
The case analysis proved the importance of the generic success factors proposed by 
Bergamin and Braun (2018), which centre around excellence in integration management and 
excellence in value creation. However, two "gaps" could be identified. Firstly, R&D-focused 
biotech stait-ups are mostly of small size and might not require as profound of an integration 
management as larger-scale acquisitions do, such as Actelion. This has been found especially 
trne in regard to the creation of an institutionalised integration office, taking cai·e of talents by 
facilitating leadership opportunities, and implementing a sophisticated and designated 
integration monitoring system. Neve1iheless, good integration management is a necessity and 
should not be neglected due to a biotech's size or an M&A's context. Secondly, R&D-focused 
biotech start-ups are often integrated in a way that allows for the prese1vation of value as weil 
as the exploitation of evident synergistic effects. However, the combination of the two 
companies in many cases also offers oppo1iunih.es for value-adding transformation and change, 
which can only be grasped if an entrepreneurial long-te1m perspective is taken. Consequently, 
big phaim a companies are not tasked with an easy feat in that they should pursue the right 
degree and type of synergy exploitation that allows for additional value creation, but without 
causing value destrnction. Thus, excellence in value creation is even more of a necessity. 
The case analysis also proved the impmtance of the industry-specific success factors 
proposed by Schweizer (2005b ), which centre around excellence in integration strategy and 
excellence in value creation. However, three "gaps" could be identified. Firstly, R&D-focused 
biotech sta1t-ups are typically still in preclinical or early clinical stages of drng discove1y. 
Hence, the line of value chain segmentation is in practice often drawn after the PoC, while later 
tasks are taken over by big pha1m a. Secondly, fully integrated mature biotech stait-ups Inight 
have other specific know-how which should be prese1ved, such as patient-centricity and 
business development expe1t ise. This requires an adaption ofthe framework as it prescribes the 
füll absorption of the non-R&D-related portion of the value chain. Thirdly, considerations of 
biotech know-how preservations are not only impmtant for the integration design, but should 
also be applied in the negotiation phase and deal strncturing as weil as in the planning of 
subsequent reorganisations. Thus, value prese1vation is a multifaceted and infinite process. 
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7.3.2 Additional Success Factors from Best Practices and the Concluding Model 
The case analysis enabled the identification ofbest practices in the integration ofbiotech start-
ups into big pharma. These best practices are not fully accounted for by the reviewed theoretical 
frameworks and should, thus, be f01mulated into standalone scope-specific PMI SFs. Although 
evidence was found for the necessity of early strategic preparation and communication, these 
factors are rather generic and do not qualify as scope-specific PMI SFs for biotech sta1t-up 
acquisitions by big pharma. Consequently, they can be seen as prerequisites for excellence in 
integration management and excellence in integration strategy. Based on the obse1ved best 
practices, four specific PMI SFs are identified for biotech sta1t-up integrations into big pha1ma: 
(1) Alignment to and commitment on a shared vision for genuine added value: recognise 
the benefits of diversity in R&D and align/coIDinit to it, achieve a truly synergistic partnership 
(2) Striking the balance between autonomy and coordination: retain the biotech' s modus 
operandi, but establish ties into the rest of the organisation to transfo1m it into a team effo1t 
(3) Preserving individualism and facilitating collectivism to achieve the best of both 
worlds: retain the unique biotech culture, but build bridges to enable identification with the 
par·ent organisation and create a sense of "togethemess" 
(4) Path the road to success by encouraging entrepreneurialism and empowering people/ 
ideas: nmture the biotech's entrepreneurial spirit and act as a catalyst for growth and innovation 
Conclusively, the following model was created to summarise the findings on success factors 
and best practices for the post-merger integration of biotech start-ups into big phanna: 
Success Factors for the Post-Merger Integration of Biotech Start-ups 
into Big Pharma 
Success Factors from Theory 
Excelleuce in lulegnnion Stra1egy IlylJ1id I111egnll1011 App1oach 1·rmuew01k 
ExceUeuce iu Imegration Management 
Excellence in Value Creatiou 
Alig111neul and Cou1111itment 
Autonomy and Coordination 
Individualism and Collectivism 
Entreprenemialism and Empowerment 
Figure 16: Concluding Model on Success Factors for the Integration of Biotech Start-ups into Big Pharma. Own 0-eation. 
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8 Conclusion 
M&As have become a regular occunence in the life science sector, if not even an 
integral part of the business model of big phaim a, which are on an endless quest for corporate 
renewal in response to challenges to their industly dominance. Especially research-based big 
phaim a companies, whose competitive advantage lies in the discove1y and development of 
novel and differentiated medicines, find themselves under pressure to live up to the expectations 
of originating new breakthrough innovations which are value-adding enough to provide the 
aspired revenue growth. Histmy, however, has shown that a "new" generation of life science 
players, the enti·epreneurial biotechs, have been more successful at originating new innovations 
than big pha1m a. Alcide Bai·beris (2020), one of the featured interview partners, states that "it 
is a lost race for the phaim a companies, not because they don 't have skills or money, but 
because the setup is different. fu biotech companies, you have enthusiasm, you have flexibility, 
you have people coming fresh out ofthe academic research. lt' s a totally different environment, 
much more creative, much more flexible and research-oriented." Consequently, it is no smprise 
that big phaim a has long ago embarked on a tl"end to acquire biotech staii-ups. M&As, however, 
are a complex unde1iaking, especially for big pharrna acquiring biotech start-ups, and require 
much more than the acquisition in itself to turn into a success. In fact, the post-merger 
integration phase is key in delivering the expected results of the M&A. 
Tue aim of this thesis was to investigate the success factors m the post-merger 
integration of Swiss biotech staii-ups into big phaim a. For this pmpose, this paper tested the 
applicability of post-merger integration theories established by Bergamin and Braun (2018) and 
Schweizer (2005b) in the context of "big phanna acquires and integrates Swiss biotech start-
ups." fu addition, this paper aimed at bridging the gap between themy and practice as well as 
identifying best practices which could be reformulated into additional scope-specific success 
factors. Finally, as integration success to some degree depends on the underlying acquisition 
rationale of the acquirer, this paper further tested three hypotheses on M&A trends and motives 
based on propositions by Kmmann Pa1iners (2017) and Schweizer (2005b ). 
To test the inti·oduced hypothesis on M&A tl"ends as weil as to situate the case studies 
and research findings, a high-level trend analysis of "big pha1ma acquires Swiss biotech" was 
made on the basis of historical data on M&A transactions as well as info1mation gathered 
through desk research. Subsequently, to test the hypotheses on M&A motives and answer the 
reseai·ch questions, a qualitative case study approach was used, which enabled an in-depth 
analysis of three post-merger integration cases on the basis of info1mation gathered through 
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desk research and inteiviews. Tue cases featured in the analysis were: GlycArt and Roche, 
ESBATech and Alcon/Novaitis, Actelion and Johnson & Johnson. 
The high-level trend analysis provided strong evidence for hypothesis 1, namely that 
big phanna of the Originator archetype predominantly acquires Swiss biotechs which identify 
as lnnovators. Moreover, it was found that Originators predominately acquire privately held 
R&D-focused start-ups and unde1take M&As with the rationale of strengthening the R&D in 
their core business segments/therapeutic areas. In the case analysis, strong evidence was found 
for the hypotheses 2 and 3, namely that big phaima, especially of the Originator archetype, has 
the short-te1m motive to access external innovations and the long-term motive to access external 
innovative capacity through biotech acquisitions. The case study analysis of a diverse selection 
of post-merger integration scenarios (diversified in buyer archetypes, target maturity levels, 
M&A strncture and contexts) validated the applicability of the reviewed integration success 
frameworks for "big phaima integrates Swiss biotech start-up" and also found strong evidence 
for the impo1tance of their application to achieve a successful M&A outcome. Moreover, the 
discussion of the findings illustrated the gap between theo1y and practice and successfully 
identified additional best practices which qualify as scope-specific PMI success factors. 
Conclusively, the SFs for the integration of biotech sta1t-ups into big phaima arefrom 
theory: Excellence in (1) Integration Strategy, (2) Integration Management, and (3) Value 
Creation, andfrom best practice: (i) Alignment and Commitment: Shared Vision for Genuine 
Added Value, (ii) Autonomy and Coordination: Striking the Balance, (iii) Individualism and 
Collectivism: Best ofBoth Worlds, (iv) Entrepreneurialism and Empowe1ment: Path the Road 
to Success. Tue newly established scope-specific PMI SFs from best practice do not only ensure 
that the integration of a biotech stait-up is successful in prese1ving and creating value as well 
as in delivering on the identified M&A motives, they also in a way suppo1t big phaima in 
mastering the transf01mation towards more agility and innovativeness. This, in turn, could make 
partnerships, including M&As, between big pha1ma and biotech sta1t-ups more value-adding 
in general, which in the end benefits patients in need for improved health care solutions. An 
imp01tant aspect to consider is, however, that eve1y M&A is unique and, therefore, requires a 
customer-tailored post-merger integration approach. The established PMI SFs, whether from 
theo1y or from best practice, should be adapted to the paiticular situation of the M&A and the 
chai·acte1istics of the companies involved in the transaction. Neve1theless, the need for 
adaptation does not endorse inferior performance or complete neglection of the success factors, 
as this could quickly turn into a pitfall for the integration project. Moreover, it was found that 
the general applicability of the PMI SFs does not differ much between young R&D-focused 
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biotechs and mature fully integrated biotechs. This implies that biotech sta1t-ups, regardless of 
their growth stage or business model, share the same underlying need for preserving their 
passion for research and their innovative capacity, that is, the know-how derived from the 
people, culture, modus operandi, and entrepreneurial spüit. In sum, big phanna should take a 
long-term perspective when acquüing and integrating a biotech start-up, recognise the 
underlying needs and value propositions of the biotech, and design an M&A/integration that is 
of mutual beneficial nature and might aid in transfonning the internal resear·ch envü·onment of 
those big pha1ma companies which have not been able to keep up theü· innovativeness. 
This thesis succeeded in answering the research question as well as testing the 
introduced hypotheses. Moreover, it promoted the understanding of the complexity of post-
merger integration between big pha1ma and biotech stari-ups by reviewing the01y on the 
subject-matter, providing an overview of the industries and the need for inter-industry 
collaboration, highlighting M&A tr·ends in Switzerland, exarnining practical cases of post-
merger integration projects, while intr·oducing first-hand insights from target company 
representatives, and bridging the gap between the01y and practice by validating or introducing 
integration success factors and best practices for big pharma/biotech sta1i-up M&As. 
However, this paper also has some limitations. Firstly, the time and length restraints of 
the bachelor thesis requü·ed a prioritisation in research scope and depth. Consequently, only the 
most important M&A concepts and industry characteristics were discussed. Moreover, the 
paper focused on providing the necessa1y medical definitions without elaborating on the 
underlying science. Secondly, the scope constr·aints only allowed a high-level tr·end analysis of 
eleven M&As and a practical exarnination of only three post-merger integration case studies, 
which restricts the significance of the findings. Thirdly, the limited info1mation publicly 
available as well as the focus of the interviews on target company representatives might have 
resulted in ce1iain info1mation gaps and unintended bias in the case study analysis. 
This paper proposes several areas for fu1iher research. The vast body of literature 
available on post-merger integration as well as on industry challenges and tr·ends offers arnple 
opp01tunity for further review. Moreover, an in-depth tr-end analysis with a lar·ger sample of 
M&As, outside of Switzerland, is recommended to verify and expand on the tr·ends and motives 
for biotech acquisitions. In addition, the analysis of further integration cases would enable the 
validation of the research findings, possibly using M&As identified in the tr-end analysis. 
Finally, the success factors from the01y as well as the newly identified ones from best practice 
could be tested through a practical application in an actual integration project. 
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10 Appendix 
10.1 Big Phaima-Swiss Biotech M&A Transactions 
Year Target Company Country Public PE/VC- Buyer Counh-y Ove1·all Deal VC ln\'estment 
Backed Value (Sm) (Sm) ---2005 GlycArt Switzerland Private vc Roche Switzerland 181 20 
2006 Fumapharm Switzerland Private Biogen idee US 500 
2008 Speedel Switzerland Public Novartis Switzerland 880 
2008 Alcon (Option) US Public Novartis Switzerla11d l l '000 
2009 ESBATcch Switzerland Private vc Alcon Switzerland 589 110 
2010 Alcon US Public Novartis Switzerland 41 '200 
f 2011 Nycomed Switzerland Private PE Takeda Japan 13'680 
2013 Okairos Switzerland Private vc GlaxoSmithK.line UK 323 1 31 
2014 OncoEthix Switzerland Private vc Merck&Co. US 375 30 
2015 GlycoVaxyn Switzerland Private vc GlaxoSmithKline UK 190 42 
2017 Actclion Switzerland Public Johnson & Johnson US 30'000 
Pharniaceuticals Ltd.4 
2019 Therachon Switzerland Private vc Pfizer US 810 =-r'' 
2019 Amal Therapeutics Switzerland Private vc Boehringer Ingelheini Genuany 366 
Source: "Phanna / Biotech M&A Transactions 2005-2019" (HBM Partners, 2020b) . 
2 Information Missing: GlycA11 Biotechnology GmbH specialised in the therapeutic area of oncology (Umaila, 2020). 
3 Inc01Tect: As of2006, FUMADERM(R) was ah-eady on the market (Biogen Idee & Fumap harm, 2006). 
45 
Stage of Lead The1·apeutk 
Product Areas(s) 
0 N/A2 
21 [ cNS 
Market Asthma, allergy 
Market Ophthahnology 
Ophthahnology 
Market I Ophthahnology 
Market OTC, gastro, 
pain 







0 Cancer 10 and 
vaccmes 
4 Incoll'ect: Johnson & Johnson acquired Actelion Ltd., of which Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd. is a subsidiary. Entry details related to acquisition of Actelion Ltd., the Holding 
Company and not the subsidiaiy (Johnson & Johnson & Actelion, 2017) . 
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10.2 Classification of Buyers 
1 Roche O1iginator 
• Research-based healthcare company (Reuters, n.d.-i) 
• Kmmann Paitners: Oiiginator (Leutenegger & Bie1i , 2016) 
• Segments: Phaimaceuticals & Diagnostics (Reuters, n.d.-i) 
1 Biogen (Idee) Oiiginator 
• Biopha1maceutical company (Reuters, n.d.-c) 
• Segments: Multiples Scleroses, Spinal Muscular Atrophy, Alzheimer's Disease, 
Biosimilars (Biogen, n.d.) 
1 Novaitis Oiiginator 
• Holding company providing a range of healthcare products led by phaim aceuticals 
(Reuters, n.d.-g) 
• Kmmann Pa1tners: O1iginator (Leutenegger & Bieri, 2016) 
• Segments: Innovative Medicines, Alcon, Sandoz (generics), Corporate Activities 
(Reuters, n.d.-g) 
o Fmm er Alcon Division was spun-off in 2019 (Alcon, 2019) 
o Sandoz Division 
Kmmann Paitners: Low-Cost Providers (Leutenegger & Bieri, 2016) 
1 Alcon Point-of-Call Specialist 
• Switzerland-based company mainly active nowadays in medical industly a11d focusing 
on eye care devices (Reuters, n.d.-b) 
• Segments: Surgical and Vision Care (Reuters, n.d.-b) 
o Before the acquisition by Nova1t is, Alcon bad a third business segment: 
Phaim aceuticals (Alcon, 2009a) 
Takeda OTC / Consumer Health (Transitioning towards O1iginator) 
• Japan-based company focusing on the phaim aceutical business (Reuters, n.d.-a) 
• Segments: phaim aceutical products, general medical products, quasi drugs, healthcare 
products (Reuters, n.d.-a) 
• R&D Segments: Oncology, Digestive System Diseases, Rai·e Diseases, Neurology, 
Plasma Fractionation Products, Vaccines (Reuters, n.d.-a) 
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• Transition towards Originator Justification: 
o In 2000, Takeda announced the divestment of non-pharrnaceutical businesses 
(incl. animal health, bulk vitamins, chemicals, food, agriculture, life-
environment) as pa1t of its growth strategy (Takeda, n.d.) 
o In 2014, Takeda announced a reorganisation into the therapeutic areas of central 
ne1vous system, cardiovascular & metabolic, gastroenterology, and oncology. 
With additional two speciality business units for oncology and vaccines 
(Takeda, 2014) 
o In 2020, Takeda announced the divestment of certain OTC and none-core assets 
Business Wire, Costa Saroukos (CFO Takeda): "This transaction 
represents the continued execution of our strategy to simplify our 
po1tfolio and accelerate deleveraging. We remain focused on investing 
in our key business areas as we continue strengthening our position as a 
R&D-driven global biophaimaceutical leader and deliver enhanced 
value for patients and Takeda shareholders." (Takeda, 2020) 
GlaxoSmithKline OTC / Consumer Health (Transitioning towards O1iginator) 
• Global healthcare company (Reuters, n .d.-d) 
• Kurmann Paiiners: OTC / Consumer Health (Leutenegger & Bieri, 2016) 
• Segments: Pharmaceuticals, Vaccines, Consumer Healthcare (GlaxoSmithKline, n.d.-
a) 
• In Transition towards Originator Justification: 
o In 2015, GSK and Novaitis made an asset swap. GSK bought part of the 
Novaitis' vaccine business and sold its mature (excl. early stage) oncology 
business (GlaxoSmithKline, n.d.-b) 
o In 2019, company announced Joint Venture with Pfizer and Demerger of 
Consumer Healthcare in order to focus on PhaimaceuticalsN accines 
(GlaxoSmithKline, n.d.-a) 
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1 Merck & Co. Originator 
• Global healthcare company (Reuters, n .d.-f) 
• Kmmann Pa1tners: Originator (Leutenegger & Bieri, 2016) 
• Segments: Pha1maceuticals, Anima! Health, Healthca1·e Services, Alliances (Reuters, 
n.d.-f) 
• Product Groups: prescription medicines, vaccines, biologic therapies, animal health 
(Reuters, n.d.-f) 
1 Johnson & Johnson OTC / Consumer Health 
• Holding company with a diversified product po1tfolio for the healthcare field (Reuters, 
n.d.-e) 
• Kmmann Pa1tners: OTC / Consumer Health (Leutenegger & Bieri, 2016) 
• Segments: Consumer Health Care, Pha1maceuticals, Medical Devices (Reuters, n.d.-e) 
Pfizer Originator (but also OTC / Consumer Health & Low-Cost Provider) 
• Research-based global biophannaceutical company (Reuters, n.d.-h) 
• Segments: Innovative Medicines (novel medicines, biosimila1·s, hospital medicines), 
Established Medicines (legacy brands, generics), Consumer Health Care (OTC) 
(Kilgore, 2018) 
o Before the reorganisation, the business segments were: Pfizer Innovative Health 
(medicines, vaccines) & Pfizer Essential Health (legacy brands, genencs, 
biosilnilar, sterile injectables, infusion systems) (Reuters, n.d.-h) 
1 Boehringer Ingelheim Originator 
• Research-driven Phannaceutical Company (Bloomberg, n.d.) (Boehringer Ingelheim, 
2020) 
• Segments: Human Pha1ma, Animal Health, Biopha1maceutical Contract Manufactming 
(Boehringer Ingelheim, 2020) 
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10.3 Classification of Targets and Strategie Prnpose ofM&A 
GlycArt R&D-focused, Hybrid, Start-up, lnnovator 
• Background: 
o Launched in 2000, VC Funding: Series A (2003) 
Source: (Cmnchbase, n.d. -i) 
• Value Proposition: 
o Wessel: "For GlycArt, the early sale confinns the wisdom of the company's 
hybrid strategy of licensing in companies to use its patented technology while 
simultaneously developing its own product candidates." 
o Swiss Biotech Association: "Glycart Biotechnology [ .. . ] recognized for its role 
as pioneer in antibody engineering for cancer immunotherapy." 
Source: (Swiss Biotech Association, 2019a; Wessel, 2005) 
• Products: 
o GAl0l , pre-clinical stage humanized antibody product 
Indication 1: treatment of lymphocytic leukemia 
Indication 2: treatment of follicular lymphoma 
o GA201, GA301, GA401, GA501, lead generation or preclinical-stage 
Indication: treatment of cancer 
Source: (Jean-Mairet, 2011; Swiss Biotech Association, n.d.; William Reed, 2005) 
• Technology: 
o Proprietaiy GlycoMab glycosylation technology 
Source: (Swiss Biotech Association, n.d .; William Reed, 2005) 
• Strategie Purpose of M&A for Roche: 
o Williain Reed: "Roche has acquired GlycArt Biotechnology in an attempt to 
furt her strengthen Roche' s capabilities in the therapeutic antibody research 
sector." 
o William Reed, Franz Humer (CEO Roche): "This acquisition is an excellent 
strategic fit with our Therapeutic Protein Initiative and our focus on developing 
clinically diff erentiated proteins and antibodies for areas of unmet medical need, 
such as oncology." 
o William Reed: "GlycoMab [ . . . ] has the potential to generate best-in-dass 
antibody therapeutics in disease areas such as oncology, where Roche is the 
global market leader." 
o William Reed: "Roche will acquire GlycArt's development pipeline." 
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o Swiss Biotech Association: "The acquisition of Glycart by Roche secured 'big 
pha1ma' access to the biotech 's innovative proprieta1y GlycoMAb technology 
and to its Glyeo- MAb-enhanced drng candidates, in pat1icular GAlOl." 
Source: (Swiss Bioteeh Association, n.d.; William Reed, 2005) 
Fumapharm R&D-foeused, Product-oriented, No Start-up, hmovator 
• Background: 
o Launched in 1983, VC Funding: N/A 
Source: (Crnnchbase, n.d.-d) 
• V alue Proposition: 
o "Fumapharm AG [ .. . ] develops therapeutics derived from fumaric acid esters 
for patients with high unmet medieal need." 
Source: (Biogen Idee & Fumaphaim , 2006) 
• Products: 
o FUMADERM(R), commercial-stage product (marketed only in Ge1many) 
Indication: treatment of psoriasis (de1matology) 
o BG-12, clinical-stage product 
Indication: treatment of multiple sclerosis (MS) and psoriasis 
Joint development with Biogen Idee 
Source: (Biogen Idee & Fumapha1m , 2006) 
• Technology: N/A 
• Strategie Purpose of M&A for Biogen Idee: 
o James C. Mullen (CEO Biogen): "This aequisition suppo11s our goal of 
developing innovative therapeutie options for people living with MS." 
o James C. Mullen (CEO Biogen): "We look fo1ward to continuing the 
development of BG-12 [ .. . ] as well as expanding our European operations by 
working with Fumaphaim's existing pa11ners to provide FUMADERM to 
psoriasis patients in Ge1m any." 
Source: (Biogen Idee & Fumapha1m , 2006) 
Speedel R&D-focused, Produet-oriented, Start-up, hmovator 
• Background: 
o Launched in 1998/2001, VC Funding: Unknown Series (2002, 2005) 
Source: (Crnnchbase, n.d. -j ; Monison, 2008) 
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• Value Proposition: 
o "Speedel is a [ .. . ] world leader m developing renin inhibition, a promising new 
approach with significant potential for treating cardiovascular diseases." 
o Offices in Basel (CH), New Jersey (US), and Tokyo (JP) 
Source: (Novartis, 2008) 
• Products: 
o Tektuma/Rasilez, commercial-stage product 
Indication: treatment of hypeitension 
Joint development with Nova1t is 
Manufacturing/ commercialisation by N ovaitis 
o SPP635, SPPl 148, & SPP676, clinical-stage products 
Follow-on direct renin inhibitor projects 
Indication: treatment ofhype1tension 
o SPP2745, preclinical-stage product 
Adosterone synthase inhibitor class 
Indication: treatment of cardiovascular diseases 
Source: (Novaitis, 2008) 
• Technology: NI A 
• Strategie Purpose ofM&A for Novaitis: 
o "Speedel pipeline provides access to many R&D projects tai·geting 
cardiovasculai· disease, including a range of direct renin inhibitors." 
o "Ownership of Speedel provides greater flexibility and speed in development of 
Tektuma/Rasilez and also ends royalty and manufacturing fee payments." 
o "R&D pipeline is a strong fit with the leading global position of N ovaitis in 
cardiovascular disease." 
o Joseph Jimenez (CEO Novaitis): "With the integration of Speedel into Novartis, 
we can accelerate development of Tektuma/Rasilez, particularly in combination 
with other medicines, and fmther advance Speedel 's pipeline of novel 
compounds." 
Source: (Novaitis, 2008) 
ESBATech R&D-focused, Hybrid, Start-up, lnnovator 
• Background: 
o Launched in 1998, VC Funding: Series A (2002), Series B (2006 & 2008) 
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Source: (Crnnchbase, n.d.-c) 
• Value Proposition: 
o "ESBATech [ ... ] has been developing a pipeline of proprietary single-chain 
antibody fragment therapeutics for topical and local delive1y for safe and 
convenient therapy." 
o "ESBATech applies its prop1ietaiy screening platfo1m IMMUNA and its fully 
human single-chain antibody frameworks to generate product candidates against 
targets of clinical relevance." 
o Application of technology and single-chain antibody frameworks m 
ophthalmology, rheumatology and respiratmy 
Transaction includes spin-off of technology application outside of 
ophthalmology into new company (Delenex Therapeutics AG) 
Source: (Alcon, 2009b) 
• Products: 
o ESBA105, clinical-stage product 
Indication: treatment of inflammatmy ocular disease 
o ESBA1008/ESBA903, preclinical-stage product/s 
Indication: treatment of age-related macular edema 
Source: (Escher, 2011; GEN Magazine, 2009; Greater Zurich Area, 2019) 
• Technology: 
o prop1ieta1y antibody fragment technology and screening platfmm Th,1MUNA 
Source: (Alcon, 2009b) 
• Strategie Purpose ofM&A for Alcon: 
o "Company gains access to prop1ietaiy antibody fragment technology 
paiticularly suited to treat eye diseases." 
o "Acquisition establishes sustainable platform for ongomg biologics 
development." 
o "The ESBATech acquisition expands Alcon's research capability outside of 
small molecules to the promising field of proteins, antibodies and other lai·ge 
molecules." 
o "Deal[ .. . ] to expand breadth and depth of Alcon's development oppmtunities 
in eye care in the long te1m." 
o Kevin Buehler (CEO Alcon): "This acquisition is pait of our ongoing strategy 
to enhance access to multiple sources of technologies and compounds that 
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bolster our total research platform in supp01i of innovative products to treat eye 
disease." 
o Sabri Markabi (Alcon Executive): "Combining ESBATech's proprietaty 
antibody fragment technology with our expertise in ophthalmic fo1mulation and 
capabilities in global development will strengthen Alcon' s leadership position 
in ophthalmology." 
Source: (Alcon, 2009b) 
Nycomed Fully Integrated, Product-01iented, No Statt-up, Manufacturing/Sales Expert 
• Background: 
o Launched in 1874, VC Funding: N/A 
Source: (Crnnchbase, n.d.-f) 
• Value Proposition: 
o "Nycomed is a [ . . . ] global pha1maceutical company with a diversified po1ifolio 
focused on branded medicines in gastroenterology, respirat01y and 
inflammat01y diseases, pain, osteoporosis and tissue management. A range of 
OTC products completes the portfolio." 
o "Its key success factors include the utilization of its broad product range and the 
application of commercialization and development strategies that fit with the 
market environment and medical needs in each individual countly and region." 
o R&D: collaborations & in-licensing 
o Sales Platfo1ms: Europe & Emerging Markets (incl. Russia/CIS, Latin America, 
Asia, Middle East) 
o Sales Partnerships: US & Japan 
Source: (Takeda & Nycomed, 2011) 
• Products: 
o Diversified p01ifolio, commercial-stage products 
Established prescription pha1maceutical products ( core product group) 
OTC products 
Source: (Takeda & Nycomed, 2011) 
• Technology: N/A 
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• Strategie Purpose of M&A for Takeda: 
o Yasuchika Hasegawa (CEO Takeda): "Nycomed enables Takeda to maximize 
the value of our pmifolio and gives us an immediate strnng presence in the high-
growth emerging markets while doubling Takeda's European sales." 
o Hakan Bjorklund (CEO Nycomed): "Tue combination of Takeda's successful 
track record of innovation with Nycomed's efficient commercialization and 
manufacturing infrastrncture will create a global player with a phenomenal 
ability to bring medicines to patients and healthcare providers around the 
world." 
o "Strong fit with Takeda's sustainable growth strategy 
Strengthens pan-European platfmm 
Leverages Nycomed's emerging markets strength to drive growth 
Allows Takeda to maximize the value of its portfolio suppo1ied by 
enhanced development expe1iise and commercialization capability in 
Europe and emerging markets 
Provides a significant growth driver with roflumilast (Daxas® 
tradename in Europe)" 
Source: (Takeda & Nycomed, 2011) 
Okairos R&D-focused, Hybrid, Sta1i-up, lnnovator 
• Background 
o Launched in 2007, VC Funding: Series A (2007), Series B (2010) 
Source: (Crnnchbase, n.d.-g) 
• Value Proposition: 
o "Okairos AG[ ... ], a specialist developer ofvaccine platfo1m technologies". 
o "Okairos is [ . .. ] developing genetic vaccines for major infectious diseases [ . .. ] 
using a novel proprieta1y technology." 
Source: (GlaxoSmithK.line, 2013) 
• Products: 
o Genetic vaccines, preclinical- or clinical-stage products 
Indication: prevention/treatment of respirato1y syncytial virns, hepatitis 
C, malaria, tuberculosis, ebola, HIV, cancer 
o Therapeutic vaccines, preclinica1- or clinical-stage products 
Indication: treatment of cancer 
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Source: (GlaxoSmithKline, 2013) 
• Technology: 
o Novel proprieta1y vaccine platfmm technology 
novel viral vectors ( cell penetration) targeting the stimulation of immune 
responses (T-cells) 
Source: (GlaxoSmithKline, 2013) 
• Strategie Purpose of M&A for GSK: 
o "GSK to fmther expand its vaccines platform technology expertise through 
strategic acquisition." 
o "The acquisition reinforces GSK's commitment to investment in innovative 
science." 
o "Okairos [ .. . ] has developed a novel vaccine platform technology which is 
expected to play an important role in GSK's development of new prophylactic 
vaccines [ . . . ] as well as new classes oftherapeutic vaccines [ .. . ]." 
o "Okairos' technology complements GSK's existing vaccine technology and 
expertise and will enable GSK to continue its work developing the next 
generation of vaccines." 
o Riccardo Cortese (CEO Okarios): "GSK is best-placed to max1mrse this 
opportunity to potentially transfmm the vaccines landscape." 
o "GSK will [ .. . ] assume ownership of early stage assets [ .. . ] supplementing the 
company's existing vaccines pipeline." 
o "GSK and the Okairos management team are committed to [ .. . ] develop ways 
of working that will maintain the autonomy, spirit and agility of this unique 
small biotech firm which will be strengthened by the suppo1t and advantages 
that GSK can provide." 
Source: (GlaxoSmithKline, 2013) 
OncoEthix R&D-focused, Product-oriented, Start-up, lnnovator 
• Background 
o Launched in 2007, Funding: Series A (2012), Series B (2013) 
Source: (Crnnchbase, n.d.-h) 
• Value Proposition: 
o "OncoEthix, a [ .. . ] Oncology Company Developing Novel BET Inhibitors for 
Hematological and Solid Cancers". 
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o "OncoEthix is [ .. . ] aiming to develop a small p01ifolio of oncology drng 
candidates." 
Source: (Merck & Co., 2014) 
• Products: 
o OTX015, clinical-stage product 
Indication 1: treatment of hematological malignancies 
Indication 2: treatment of advanced solid tumours 
Business Wire: "OTX015 was in-licensed from Mitsubishi Tanabe 
Phaima Corporation in March 2012" 
Biospace: "MTPC [ . .. ] licensed the compound to OncoEthix to take 
advantage of its expeliise in the development of novel oncology drngs." 
o OTX008, clinical-stage product 
Indication: t:reatment of cancer 
Source: (Merck & Co., 2014; OncoEthix, 2012) 
• Technology: N/A 
• Strategie Purpose of M&A for Merck: 
o "Expands Merck's Oncology Po1ifolio with Novel Oral BET Inhibitor, 
OTX015" 
o Roy Baynes (Merck Executive): "Oncology is a priority area of focus for Merck 
and the acquisition of OncoEthix supports our strategy to prioritize the 
development of innovative molecules with the potential to improve the treatment 
of advanced cancers." 
o Roy Baynes (Merck Executive): "OTX015 [ .. . ] strategically complements our 
broad immuno-oncology development program." 
o Be1irand Damour (CEO OncoEthix): "Merck best positions OTX015 to be 
developed to its füll potential in ai·eas of high unmet medical need." 
Source: (Merck & Co., 2014) 
GlycoVaxyn R&D-focused, Hybrid, Stali-up, lnnovator 
• Background 
o Launched in 2004, VC Funding: Seed (2006), Series A (2007), Series B (2009) 
Source: (Crnnchbase, n.d.-e) 
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• Value Proposition: 
o "GlycoVaxyn AG [ .. . ] is focused on the development of next-generation 
bioconjugate vaccines against bacterial infections, utilizing its versatile and 
innovative bioconjugation platfotm." 
Source: (GlaxoSmithKline, 2015) 
• Products: 
o Bioconjugate vaccines, preclinical- or clinical-stage products 
Indication: prevention/treatment of bacterial infections (pneumonia, 
Pseudomonas, Staphylococcus aureus, Shigellosis) 
Source: (GlaxoSmithKline, 2015) 
• Technology: 
o Innovative biological conjugation platform technology 
Source: (GlaxoSmithKline, 2015) 
• Strategie Purpose ofM&A for GSK: 
o "GSK strengthens early stage vaccine pipeline with acquisition of Glyco Vaxyn 
AG." 
o "GlycoVaxyn has developed a [ . . . ] platfo1m technology which has the potential 
to play an imp01iant role in the development of new prophylactic and therapeutic 
vaccines for a range of bacte1ial diseases." 
o "The proprieta1y technology also has the potential to enable GSK to develop a 
simplified conjugate vaccine manufacturing process." 
o "GSK will additionally acquire a small number of early stage vaccines [ .. . ] 
supplementing the company's existing vaccines pipeline." 
o Moncef Slaoui (GSK Chairman): "This is an exciting oppotiunity to expand our 
research efforts to develop a new generation of vaccines for common and severe 
bacterial infections, for many of which there are cmTently no effective vaccines. 
lt reinforces our commitment to seek out and invest in great science and 
complements our proposed transaction with Novartis which will strengthen our 
leading position in vaccines." 
o Phillipe Dro (CEO GlycoVaxyn): "[W]e are delighted tobe working even more 
closely with one of the leading vaccine companies in the world". 
o "GSK and the Glyco Vaxyn management team are committed to [ . .. ] develop 
ways of working that will maintain the autonomy, spitit and agility of this unique 
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small biotech fnm which will be strengthened by the supp01t and advantages 
that GSK can provide." 
Source: (GlaxoSmithKline, 2015) 
Actelion Fully Integrated, Product-oriented, Start-up, Innovator 
• Background 
o Launched in 1997, VC Funding: Unknown Series (1998) 
Source: (Crnnchbase, n.d. -a) 
• Value Proposition 
o J&J and Actelion: "Actelion Ltd. is a leading biopha1maceutical company 
focused on the discove1y, development and commercialization of innovative 
drngs for diseases with significant unmet medical need." 
o J&J and Actelion: "Actelion is a leader in the field of pulmonaiy aitelial 
hype1tension (P AH)." 
o Mai·ket Coverage: Global key markets (incl. Europe, the US, Japan, China, 
Russia, Mexico) 
Source: (Duato, 2017; Johnson & Johnson & Actelion, 2017) 
• Products: 
o PAH P01tfolio, commercial-stage products 
Indications: treatment of the whole disease spectrum (from WHO 
Functional Class II to Functional Class IV) 
o Specialist diseases p01tfolio, commercial-stage products 
Indications: treatment of i.e. Type 1 Gaucher disease, Niemann-Pick 
type C disease, Digital Ulcers, T-cell lymphoma 
o Early-stage clinical development assets 
Transaction includes spin-off of early-stage R&D products into new 
company (Indorsia AG), in which Johnson and Johnson has a minority 
stake 
Includes ACT-132577, clinical-stage product 
• Indication: treatment of resistant hype1tension 
• Johnson & Johnson retains option for development and 
commercialisation 
Source: (Duato, 2017; Johnson & Johnson & Actelion, 2017) 
• Technology: N/A 
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• Strategie Purpose of M&A for Jonson & Johnson: 
o J&J and Actelion: "Actelion has established a leading franchise of differentiated, 
innovative products for pulmona1y a1terial hype1tension (P AH) that is highly 
complementaiy to the existing po1tfolio of the Janssen Phaimaceutical 
Companies of Johnson & Johnson." 
o J&J and Actelion: "Tue addition of Actelion's specialty in-market medicines and 
late-stage products is consistent with Johnson & Johnson's effo1ts to grow in 
attractive and complementa1y therapeutic areas and se1ve patients with serious 
illnesses and significant unmet medical need." 
o J&J and Actelion: "[T]he transaction strncture will provide Johnson & Johnson 
flexibility to accelerate investment in its industly-leading, innovative pipeline to 
drive additional growth." 
o Joacquin Duato (JnJ Chailman and Executive VP): "Actelion brings to Johnson 
& Johnson a best-in-class, paradigm-shifting portfolio of medicines that can help 
address an impo1tant medical need: pulmona1y arterial hype1tension." 
o Joacquin Duato (JnJ Chaüman and Executive VP): "The Janssen phaimaceutical 
companies of Johnson & Johnson have been working in five therapeutic ai·eas-
neuroscience; infectious diseases and vaccines; immunology; oncology; and 
cardiovascular and metabolic diseases-and this acquisition will provide our 
sixth." 
o Joacquin Duato (JnJ Chailman and Executive VP): "Johnson & Johnson and 
Actelion will combine our individual capabilities and expertise to fmther 
identify oppo1tunities to reach more patients with P AH, as well as identify new 
geographies in which Actelion has not had a footprint to extend the medicines 
to those areas." 
o Joacquin Duato (JnJ Chailman aind Executive VP): "We will also work with the 
global medical P AH community to fmther enhance the scope of available 
ti·eatment strategies and develop next generation therapies that could potentially 
help patients five to 10 years from now." 
Source: (Duato, 2017; Johnson & Johnson & Actelion, 2017) 
Therachon R&D-focused, Product-oriented, Start-up, funovator 
• Background: 
o Launched in 2014, VC Funding: Series A (2015 & 2017), Series B (2018) 
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Source: (Crnnchbase, n.d.-k) 
• Value Propositions: 
o "Therachon is [ .. . ] focused on the discove1y and development of innovative 
treatment for severe, rare condih.ons with significant unmet need" 
o "The company is cmTently advancing a pipeline of therapeutics focused on rare 
gastrointestinal and musculoskeletal disorders and conditions, including both 
achondroplasia and short bowel syndrome" 
Source: (Pfizer, 2019) 
• Products: 
o TA-46, clinical-stage product 
Indication: treatment of achondroplasia (short-limbed dwarfism) 
o Apraglutide, clinical-stage product 
Indication: treatment of sho1t bowel syndrome 
M&A includes spin-off of Apraglutide program into new company 
(VectivBio) in which Pfizer Ventmes holds a minority stake 
Source: (Pfizer, 2019) 
• Technology: N/A 
• Strategie Purpose of M&A for Pfizer: 
o Mikael Dolsten (Pfizer Executive) "By acqumng Therachon, we hope to 
leverage Pfizer's leading scientific and development capabilities to more rapidly 
advance this potentially promising therapy for people with achondroplasia." 
o Luca Santarelli (CEO Therachon): "With its rare disease expertise and 
worldwide reach, Pfizer is weil positioned to accelerate the development of TA-
46 and fulfill Therachon's vision of addressing the complications suffered by 
children with achondroplasia by targeting the molecular root causes of this 
condition." 
o Seng Cheng (Pfizer Executive) "Pfizer's existing research programs for 
pediatric growth disorders provide a complementaiy setting for this potential 
breakthrough therapy." 
o "Expands Pfizer's rare disease p01tfolio with potential first-in-class therapy for 
achondroplasia." 
Source: (Pfizer, 2019) 
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Amal Therapeutics R&D-focused, Hyb1id, Start-up, lnnovator 
• Background: 
o Founded: 2012, VC Funding: Seed (2014), Series A (2016), Series B (2017 & 
2018) 
Source: (Cmnchbase, n.d.-b) 
• Value Proposition: 
o "Amal is focused on cancer immunotherapy and advancing first-in-class 
therapeutic cancer vaccines derived from its technology platfo1m KISIMA" 
Source: (Swiss Biotech Association, 2019b) 
• Products: 
o ATP128, clinical-stage product 
Indication: treatment ofIV colorectal cancer 
Source: (Swiss Biotech Association, 2019b) 
• Technology: 
o KISIMA platfo1m technology 
"AMAL's first-in-class proprietary KISIMA® platfmm leverages 
peptide/protein-based vaccination technology" 
"AMAL's proprietary technology platfmm KISIMA enables the 
assembly of three functional components into one patented fusion 
protein used as a vaccine" 
Source: (Swiss Biotech Association, 2019b) 
• Strategie Purpose of M&A for Boehringer Ingelheim: 
o "Acquisition adds key platfmm suppo1ting Boehringer lngelheim's focus on 
patients with difficult-to-treat gastrointestinal and lung cancers." 
o "Boehringer Ingelheim plans to develop new therapies by combining assets from 
its cancer immunology portfolio with AMAL's proprietary KISIMA 
immunization platfo1m." 
o Michael Pairet (Boehringer Ingelheim BOD): "Acquiring AMAL is patt of 
Boehringer lngelheim's long-te1m strategy to enhance our existing position as 
an innovator of novel cancer therapies, including immuno-oncology treatments, 
which leverage cutting-edge scientific discoveries and their applications" 
o Michael Pairet (Boehringer Ingelheim BOD): "We want to pioneer new 
paradigms of biology-based care for cancer patients, and the technologies and 
expertise developed at AMAL ai-e critical to our effmts" 
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o "The AMAL acquisition [ ... ] significantly st:rengthens Boehringer Ingelheim's 
strategic focus on immune cell-directed therapies." 
Source: (Swiss Biotech Association, 2019b) 
10.4 Classification of Transactions 
Roche - Glycart 
• Business Segment: Phannaceuticals (core) 
• Therapeutic Area: Oncology (core) 
• V alue Chain: R&D 
Biogen Idee - Fumapharm 
• Business Segment: Phannaceuticals (core) 
• Therapeutic Area: Multiples Scleroses (core) 
• Value Chain: R&D and Marketing & Sales 
(only DE) 
Novartis - Speedel 
• Business Segment: Phannaceuticals (core) 
• Therapeutic Area: Cardiovascular (core) 
• Value Chain: R&D 
M erck & Co. - O.ncoEthix 
• Business Segment: Phan11aceuticals (core) 
• Therapeutic Area: Oncology (core) 
• Value Chain: R&D 
Boehringe1· Ingelheim - Amal The1·apeutics 
• Business Segment: Phannaceuticals (core) 
• Therapeutic Area: Oncology ( core) 
• V alue Chain: R&D 
Alcon - Esbatech 
• Business Segment: Pharmaceuticals (core) 
• Therapeutic Area: Ophthalmology (core) 
• Value Chain: R&D 
Novutis - Alcon 
• Business Segment: Va.rious (core/non-core) 
• Therapeutic Area: Ophthalmology (non-core) 
• Value Chain: all 
Pfize1· - Theuchon 
• Business Segment: Phannaceuticals (core) 
• Therapeutic Area: Rare Diseases (core) 
• V alue Chain: R&D 
Gla:xoSmithKl.ine - Okairos 
• Business Segment: Vaccines (new core) 
• Therapeutic Area: Prophylacticffi1erapeutic 
Vaccines ( core) 
• Value Chain: R&D 
GlaxoSmithKl.ine & GlycoVaxyn 
• Business Segment: Vaccines (new core) 
L Therapeutic Area: Vaccines (core) Value Chain: R&D & Manufacturing 
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01ig:i.nator acquires I.nnovator 
-+ To strengthen R&D in core business 
segment for core therapeutic area 
1 01iginato1· acquires Innovator 
-+ To strengthen R&D in core business 
segment for core therapeutic area 
01iginator acquires Innovator 
-+ To strengthen R&D in core business 
segment for core therapeutic area 
01iginator acquires Innovator 
-+ To strengthen R&D in core business 
segment for core therapeutic area 
Originato1· acquires Innovator 
-+ To strengthen R&D in core business 
segment for core therapeutic area 
Point-of-Call Specialist acquh-es Innovator 
-+ To strengthen R&D in core business 
segment for core therapeutic area 
01ig:i.nator acquires Point-of-Call Specialist 
-+ To expa.nd core and non-core business 
segments for none-core therapeutic area 
01iginato1· acquires Innovator 
-+ To strengthen R&D in core business 
segment for core therapeutic areas 
OTC / Consume1· Health acquires lnnovator 
-+ To strengthen R&D in new core business 
segment for core therapeutic areas 
OTC / Consumer Health acquil'es Innovator 
-+ To strengthen R&D in new core business 
segment for core therapeutic areas 
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Johnson & Johnson - Actelion 
• Business Segment: Pharmaceuticals (core) 
• Therapeutic Area: Pulmonary Arterial 
Hypertension (non-core) 
• Value Chain: (R&D), Marketing & Sales 
Takeda - Nycomed 
• Business Segment: Phannaceuticals (new 
core) 
• Therapeutic Area: Vaiious 
• Value Chain: Manufacturing and Marketing & 
Sales 




OTC / Consumer Health acquires 
lnnovator/Francbise Ma1·ket Leade1· 
-+ To expand core business segment for new 
therapeutic area 
OTC / Consumer Health acquires 
Manufäcturing and Sales Expert 
-+ To optimise value chain and expand 
market reach of new core business 
segment for various therapeutic ai·eas 
1 
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10.5 Interviews with Target Company Representatives 
10 .5 .1 Interview with Dr. Pablo Umafia, Representative of GlycAit 
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW 
Interview with Dr. Pablo Umafi.a 
• Company Co-Founder, CSO of GlycA:rt Biotechnology GmbH (until 2005) 
• Head of Research Roche Glycrut AG, Roche Group 
• Head Cancer lmmunotherapy Discove1y, RICZ, Roche Glyca1t AG 
Interview Details: 
Interviewer: Francy Grnbenmann, Student at ZHA W 
Interview Partner: Dr. Pablo Uma:fia 
Date and Time oflnte1v iew: Wednesday, 29th of April 2020, 11:30 - 12:45 
Fonnat, Place: Video Conference, Switzerland 
Language: English 
Interviewer: When did the idea to do an M&A come up and what made Roche stand out as a 
potential paitner? 
Pablo Umafi.a: From the ve1y sta1t of the company we thought that an M&A was one of the 
exit options. lt was at that particular point in time, however, towards the ve1y end of 2004 and 
beginning of 2005, when it was not ourselves planning for it to happen. lt came really 
unexpected as a completely unsolicited offer from another company. lt was a mid-size European 
phaim a company, which at that point had a lot of cash and wanted to move into oncology, and 
they had a strategy of acquiring small companies for that. This company had as a consultant 
someone who had worked with us before and this person knew all about what we have, and 
what we had in our pipeline let's say, and then this person recommended them to acquire us. 
But we were not aware. So, one day a letter arrived to our board and all our investors with a 
ve1y good unsolicited offer to acquire the company. Alld so, basically, the board decided to take 
this offer, but at the same time, we hired an investment bank to help us manage the process of 
a controlled auction. A series of big biotech and pharma companies were contacted and they 
were told that Glyca1t is now possibly going to be acquired. But that they now have a shmt 
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period of time to come and do an analysis, a due diligence, and if they wanted to, they could 
make a competitive offer. lt was in that process that Roche was one of the companies which 
was contacted, and they came in and they did the due diligence and so on. And in the end, they 
made a better offer than the company which had originally approached us. Of course, we already 
knew Roche as we had an R&D collaboration with Roche. But the M&A process was 
completely independent of that. I'm jumping ahead with one of your questions, but of course 
that contact helped once the process was kicked off. Having already that interaction with Roche, 
and that some of the people involved in the M&A process were the same people that were 
involved in the collaboration helped to some extent. But that was not the reason why Roche 
decided at the end to participate in the M&A process. lt was all kicked off by an unsolicited 
third-paity offer. 
Interviewer: And what made Roche stand out as a suitor? Of course, probably they made a 
ve1y good offer anyway, but what made it stand out in tenns of strategic fit? 
Pablo Umaiia: Glycart was at that time focused just on one platfonn technology, GlycoMAb, 
which was enhancing anti-cancer antibodies, or therapeutic antibodies in general, but mainly 
used for anti-cancer antibodies. And we had two main drng candidates. One was GAlOl, which 
is the anti-CD20 and which is now Gazyva, actually. And then we had another molecule for 
EGFR, another receptor for solid tumours, and that molecule we called GA201. Clearly Roche 
was and is the world leader in oncology and also the biggest, in a way, biopharrnaceutical 
company in the world. And in particular in the ai·ea of CD20 antibodies, Roche was the world 
leader at that point. The only molecule really in the market for anti-CD20, the only anti-CD20 
antibody, was Rituxan/Mabthera and this was from the Roche group. So, from all aspects, being 
the world leader in biophaima, being the world leader in oncology, and really being the only 
developer of an anti-CD20 antibody for the treatment of a lymphomas and leukaemia and 
maybe somewhat immune diseases. All those aspects made Roche the perfect fit. 
Interviewer: And by that, Roche really could see the value of Glycart as well, right? 
Pablo Umaiia: That of course as weil. I was just saying from our point of view, why we thought 
Roche would be a ve1y good fit for Glycart. There was also their whole science-based culture 
and how much they invest in reseai·ch. So that made it of course also ve1y attractive. But even 
just strategically from the type of technology and the type of drng candidates and specifically 
for our main product, which was GA101, which was to become Gazyva, it was a great fit. We 
knew that developing it will require at the end ve1y long and big trials comparing against the 
standard of eure, which at that point of time was, or still is in many indications, Mabthera, 
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which is a product by Roche. Tue perfect partner for that was actually Roche. Not only from 
their overall culture and their philosophy for R&D, but also, actually, from the specific product 
areas in which we were active in. And then, for Roche, it was for the same reasons. They were 
ve1y interested in anti-cancer antibodies and in technologies to enhance these anti-cancer 
antibodies. And they themselves saw that of all the emerging second generation anti-CD20 
antibody drng candidates at that time, some were afready in the clinical stage and others were 
in the preclinical stage like Gazyva, of all of those they saw that GAlOl was a quite promising 
one. Of course, it is still ve1y risky because it was at the preclinical stage, but the data that we 
had at that moment already showed that it had quite good potential. So, from their point of view, 
Roche was the one who was leading and owning, in a way, the anti-CD20 antibody market. So, 
they thought this could be a next generation product that potentially could be better than their 
cmTent product in the market, at least in some indications. So, for them it was also imp01tant to 
get in early. 
Interviewer: Definitely, it does sound like the perfect strategic fit. 
Pablo Umaiia: But the curious thing, I would say, was that although we always thought that it 
would be great to pa1tner eventually with Roche, we were not planning to do that at that 
particular time point. lt was an extemal event which tiiggered the whole thing. 
Interviewer: But for the positive in the end, I would say, right? Now you are a centre of 
excellence within Roche and doing so many great things. 
Pablo Umaiia: Absolutely, it couldn' t have gone better, actually. 
Interviewer: Maybe, if we go along with the questions, we will ce1tainly talk later about this 
more in detail. But were there any other collaborations? And did you also generate some 
revenue from licencing or were you just focusing on R&D? 
Pablo Umaiia: We were focusing on R&D, but we had other research collaborations. The 
model that we had in the company was kind of that we had two main things. One was the 
technology per se and licensing that technology to partners so that they can use it to improve 
their anti-cancer antibodies. And we had a few, not many, but a few early stage preclinical 
resear·ch collaborations testing that technology with some partners to improve their antibodies. 
So, this was all preclinical. For example, one of these collaborations we actually had with 
Roche. And like this, we actually had a few others, but not many. And then the main thing was 
actually developing our own drug candidates that were also improved with the GlycoMab 
technology, like GAlOl. That was the main pait. So, we had a dual model, a hybrid sh"ategy. 
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Licensing to improve products from others, but also developing our own drng candidates. And 
therefore, besides the preclinical collaboration with Roche, we also had a few others. But, of 
course, at that stage, because those were really early preclinical-stage collaborations, the 
revenue streams we had from that was relatively small compared to the funds that were coming 
from our venture capital investors. The main funds for the company were really investrnents 
from venture capital fnms, and there was a small funding coming from these research 
collaborations. But at that stage, it was still ve1y early, so it never moved into clinical stage 
projects with bigger milestone. lt was just early research milestones and they were not that 
huge, let's say. 
Interviewer: So, is it conect to assume that you did not have very established manufacturing 
or marketing and sales units? Because you were still in a preclinical stage, right? 
Pablo Umaiia: Y es, we were preclinical. Actually, we did have, at that time, one clinical study. 
lt was not a product of ours, it was more again a research collaboration with an academic group, 
the University of Oxford. They had originated an anti-cancer antibody many years ago for a 
ce1tain type of leukaemia and they had licenced that antibody to a company in the US, but they 
had maintained some rights to still do some research. Together with them, we designed a ve1y 
small clinical study to make a GlycoMab version ofthat antibody . And then, they would test it 
in a few patients, comparing the two antibodies. lt basically was for a proof of concept of the 
technology per se. But that was still in a time when they had their own kind of GMP facility, 
but it was kind ofvery small within the University. And it was a collaboration with them at that 
stage, but we were not doing the manufacturing, they were doing it. But we were collaborating 
with them for that. And then, for our own product candidates like GAl0l or GA201, we were 
collaborating on the manufacturing side of things with a contract manufacturing organisation, 
which was Lonza, actually. We were collaborating with them to make the production cell lines 
for that. And the very start of defining the production processes. So, that was still at very early 
stages. But for example, the production process for Gazyva is based on the original Lonza 
process. And the manufacturing cell line that is still used now for the market is the cell line that 
we made originally in Schlieren, using the Lonza technology for making the cell lines. And 
Roche adopted that and they optimised the process also. But it was originally based on the 
Lonza ones. So, we did do a little bit of the first GMP manufacturing steps, the ve1y basis at 
that point. And then, the M&A with Roche happened, so they took that over. But the actual cell 
line and production cell was made in Glyca1t. So, that's for manufacturing. We had this 
collaboration with Lonza and already had worked on the early steps. And then for marketing, 
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we had a business development person, and that was basically it. But that person was mainly 
managing interactions with partners for research collaborations. 
Interviewer: Okay, so, that means Glycaii was mainly R&D-focused, had a collaboration with 
Lonza for eai·ly manufacturing and a business development person to manage R&D 
paiinerships, conect? 
Pablo Umaiia: Exactly. 
Interviewer: And then came the M&A with Roche and the integration management. So, when 
did the planning of the integration begin, because you said there was this auction process with 
the due diligence. Did you plan the whole integration project already before the deal was 
closed? And was eve1yone involved, and was iliere a cleai· vision from the beginning on? 
Pablo Umaiia: Yes. Towards the ve1y end ofthe negotiation, when it was clear that the M&A 
was happening, then the integration became pa11 of the discussions. How we would be 
integrated, but at a high level first. For example, we had agreed at the beginning on a trial period 
oftwo years to see how the whole thing would work, basically. And then how our reseai·ch will 
be kept, what we will be working on in general, with whom we will be working, with which 
divisions in Roche we will be interacting. And that were just basically those tenns. But that was 
also stipulated in the contract, in the acquisition agreement. Those bigger tenns or conditions, 
they were already agreed upon in the contract. The actual fine details, then, happened once the 
acquisition contract was signed. But it happened ve1y fast. lt happened immediately and there 
was an integration task force, and with several people involved from Roche and several people 
from our side, coordinating all aspects really, from how to manage the whole human resources 
paii, the financial controlling paii, and the actual projects, of course. A big driver of the 
acquisition was GAl0l, so planning how to manage that project, and creating joint research 
teams between people in Roche and the people in Glyca11. All that was triggered ve1y fast and 
was ve1y well planned in detail. We always had a ve1y impo11ant role in that, as equal pa11ners, 
I would say. So, the integration planning went quite weil. And, of course, some of the people, 
just a few, but some of the people we already knew from before through the research 
collaboration that we had. And they were, as I said, involved in the due diligence and they were 
also involved in the integration task force. Another thing that was ve1y important for me was 
that the head of R&D at Roche at that time, based in Basel, was also quite involved. And he 
was very keen on maintaining this kind of general model that Roche has for this type of 
acquisitions, namely to maintain diversity, let's say, even if the companies are ve1y small like 
Glyca11. So, to reach kind of an optimum between the local culture and independence, but still 
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veiy well coordinated with the central research, so that you have this coordination, but you don't 
completely kill the independence. Because otherwise, if you completely impose all the 
processes and culture and eve1ything, then, of course, you have something probably ve1y 
predictable. But you also just get more of the same. If you want to keep a little bit of diversity, 
you have to strike a balance there. And he was ve1y keen on achieving that. So, from the 
beginning, he told me that I have a direct line to him. And whenever I have a concem or I feel 
that something is not going in the right way, to just call him. And that's what we did. When 
there was some confusion or some disagreement of how something was being done, I would 
directly call him and then he would help to resolve it. 
Interviewer: That sounds like really good communication and collaboration. 
Pablo Umaiia: Absolutely. But it was clear for eve1yone, and really coining from the top in 
Rache that this should be the spirit of the collaboration and the integration. And I think it was 
ve1y imp01tant that people also saw that. That the top level was ve1y intent and that he was ve1y 
keen on making sure that this would happen. 
Interviewer: According to integration theories, it is really impo1tant for biotech stait-ups to 
mainly focus on R&D and to be integrated in a way that prese1ves their culture and know-how 
as much as possible, which is, essentially, by giving them independence. But I would even 
argue, also now based on what you explained, that it's equally important to really work together 
and to get that collaboration going. Do you agree? 
Pablo Umaiia: Absolutely. I think you have to consider that each case may be different 
depending on how advanced and how developed that biotech company was. In our case, we 
were really in a ve1y eai·ly stage. And as I said, we didn't really have clinical development 
expe1tise and we didn't have our own toxicology expe1tise. We only were doing that by 
collaborating with CROs or CMOs. We also didn't have our own manufacturing pait. And the 
major driver for the collaboration was the dmg candidates and transfening that technology, 
transfening the process and so on, but moving that ve1y fast into clinical development. That, 
obviously, required a lot of interaction. lt would be different if Glycait had been at a much more 
advanced stage and had all those functions already within itself. Then maybe Rache could have 
said, "OK, well, then we have like a cominittee or whatever, but you are rnnning all that." But 
in this case, because of the stage of development that Glyca1t was in, that was not possible. To 
move the project fast into clinical trials, it required the people in Rache in those vai·ious 
functions. Manufacturing, toxicology, technical trials, that all had to come from Rache because 
we didn't have it in Glycait. But during those early phases, we needed still to transfer the 
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technology, the cell line, the analytics of how to check for the quality ofthe product, and then, 
all the research pait, that was done completely jointly to still study preclinically the biology of 
the molecule. Because even at that stage, you are just leaming how the molecule is really 
working and with what to combine it best, for example. So, you still need to do a lot of 
preclinical biological research. And there, we were still ve1y active, and we remain ve1y active 
today, in the preclinical biology for research on the molecule. We remain ve1y active in the 
technology itself regai-ding, as I said, developing assays to monitor the quality of the product 
and these kinds of things. But always interacting with Roche. And then, there were things that 
Roche was completely in charge of, like the clinical development and so on. But the nice thing 
was that we were still involved. F or example, myself and a few of my colleagues, we were pa1t 
of the development team even though we had the expe1tise at that point on clinical development 
and so on. But they made us pait of it so we could always have a kind of scientific discussion. 
And for some paiticulai· questions dming the early clinical development, they needed to have 
insight into how the molecule was working. They were also always asking for om opinion. So, 
I think even that was done in a ve1y nice and inclusive way, even in ai·eas which were not really 
of our expe1iise. 
Interviewer: lt sounds like trne team spirit. And it's really one team. Of course, at some point 
somebody's more responsible than the other, but it's still one effmt behind everything, right? 
Pablo Umaiia: Exactly. All that was, of course, with the original products and the original 
technology. And that was ongoing. Then came the phase ve1y shmtly afte1wards where 
Glyca1t' s focus expanded. The technologies that Glyca1t had were of course GlycoMab, but 
also, we had some more expe1tise in protein engineering, for example, on how to humanise 
antibodies. And at that point Roche did not have that technology per se themselves in-house. 
They were getting that as a service from other companies. So, then we actually staited providing 
that service also in a way for other projects within the Roche portfolio. And then, of course, 
there were other anti-cancer antibodies in Roche where they also wanted to test them in the 
GlycoMab version. We then sta1ied a phase where we were working with other project teams 
in Roche. There was a project team - let's say in Germany or even at that time Roche had a 
research centre in Palo Alto for example - and they had their own antibody that they were 
developing for a ce1tain indication and they wanted that antibody to be engineered. So, we were 
helping in that effort as weil. As a result, we became also integrated in the global R&D 
organisation in that respect. Not only with our own projects, but also paiticipating in other 
projects for enhancing them. So, we had two types of expe1tise or areas ofwork, you could say. 
One was on antibody or protein engineering, independent of what the application of that protein 
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was. And the other area was our anti-cancer antibodies that we were developing together with 
Rache. And because ofthat, we were kind of integrated R&D-wise in a dual way. We had one 
connection, one foot let's say, in the therapeutic protein organisation ofRoche. Today, it's the 
same organisation, but it has grown and evolved and is now called the large molecule research 
organisation. So, I always had a reporting line to the head of this organisation. And our teams 
were always pa1ticipating in the global meetings and so on of this organisation. And we were 
doing a lot of projects then jointly. 
Interviewer: And this was not exclusively focused on oncology, if I may ask? 
Pablo Umaiia: That was many times oncology, actually, because the majority ofthe p01tfolio 
is oncology. But sometimes, there were other indications, like neuroscience, inflammation, or 
infectious diseases, and so on. As long as it involved protein engineering, so things where we 
could contribute with some of our expe1tise that we had developed. That was one patt. And 
then, the other patt was oncology itself, the oncology R&D, because of the dmg candidates that 
we had. So, I also was reporting directly to the head of reseat·ch in oncology. We always had 
these dual repo1ting lines. And even today, almost 16 years later, we have maintained that. We 
are still patt of both R&D organisations. We are still patt of the lat·ge molecule protein 
engineering organisation and we at·e still part of the oncology R&D organisation. What changed 
quite early on, around 2007 or 2008, was that we ourselves saw that, okay, we were helping 
with those two projects that we had already in Glycatt, the GAl0l and the GA201, we were 
patticipating in the R&D by applying the GlycoMab technology to other anti-cancer antibodies 
from other researchers in Roche, and we were pa1ticipating in applying some of our protein 
engineering expe1tise and know-how to other projects. That's what we were doing. But we felt 
that this was becoming maybe too limited. And it was a little bit risky to depend only on this 
GlycoMab technology, which was one way of engineering antibodies and one particular way to 
engage ceitain cells of the immune system to contribute to the anti-cancer attack. Let's say it's 
one therapeutic approach. So, we decided that we didn't want to be kind of like a one-trick-
pony. And thus, we decided to still capitalise on our expeitise, but broaden a little. We said, 
" let's developed other technologies, other protein engineering technologies, other ways to 
engineer antibodies," but also, "let' s developed other type of dmg candidates, still on cancer 
and still on engaging the immune system to attack cancer, but in a different way than GlycoMab 
does." Because there are many other types of immune cells that you can recrnit to attack the 
tumour. And that's how we, already back in 2008, made a lot of proposals for projects, 
technology development, and new types of drug candidates. And I presented all these to the 
head of oncology research, to the heads of protein technologies or therapeutic protein research 
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and so on. And they were endorsed and then, we got the funding. And based on this plan - when 
we were still, in parallel, continuing to do the other things that I mentioned - we struted 
developing all these new drng candidates and all these new platfo1m technologies with the 
specific focus on how to better engage the immune system to attack cancer. And at that time 
the cancer immunotherapy field was just staiting to emerge, but today, it is one of the hottest 
areas in the field. And it was through that kind of organic process that we, over time, over this 
period of 15 years, became then the centre of excellence for the Roche prut of the organisation, 
pRED. So, we became the centre for cancer immunotherapy reseru·ch. Because a lot of that is 
based on how to engage T-cells with special types of bispecific antibodies, which was one of 
the things that we sta1ted already back in 2008. Based on new generations of cytokines, which 
was also something that we struted already that time. Something that we started a little bit later 
was using other types of immune modulating proteins. Basically, we have built a pipeline that 
has become quite large and has become the core ofthe immunotherapy pipeline from the pRED 
side. And based on that work, and because we were delivering and these things were moving 
forward, then we grew over that period of time from 29 people, which we were when we were 
acquired, to about 190 people today. And we had only our small building there before, on top 
of a cru· gru·age. And then, a little bit more than two years ago, Roche helped us to have our own 
building. So now, we have a building of 10 floors that is fully dedicated to us. 
Interviewer: And how would you say did Roche support that process of expanding your 
research focus, expanding your technology, and your expertise? Was it easy to find support or 
did it take a lot of convincing? 
Pablo Umaiia: We had huge support and we still have huge support. But of course, you have 
to come up with good plans and you need to work very hai·d for it. You have to come up with 
unique ideas and you have to invest in doing the right experiments and generating the right 
patents. lt is not that they will just do it because you're nice, let's say. Y ou have to come up with 
good ideas and things that look promising. But they were really open to that. And as I said, 
everything that we have been doing - from the acquisition until today - are things that we have 
proposed. There ha.s never been anything imposed on us. So, they never said, "okay now you 
have to work on this." Everything that we are doing is everything that we have proposed. And, 
of course, throughout the time, we needed to align and we needed to go through the normal 
govemance steps for these projects. Andin all these projects, even though they were generated 
from our group, we rely and depend on significant input from many other researchers in other 
pruts of Roche. For example, all the GMP manufacturing, the process development, and the 
toxicology are done in other pruts ofRoche. lt is a close collaboration. None of our projects are 
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done by Roche Glycait alone. They are all done as a collaboration with many other people in 
Roche. So, we ai·e fully embedded. But in a way, this vision ofhaving something that is a source 
of innovation, that has its own culture, and has its own ce1tain level of independence - not 
complete independence, but some level independence- somehow has really tumed out to work 
in practice. But it requires finding this optimum. Optimum of having good supp01t, a lot of 
input, and a lot of collaboration, but at the same time leaving room for proposals coming from 
US. 
Interviewer: Was it already an idea that Glycart should fmther expand and achieve this state 
as a centre of excellence from the stait or was it something that developed? 
Pablo Umaiia: No, it was something that developed. As I said, in the very beginning it was just 
a two-year trial period. I mean, Roche made a significant investment in Glycait and they were 
mainly acquiring the technology and the products, the dmg candidates. And as I said, the major 
driver was really the GAlOl. So, the first two years had a real focus on that and making sure 
this worked out and that the maximum potential of it will be realised. lt was only during that 
time that they got to know us better, and we ourselves then also proposed and said, "look we 
can do this and we would like to do this." We came up with proposals and with ideas and 
convinced people. A lot of it had to come from us, but they were ve1y open to that and ve1y 
supp01tive and flexible. And as I said, at the high level, there was always this vision of making 
the most out of the collaboration. But the actual plans and so on, we bad to drive it. But as I 
said, they were ve1y receptive and ve1y supp01tive. 
Interviewer: And that trial period you mentioned, that was right after the acquisition, conect? 
During that period, did Glycart remain approximately the same as before, or was there already 
some integration happening at that time? For example, HR and IT were already being 
integrated, right? 
Pablo Umaiia: lt was quite intense during that time, as I mentioned. These functions were 
managed locally in our site, so we had an IT person, an HR contact, and a finance person. They 
were from our team, but they were closely collaborating and on a daily basis in contact with 
their counte1pa1ts in Roche. And even the HR at the beginning, because at Glyca1t, we didn ' t 
have our own HR but had a company that was helping us with that service. And even during 
the first months of the integration, they still stayed as a bridge in making the transition to Roche. 
Of course, after a few months, there was eventually a complete transition to Roche HR. 
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Interviewer: So, the people in Glyca1t wbicb were responsible for IT or finance remained? 
They basically became the local counterpa1ts to tbe Rocbe functions? 
Pablo Umaiia: Exactly. Even today, our local head of finance, sbe still repmts to me, but also 
bas a double reporting line to someone in the Rocbe finance organisation. 
Interviewer: So, it's a matrix approach? 
Pablo Umaiia: Exactly. 
Interviewer: And in regard to the integration progress, where there any kind of hurdles that 
you bad to overcome in the integration? And how was the repo1ting handled? Was there always 
claiity on the next steps, and the milestones? And was there transparency in bow eve1ything 
was handled? 
Pablo Umaiia: Yes. There was complete transparency and it was ve1y well organised with 
repmting. lt was all organised by projects, and there were global forums where things would be 
presented. And we bad joined teams. Tbere were govemance bodies wbere repmts were given 
to and so on. At the beginning especially - wben you go into the nitty-gritty of things for 
individual projects and technical details and when there are joint teams - for some people, 
maybe, it was not clear, I would say, from the Roche side. And they feit, "this has to be done 
like this, this is how you should do it." And then, we had to solve those little glitches, but those 
were all, in the end, minor things. And as I said, tbe good thing for us was that we knew that 
we had the suppo1t at the high level and we could always then consult and get their back-up and 
they would always help us resolve those situations. So, there was nothing really major in that 
respect. What was quite demanding for me in a way was that, especially between 2007 and 
2015, there were four overall buge changes in the wbole R&D organisation of Rocbe. With a 
completely new bead of R&D coming and reorganising eve1ytbing. And each of those cbanges 
required a lot of effo1t from myself and from my team to again making sure that what we had 
established before - the ways of working, what was our mission, what was our contlibution to 
the organisation, how was our relationsbip - that all of that was kept and if possible even 
improved and grown. There weren 't the same people that were there from the ve1y beginning 
anymore and we had to kind of re-establish some relationsbips. Four times we bad to go througb 
this wbole reorganisation in Rocbe and that required quite an effort. The good thing was tbat 
we were in Schlieren and we were a unit there. But all the interfaces and, especially, making 
sure that our role and the projects we are working on and the funding and all that was 
maintained, that took some eff 01i. Because eve1y time there is such a big reorganisation, then 
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eve1ything is a little bit questioned again. Do we need to do this this or that way and who is 
responsible for this or that? Should we put more money here or more money there? lt is not an 
integration, but it takes also almost as much effo1t. If you believe in your mission, you want to 
make sure that this mission continues. And, of course, that they will also see it. And in the end, 
it was always good because they could see the value and were all ve1y supportive. They saw 
the contributions we were making and it always worked well. But it required effo1t, it's not like 
that it happened automatically. Eve1y time there is such a research reorganisation, it requires 
some alignment. 
Interviewer: But you were really successful in overcoming these challenges, it seems. Was 
there ever a discussion of moving Glycait to Basel? 
Pablo Umafia: There were, but they never even reached me. I was directly infmmed by my 
bosses in Roche after such a discussion took place, which they had once in a while in the 
leadership team in Basel. But those discussions stopped very quickly. Again, at the highest 
level, where they would say, "no this is not our model, we want to maintain the diversity and 
maintain this innovation and the different innovation spirits." So, those ideas were stopped ve1y 
quickly and they never even reached me. I was told afte1wards. 
Interviewer: You really enjoyed strong support at the top level, and the leadership was really 
committed to your mission, then? 
Pablo Umafia: Yes, absolutely. 
Interviewer: Was there ever unce1tainty in the begilliling about what would happen, or did 
people always feel confident about their future at Roche? Especially considering this two-year 
trial period. Of course, there is always uncertainty in an integration, but if managed well this 
can be limited. How was it for Glyca1t? 
Pablo Umafia: lt think it was ve1y well-managed. Of course, at the beginning, there was some 
unce1tainty, and eve1y time there was one of these R&D reorganisations, there was a little bit 
of unce1tainty. But over time, less and less and less. I think it was always quite well-managed. 
And maybe just at the ve1y beginning, because as I said we had this two-year trial period as per 
contract, so we had only tempora1y contracts for two years. During that time at the beginning, 
it was not quite clear. But ve1y quickly, I think akeady after a year or so, it was getting much 
clearer that we were gonna stay there for the long-te1m . 
Interviewer: The trial period was when exactly? 
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Pablo Umaiia: Mid-2005 to Mid-2007. 
Interviewer: And that was agreed upon at the beginning of the acquisition? 
Pablo Umaiia: Yes, it was in the contract ah·eady. 
Interviewer: And the idea was to test out the waters, to see where the projects would go and 
then decide finiher? 
Pablo Umaiia: Exactly. 
Interviewer: In tenns of talent management, you ah·eady mentioned that there is generally a 
lot of collaboration, especially as Glycaii became bigger and expanded. How was and is this 
knowledge exchange ensured, and are people free to maybe join different teams or to develop 
themselves professionally in other areas of Roche? 
Pablo Umaiia: Absolutely. For the projects, eve1yone is pa11 of global teams and therefore they 
are interacting with people all over the world in Roche. Many times also through collaborations 
that we have with people in Chugai or in Genentech. And of course, we have projects that have 
moved into the later-stage organisation. So - after clinical proof of the concept when the 
projects moved into late phase two or phase three, or into the market like Gazyza - there is an 
interaction with people that are in the latest stage global organisation all over the world and 
with commercial and so on. And so, those interactions ai·e given and people are quite connected. 
And sometimes people have moved away from Schlieren and have actually taken a job 
somewhere eise in Roche, in Basel or Penzberg, for example. 
Interviewer: Did people from other pa11s ofRoche join Glycart as well? 
Pablo Umaiia: Absolutely, that as well. It's really both ways. 
Interviewer: That is great and probably also helped in establishing this feeling of 
"togethemess," right? 
Pablo Umaiia: Exactly. And then, of course, also in our building, now we have people co-
located from what we call other global pRED functions. They are not repmting to me, but they 
are located in Schlieren because they collaborate ve1y closely with us, so it was important to be 
co-located. We have people, for example, that are from the clinical side, we have people that 
are on the clinical biomarkers or the actual clinical scientists and clinical leaders that are based 
in Roche Glycart and pa11 of Roche Glycait But their global repo11ing line is not with me, 
because they ai·e in the clinical organisation. We also have people from the toxicology/safety 
Francy Grnbenmann 135 
Phanna Post-Merger Integration - Success Factors and Best Practices in the Integration ofSwiss Biotech 
Sta1t-ups 
organisation that are also based in Schlieren and they repmi to someone in Basel, for example. 
We have people from the global infmm atics organisation which are also based in our building 
as they need to suppo1t our projects and facility, a lot of big data type of analysis and things 
like that. They are not repo1t ing to me, but they are co-located. Of course, the majority of the 
people based in Roche Glycait, because it is an early R&D site, is under this cancer 
immunotherapy research with an oncology and protein engineering pa1t. As of today, that is 
still the majority. And through a couple of layers, these people are repmting to me and then 
repmting from me into the global oncology and into the global large molecule reseai·ch 
organisation. But, in addition to those, we also have a few people from other pa1is of the 
organisation which are co-located with us. 
Interviewer: That, indeed, makes much sense because it's really impmtant to have this inter-
connectedness in a way, right? 
Pablo Umaiia: Absolutely. 
Interviewer: In te1ms of cultural integration challenges, would you say that there was some 
kind of unce1iainty towards Roche as a big phaim a corporation, especially from your 
perspective as an entrepreneurial staii -up. Or were there no challenges in that aspects? 
Pablo Umaiia: I think there was some uncertainty at the beginning, especially the first years. 
But as over time people staited interacting a lot more in these global teams and as we saw that 
we could develop our ideas but at the same time collaborate, this unce1iainty kind of all went 
away. lt is nice because I can really say we kind ofhave both things at the same time. We have 
a local identity and the local biotech spirit, and people really appreciate the local culture and 
the ways we work and interact and so on. But at the same time, people really feel pa1t ofRoche 
and appreciate that and are proud of that. And so, it is really nice as we have the best of both 
worlds, actually. 
Interviewer: That's great and definitely sounds also like a recipe for success. I think it's ve1y 
impo1iant to preserve that biotech spirit, but also at the same time become one bigger unit, one 
team. 
Pablo Umaiia: Absolutely. 
Interviewer: And how independent, would you say, ai·e you in te1ms of research, especially 
considering decision authority with the projects you are working on. 
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Pablo Umafia: I would say the vast majority ofwhat we are doing is really things that we have 
proposed. I mean, we do some things where we are supp01ting other projects that were proposed 
somewhere else. But the majority of what we're doing are things that we proposed. For those 
things eventually to move f01ward into the clinic, it requires a lot of funding and it requires a 
lot of input from people working in other parts of Roche. And therefore, for that to happen, 
those projects need to go through the normal govemance and approvals. We need to 
demonstrate certain things and we need to present them. The project teams, they need to rep01t 
on what is the result so far and what are the plans for the next stage, and how much money and 
people are needed to supp01t the next phase. And this needs to be endorsed of course. In that 
sense, we are not independent, let's say. But we are independent in the sense that it is up to us 
to make that happen and to generate the idea and then the data and move the project forward. 
In collaboration, of course. So engaging people from many other parts of Roche. But in the end, 
it of course requires approval. That is for the projects. And then our n01mal functional costs, 
let's say the budget, so the salaries ofthe people, the costs for rnnning the site, the rent, all that 
at the end has tobe approved by people in pRED's central management. 
Interviewer: Y ou also talked about how the integration into Roche helped Glycart expand and 
how you had a lot of support from Roche for that. Do you think that through this transformation 
which Glycart went through, that you also transformed Roche in a way? 
Pablo Umafia: I would like to think so, yes. Even little things at the beginning did a bit. The 
production processes for making the therapeutic proteins, for instance, we brought in from the 
collaboration with Lonza. In Roche, it was applied then for other projects as well. Roche, of 
course, was developing their own production platform , which is the one that is used today. But 
for some products, the Lonza one was used and in a way that was introduced because of the 
collaboration with Glycart. That is just a minor thing. But of course, the bigger thing is that if 
you look today, oncology is still the major area for Roche. And within the pRED part of the 
organisation, which is one third of the organisation, cancer immunotherapy has a major part of 
the oncology p01tfolio, and we are mainly responsible for that. If you look at, for example, the 
clinical pipeline today in pRED, a large propor1ion of that comes originally from projects that 
were started in Schlieren. So, I would like to say that from that point ofview, of course Glycart 
has bad a big impact in Roche. The whole cancer immunotherapy strategy is based on ce1tain 
platfo1ms on how to engage T-cells and how to stimulate ce1tain immune cell, and these were 
things that have been developed out of ideas and eff01ts that we started in Glycart ar·e ah·eady 
10 years ago. And that's why we have kind of become de facto the cancer immunotherapy 
centre for the pRED part of the organisation. 
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Interviewer: So, you brought that expeliise into Roche? 
Pablo Umafia: Exactely. In that patt, absolutely, yes. We have a big impact in Roche. I don' t 
know if your question was more in regards to culture or so? 
Interviewer: I mean, as you said in the beginnin.g, Rache celebrates cultural diversity, so I think 
with eve1y additional culture represented, the culture of Rache gets more diverse, right? 
Pablo Umafia: Absolutely. 
Interviewer: I was more thinking about what was the value that Roche gained from Glycatt 
and what were the changes in strategy, business focus, or approaches resulting from the 
integration of Glycatt? 
Pablo Umafia: Well, as I said, the major patt ofthe therapeutic p01tfolio today, of the clinical 
po1tfolio, is cancer immunotherapy. And a lot of the strategy and the drng candidates currently 
in the pipeline for cancer immunotherapy have been born out of this original eff01t from 
Glycati. 
Interviewer: And what would you say is the value for customers from the acquisition? 
Pablo Umafia: Tue value is that, as a company, we are generating many more options, new 
shots on goal, let's say. We have new differentiated drng candidates. Our role in society where 
we are now in the R&D is to bring meaningful new potential treatment options for patients in 
need. In paiticular in our case for cancer patients in need. And that' s the great thing about being 
patt of Rache in a way, because the philosophy is all about differentiation. lt is all about no me-
too products, they really need to have something significantly different, either from increa.sed 
efficacy or a better therapeutic index that maintains the efficacy but is better tolerated and things 
like that. So, the molecules need to be differentiated and that can only come from new research 
ideas. And I think the collaboration between Glycatt and Rache has really delivered on that. 
Interviewer: And not only with your ideas, but also with your technologies and approaches, 
COITect? 
Pablo Umafia: Absolutely. lt is both things. On the one side we have the ability for how to 
engineer antibodies to do a ce1iain job better. That is a critical element, but it's not the driver. 
Tue driver is always the understanding of the disease biology, where we also invest a lot. 
Understanding how the immune system is recognising the cancer cells, how the immune system 
can attack that tumour, and so on. And based on that new understanding that we gather - of 
course by ourselves, but also in collaboration with others in Roche and in collaboration with 
Francy Grnbenmann 138 
Phanna Post-Merger Integration - Success Factors and Best Practices in the Integration ofSwiss Biotech 
Sta1t-ups 
extemal world and aeademie partners - based on that understanding, we then make new 
therapeutie hypothesis ofhow we ean make a medieine that better engages the immune system 
to attaek eaneer. And then, we take advantage of our protein engineering expe1tise to make that 
new type of medieine. But the driver is always the new biologieal understanding and a new 
therapeutie hypothesis, whieh is then enabled by the improved protein engineering. 
Interviewer: So basieally, first you have to understand it better and then develop something 
that ean fight or treat it better, eoneet? 
Pablo Umaiia: Exaetly . 
Interviewer: That sounds really like a wonderful value proposition and I am trnly looking 
f mward to seeing what other medieines will originate from Glyeart. Regarding Geneteeh, whieh 
was shmily fully aequired by Roehe after the aequisition of Glyeart, and you did have some 
kind of eollaboration during that time eoneeming Gazyva, right? Do you think the aequisition 
of Glyea1i and thereby Gazyva influeneed Roehe in its deeision to fully integrate Geneteeh? 
Pablo Umaiia: No, I don't think that was a driver at all. That was mainly driven by other 
strategie reasons. lt is trne that the in-lieensing of Gazyva by Genenteeh happened prior to the 
füll acquisition of Genetech. At that time, Genentech had a collaboration with Biogen Idee on 
a next generation produet for CD-20 antibody. They were also working on a new one and in a 
way eompeting with Gazyva. But ve1y early on, already in phase 1, they thought Gazyva was 
more promising. So, they stopped their projeet and both Genenteeh and Biogen Idee in-lieensed 
Gazyva. Moreover, Chugai also in-lieensed Gazyva. In the ease of Genenteeh - nowadays 
Genenteeh does not in-lieense anything beeause it is fully part ofRoehe - but at that time it was 
not fully pa1t of Roehe, so Genenteeh had to in-lieense Gazyva. But that was in no way a driver 
of the füll aequisition of Geneteeh. 
Interviewer: Ah ok, so that just eon elated in the timeline. 
Pablo Umaiia: Exaetly. 
Interviewer: Maybe in more general ten ns, do you think the aequisition by Roehe aeeelerated 
the progress made at Glyeait or did it slow it down? 
Pablo Umaiia: Absolutely aeeelerated it. For us, it was a huge eatalyst. Beeause of the way in 
whieh it was done. And beeause we were allowed and given the spaee to develop and pursue 
our own ideas, but at the saine time getting a lot of suppo1t from Roehe. Not only finaneial 
suppmt, but aetual R&D suppmt. We beeame paii of a joint team that was helping to move 
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forward ideas that we had proposed. So, it has been a huge catalyst. Being pait of Roche has 
allowed us to grow tremendously and to pursue new ideas. We have a completely different 
focus today. I mean, we have the same focus in the sense that we are still doing antibody 
engineering and we are still working on how to engage the immune system on how to attack 
cancer. That was the focus of Glyca1t from the beginning, antibody engineering and engaging 
the immune system to attack cancer. But the kind of things that we ai·e doing today - the type 
of antibody engineering and the type of ways in which we engage the immune system - are 
completely different. 
Interviewer: I was just asking because in some integration cases, it happens that it shifts the 
focus away from impmiant things or complicates ce1iain matters, and as a result, the progress 
slows down. But if done right, it' s the opposite, do you agree? 
Pablo Umaiia: Absolutely. And as I said, most things we are doing locally is under our control. 
That is also why it is impo1tant to maintain this kind of duality. Because all those things ofhow 
we do the initial pait of our research, how we do our experiments, and coordinate those things, 
and prio1itise certain things over others. All that still is done completely by us and in a way in 
which we think is best. So that' s how things are not slowed down. lt is not that if we need to 
make a new protein or to test something in a new assay or so, we have to ask pe1mission from 
someone. 
Interviewer: So, you really got that suppmt and that autonomy to make that process effective? 
Pablo Umaiia: Yes, absolutely. 
Interviewer: Finally, what would you say is the most impmtant thing when integrating a 
biotech company, especially for big phaima? What was the lesson leained, basically? 
Pablo Umaiia: I think, it's really having a lot of transpai·ency and from the beginning making 
sure to have alignment at the higher level with people that are really at the top of the R&D on 
what the vision is for the collaboration. An early aligning on that, and making sure that this is 
maintained. And really - because if you don't want to have more of the same - having that sense 
of how we can organise things in a way that is trnly synergistic. And not in the end making an 
amalgam that is just making more of the same. Having a lot of clarity from the beginning on 
that and aligning in the higher levels of management on that vision. 
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10.5.2 Interview with Dr. Dominik Escher, Representative ofESBATech 
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW 
Interview with Dr. Dominik Escher 
• Company Co-Founder, CEO of ESBATech AG (until 2009) 
• Head ofESBATech, an Alcon Biomedical Research Unit LLC (until 2011) 
• Head of ESBATech, a Novartis Company LLC (until 2016) 
• Pa1tner at Pureos Bioventures 
• Executive Chairman of CDR-Life Inc. 
• President of Swiss Biotech Association 
Interview Details: 
Interviewer: Francy Grnbenmann, Student at ZHA W 
Interv iew Partner: Dr. Dominik Escher 
Date and Time oflnterv iew: Tuesday, 21st of April 2020, 9:00 - 10:00 
Format, Place: Telephone Call, Switzerland 
Language: English 
Interviewer: What was the situation of ESBATech before the acquisition? Was Beovu already 
in the development pipeline? I also read that ESBATech had a collaboration with Roche. Where 
there any others and how did ESBATech generate revenues? 
Dominik Escher: With Roche, it was a very early collaboration on target gene validation. lt 
was a time when all these genes, because the human genome sequencing was completed, were 
all of a sudden available and nobody really knew the function behind them. So, when we star·ted 
in 1998 with ESBATech, there was the business plan to establish ourselves in the field of tar·get 
gene validation. We were using yeast, which is a cellular system which we did a research on at 
the university. The concept was that we sort of take human diseases and put that into yeast, and 
then start to understand at the molecular level how the disease works, and more imp01tantly, 
trying to eure the disease at the molecular level. And that was the topic of the Roche 
collaboration. There was a gene in Alzheimer' s disease where the function was not yet 
completely clear and we provided a resear·ch plan to them to elucidate the function of that gene. 
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And that research collaboration was anticipated over two years which we completed, and 
eveiything was fine. We could smt of identify the function of that gene in Alzheimer's disease. 
But that was at the very early beginning and I think we started in 1999 and that was terminated 
or completed in 2001. 
Interviewer: Were there any later collaborations? 
Dominik Escher: No, we had none. Actually, it was a little bit on purpose because we decided 
to go through the classical venture capital financing round. And we had then, in the end, back 
in 2009, we had 90 million ofventure capital in the company. We did the first financing round 
two weeks after 9/11, which had everybody turn crazy and the deal almost broke apart of course. 
lt was especially the bankers, the world was mad, probably even madder than today with the 
coronavims crisis. But that was the first financing round where we had mainly three Swiss 
banks, Lombard Odier as the lead investor, Credit Suisse, and Banca della Svizzera ltaliana. 
And shortly thereafter, the tech bubble hurst, where the market crashed dran1atically. And all 
the Swiss banks had to step out of venture capital because they considered this class of 
investment as much too risky for them. So, we lost all of our investors, which was not an easy 
task then to do the second financing round. But back in 2006. Because the first question, if you 
go to any investor for a second round is, how much is coming from the old investors and who 
is taking the lead from the old investors. There, I had to say, well, we lost basically all our old 
investors and we will not get money from our old investors. lt was a difficult task and we on 
purpose went out to the US to attract US VCs and we were lucky to find Clarus Ventures and 
SV Life Sciences, two strong US life science-specialised venture capitalists. And then, I took 
the lead and by that I could then fill up. 
Interviewer: So then conceming revenue streams before the acquisition? 
Dominik Escher: Yes, that was zero. 
Interviewer: But you did have this great technology that had proven successful and you had 
some attractive dmg candidates in the pipeline? Was Beovu already in R&D at that point? 
Dominik Escher: Y es, the second most advanced program was Beovu. We started that program 
back in 2006. 
Interviewer: And then came the acquisition by Alcon, which seemed like a perfect strategic 
fit, conect? 
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Dominik Escher: So, the acquisition was driven by our financial need. As I mentioned before, 
we had 90 million venture capital in the company, which was for that time, at least for a Swiss 
biotech company, quite a sizable amount. And we had three programs in the clinic. And as soon 
as you strut clinical development, the costs are again dramatically increasing. So, we probably 
would have had a financing need of another 100 million in order to advance our programs. We 
would have been at that time perfectly IPO ready. But you might recall that again in 2008/2009, 
there was a financial crisis and there were, I think:, globally hardly any biotech IPOs. So, it was 
for us just possible to go through the M&A route, which was never my prefen ed scenario. If I 
was right in our business plans scenario 1, an IPO and to fmther build the company was always 
my prefened scenru·io. But you know, "bad timing" of course. So, we went through the 
acquisition route and we approached all the players in the field. We, on purpose, only wanted 
to do a trade sale with a franchise deal. Tue company, at that time, had three clinical programs. 
Two were in eye diseases, so in ophthalmology, and one was outside of ophthalmology. But we 
said that the ideal case would be to sell the ophthalmic pa1t and to retain the rights outside of 
ophthalmology for a new company in order to fmther advance that company. 
Interviewer: And the new company was Delenex, right? 
Dominik Escher: Exactly. That was the spin-out of all non-ophthalmic assets into Delenex, 
which we then sold in summer 2016 to Cell Medica. And with the Alcon acquisition, we really 
went shopping, of course, and had quite some interest from a number of companies. But as you 
mentioned before, we also felt that with Alcon we had the best strategic fit. And Alcon was at 
that time the leader in eye diseases, globally, very recognised in that space. But they had no 
biologics. And we were developing so-called antibody fragments which are biologics and they 
had to move into that field because it was a huge growing field in eye diseases. 
Interviewer: Okay, perfect. Then, I would like to ask you some questions regarding the 
integration phase, and if possible, always cover both the integration into Alcon as well as the 
one into Nova1tis for each topic. So, the first question is, when did the integration planning with 
Alcon start and were all pruties involved in that? 
Dominik Escher: With Alcon, then, it was a process which went, I think a little bit more than 
one year and, of course, we were fully involved in all the integration pa1ts. So, from our side, 
actually, we made a proposal on how to integrate into Alcon. Of course, we started to get to 
know the Alcon company in much more detail during the due diligence. Y ou meet all the 
people, you talk to all the scientists and to all the executive leadership, and you see how Alcon 
operates. And, of course, they also started to understand, then, how we operate and what we 
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can bring into the deal. And from that point of view we sta1ted to write a business plan for post-
integration into Alcon where we had a steady growth over the next coming years in conjunction 
with quite a sizable investment from Alcon into ESBATech to fully automate some pait of the 
research programs. And that whole plan, including integration, who will be pa1t of the 
leadership, all that stuff, that was in place before we signed the agreement with Alcon. 
Interviewer: So, before the acquisition was closed? 
Dominik Escher: Exactly. lt was really going integral during the negotiations, we sta1ted to 
write this business plan and the integration plan .. lt was ve1y strnctured and ve1y well organised, 
from both sides. And ve1y committed from Alcon because, of course, they wanted to acquire 
us. And I think they also paid a reasonable price for that. For them, it was one of the !arger 
acquisitions they have done in their hist01y, so from that point of view, we really had the füll 
attention from all the management levels. 
Interviewer: Then, what about Nova1tis, were you also equally involved in the integration into 
Nova1tis? 
Dominik Escher: We were actually d1iving the whole integration and from Novaitis, there was 
much less reaction. lt was the complete acquisition of Alcon, you know. And, of course, they 
realised that within Alcon, there is also a legal entity called ESBATech in Zurich, which at that 
time roughly bad 85 people, so, relatively small compai·ed to the whole Alcon group. But the 
overall reseai·ch and development was roughly 120 people at Alcon in Fo1t W01th. And as I 
mentioned, roughly 80 to 90 people at ESBATech in Zurich. So, it was a little bit more that 200 
people in the R&D sector. And within Novartis, R&D is conducted in the division called 
Nova1tis Institute of Biomedical Research. The NIBR division. That's the only division which 
does not generate any revenues, but is just responsible for discove1y and early research up to 
clinical proof of concept. And at that time, there were roughly 30 people in Cambridge focusing 
on eye diseases. So overall it [ Alcon + Nova1tis] was an R&D organisation of 230 to 250 people, 
depending 011 how you calculate it with the associates. And it was the Iai·gest research 
organisation globally just focusing on eye diseases at the time of acquisition. So, given that 
size, of course, that brought some interest also from Novaitis. But for the integration into NIBR, 
that was then a process where the head of NIBR ophthalmology was involved as well as all the 
heads of Alcon and ESBATech. And we sort of designed an organisation where all the different 
pa1ts were continuing to do research and were sort of equally distributed. That was the 
integration into NIBR, but since we were located in Switzerland, ESBATech, from a legal point 
of view, was integrated into Novartis Phaima Switzerland. And still being a legal entity, I was 
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also pa1t of the executive management of N ovartis Switzerland. But that integration was 
completely driven by us, so we made proposals on what has to be done. Then, of course, they 
had some requirements on IT solutions, financing, all that stuff, you know, the SG&A aspect 
and that was basically just taken over then from Novaitis. 
Interviewer: And the integration planning happened already before the completion of the 
takeover of Alcon by Novaitis or afte1wards? 
Dominik Escher: No, it was after the closing. 
Interviewer: And Novaitis already had a majority shareholding in Alcon before the acquisition 
and then decided to fully acquire it, conect? 
Dominik Escher: That 's conect. At the first possible time, they had the option to fully acquire 
Alcon, and Nova1t is triggered on that. At the first option they were able to do this. 
Interviewer: But the actual planning ofthe integration, especially of R&D, was then done post-
acquisition? 
Dominik Escher: Yes, exactly . 
Interviewer: How about the integration management in regard to integration leadership and 
integration office. Were responsibilities clearly assigned during the whole process? 
Dominik Escher: With Alcon yes, with Nova1tis no. And as I mentioned before, we were 
driving that because we felt as s01t of being in the vacuum. Especially with the requirements 
for repo1t ing within Novaitis and all the requirements for financial repo1t ing, IT systems, all 
that stuff. And we had to proactively approach Novait is hundreds of times probably to navigate 
our ways through the integration. 
Interviewer: So, there was a lot of unce1tainty in that phase? 
Dominik Escher: Yes, totally. 
Interviewer: But with Alcon, it was clear? Did you have a dedicated team for the integration? 
Dominik Escher: Yes, exactly . 
Interviewer: And with Alcon, the integration team was representative of both companies 
involved, and with Novaitis it was more of a strnggle, conect? 
Dominik Escher: With Novartis it was a complete freestyle. To give you an example on the 
commitment: When we did the Alcon integration, the whole executive leadership team from 
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Alcon located in Fort W01th flew over to Zurich to welcome all of the employees. We had a 
townhall meeting, where they were presenting and welcoming us. Basically, like good parents 
when the kids come home, they are there and say hello to the kids. With Novartis, it took almost 
two years after the acquisition until Joseph Jimeuez as CEO came over to Zurich. And he started 
to recognise what kind of value we bring to Nova1tis as we achieved quite a number of clinical 
proof of concepts with our programs. But, for instance, the president ofNIBR, Mark Fishman 
at that time, he never visited us in Zurich. And I think that is just an extremely poor behaviour 
and poor leadership from my point ofview. 
Interviewer: I would agree. And it doesn't really promote commitment or confidence among 
the ESBATech employees. 
Dominik Escher: That's right. 
Interviewer: Moving on to my next question, how was progress monitoring and 
communication handled? Was there a lot of transparency with Alcon? 
Dominik Escher: Y es, as I mentioned, we really had this business plan, which had several 
stages of the integration. And we always monitored the progress on this integration plan. And 
that was perfectly done. Also, the whole growth afte1wards within Alcon, as I mentioned, all 
these automations and optimisation of research pa1ts. That was perfectly done and a huge 
investment from Alcon. And they, of course, were extremely interested in that we advance our 
pipeline as fast and as good as possible. And that worked perfectly well. 
Interviewer: And with Novaitis, there wasn' t much monitoring or communication? 
Dominik Escher: There was zero monitoring. 
Interviewer: Do you think that has anything to do with Novaitis' size or because ESBATech 
was not individually acquired, but as apart of Alcon? 
Dominik Escher: Good question. Novaitis has done a couple of acquisitions and I think they 
probably leamed from how poorly the Alcon acquisition was done. Because that was sometimes 
also a topic in the leadership or executive team meetings. And we could give an example of 
how we did the integration into Alcon. And so, Novaitis probably leamed a little bit on the 
mistakes they made. But such integrations are always really difficult, except if you ai·e 
extremely motivated, as Alcon was, then you spend time, money, and energy on that. But with 
Novaitis, I think many people did not really want to have Alcon at Nova1tis. So, it was really a 
decision which was driven by Daniel Vasella at that time. And the executive leadership 
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basically just had to say yes to that and then, of course, it was pushed down into all the different 
divisions and functions, and people were not convinced about that acquisition and, of course, 
then you already stait to fight against quite some pushbacks from different people. 
Interviewer: How were cultural differences handled as there was assumingly quite a difference 
in corporate cultures between ESBATech, Alcon, and Novaitis? 
Dominik Escher: The cultural difference to Alcon was quite dramatic, I would say. There was 
an old organisation located in Texas, whicb has a different mindset tban people here in central 
Europe . Ve1y much sales- and marketing-driven and a relatively small research unit whicb was 
unsuccessful in the pharma business to generate any innovation over years, almost decades. 
And from that point, the cultural difference was dramatic. But the good thing was that Alcon 
really left us in complete freedom and actually even the CEO mentioned, when he came to this 
townhall in Zuricb to welcome us, that be wants to maintain the ESBATech spirit because that' s 
why they acquired us at that time. Because they were fascinated at bow we were working on 
the innovation and, of course, you do not want to disrnpt that. And so, we bad füll freedom to 
operate. I think we had a ve1y privileged position also in the leadership team. Some people 
really had bard times to pusb the programs througb, and all our programs were approved and 
went througb the pipeline extremely smoothly . From that point of view, this was pretty good. 
At Nova1tis, it was then completely different because Nova1t is had all these requirements to 
adapt to all their systems, whether it made sense or not. Moreover, Novaitis has a culture, if we 
look at their past acquisitions, to really completely integrate and make eve1ything flat. That's 
their policy. Rocbe, for example, has a completely different philosopby in that. Tbey leave, just 
as Alcon did, all these companies at arms-length, give them freedom and ce1tain autonomy . But 
Novaitis was the complete opposite. 
Interviewer: So, with Nova1t is, there was a great degree of integration wbich did not really 
resonate with the people? 
Dominik Escher: Yes, that' s in pait the consequence. We bad also a mucb-increased tumover. 
As a biotech and even within Alcon, the tumover was extremely low and people really stayed 
with the company in the difficult times before the acquisition. But then, at Novait is, that's an 
easy measure then, the tumover sta1t ed to increase and that' s always a sign that something is 
not working ve1y well. 
Interviewer: This leads me to my next question. How was talent management done in te1m s of 
personnel excbange or development oppo1tunities? 
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Dominik Escher: With Alcon, since we were then much more in clinical development, we 
actually requested that somebody from the clinical department of Alcon came over to Zurich. 
This was a person who then did a two-year sabbatical with us, which is a big commitment. He 
had, or has, a family in Fo1t Worth but decided to spend two years in Zurich and commuting 
eve1y quruter back to visit. But I think it was ve1y good to have a person here in Zurich who 
knew all the systems and the culture for clinical development at Alcon. And we were using 
these resources of course. We had a relatively small clinical team of roughly eight people at 
that time. But when you sta1t more clinical trials, then, of course, you have to expand on the 
headcount quite dramatically . And we could use the resources of Alcon, which I think was a 
great synergy. And with this link we had optimal communication between the two units. 
Interviewer: Do you think this link also suppmted the infonnation exchange between 
ESBATech and Alcon? 
Dominik Escher: Ce1tainly that and also, of course, through me. I was prut of the global R&D 
leadership team at Alcon and we had weekly meetings and video conferences. I visited Fo1t 
Wo1th once a month. And, of course, we had to make sure that communication flows well. 
Interviewer: And how was the talent management and exchange with Nova1tis handled? 
Dominik Escher: In this aspect, I have to say that Novartis is really doing a good job. They 
have a system where they allow people to explore new sides within Novrutis and we had three 
people at least who spent three to six months over in Boston, working in another reseru·ch group, 
not only in ophthalmology, but also in other groups at Novrutis. There, Novartis is extremely 
open within the company that people can explore new possibilities and that you have the 
possibility to see new functions or roles. Also, for development. That's a really good aspect of 
Nova1tis. 
Interviewer: Ce1tainly, and it probably also facilitated knowledge sharing? 
Dominik Escher: Yes, absolutely. 
Interviewer: What about the integration of functions such as Mru·keting and Sales as well as 
suppo1ting functions? 
Dominik Escher: In regards to IT, we took over the Novrutis IT system. For HR, we had our 
own function at ESBATech. In that aspect, it was impo1tant to me to have a ce1tain 
independence. Sales and Marketing is of course not really a topic if you still focus on R&D, so 
there was no integration and NIBR also had and still has nothing to do with sales and marketing. 
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Interviewer: How were responsibilities in terms of drng discove1y and development as weil as 
commercialisation handled? Did ESBATech handle the R&D up until clinical proof of concept 
and then the sales and marketing departments ofNovaitis took over? 
Dominik Escher: Y es, that was also the concept that we had agreed upon with Alcon. 
ESBA Tech was responsible from beginning of the reseai·ch, the discove1y phase as it is called, 
up to clinical proof of concept, which is n01mally the so-called clinical trial phase 2a. This is 
where you for the first time show that the dmg is working in patients. And then afte1wards, it 
really gets into a completely different world where we had no experience and you need much 
more people for expanding on the clinical side. For Beovu, the phase 2b was done by Alcon 
and then Novartis took over and did the phase 3. Interestingly, this was the same stmcture that 
also NIBR has within Nova1tis. NIBR is also, within Nova1tis, responsible from discove1y up 
to clinical proof of concept. There, we were fully aligned. 
Interviewer: In te1ms of value creation, where do you think was the biggest synergy potential 
with Alcon and Novaitis? 
Dominik Escher: With Alcon, the synergy was that Alcon had three divisions, which were 
phaima, vision care, and surgical. And in lenses and surgical, they were still ve1y innovative 
and were really leading the field. Whereas in the phaima sector, which, from a financial point 
ofview, was the most impo1tant one for Alcon, they completely lacked innovation. They didn' t 
bring a new drng to the market for about 15 or 16 years before our integration. So, all that they 
did was repurposing old dmgs into eye drnps and selling that as their medicines. But no 
innovation. 
Interviewer: And then, ESBATech supp01ted innovation by bringing in their technology and 
expe1tise? 
Dominik Escher: Exactly. 
Interviewer: How about with Novaitis? 
Dominik Escher: With Novaitis, the situation was different because Novartis has some, or 
claims to have some, expe1tise with biologics. Which, however, ifyou look at what they really 
develop intemally, is still extremely poor from my point of view. And we were act:ually 
contributing 18% of all the biological proof of concepts at the complete Novaitis life from 
ESBATech. Which was with 90 people at that time, and comparing to more than 6,000 at NIBR 
doing just reseai·ch and development, quite sizable. And that was the reason that also drove the 
attention of the key management to Zurich. They sta1ted to recognise that this small unit in 
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Zuricb is doing quite well. This is always a big event in any company if you can, for tbe first 
tin1e, sbow that your drng works witb patients. And, of course, also Novaitis is celebrating that. 
And Nova1tis bas to deliver rougbly 10 proof of concepts eve1y year and, as I mentioned, we 
bad four proof of concepts with biologics and if you just look at the biological proof of concepts, 
they were mucb less compared to the so-called small molecule drngs. Which are the classical 
pbaima drngs. And there we contributed 18% of all biologics of the complete Nova1tis pipeline 
since its inception. 
Interviewer: Tbat is indeed a great acbievement, especially when comparing the team size. 
And you bad this unique technology wbicb you used for your researcb? 
Dominik Escher: Y es. These are so-called single cbain antibody fragments, whicb are the 
smallest functional unit of an antibody whicb still can bind to tbe target. And that small protein 
has quite some advantages because it is ve1y small and can penetrate much better into the tissue. 
And, of course, if you ai·e in the eye, the back of the eye is füll of ne1ve cells which is extremely 
dense tissue. This means if you have a lai·ge molecule or a large protein, that can hardly 
penetrate into that tissue, whereas if you have a small one, that can easily penetrate. And we 
were always focusing on these single chain antibody fragments. Actually, the first patent ofthis 
single chain was described in 1988, which means more than thi1iy years ago. So far, not a single 
single-cbain antibody fragment came to the mai·ket. They all failed in clinical development. 
Beovu is now tbe first single-cbain antibody fragment which comes to the mai-ket and is opening 
up a new product class. With this technology, we bave taken a completely different spin 
compared to what the field was doing. 
Interviewer: Was the technology only applied by ESBATech after the acquisition and 
integration or did it also fmd applications in other research depaitments? 
Dominik Escher: No, since Alcon only acqui1ed the ophthalmic rights, both Alcon and later 
on Novartis were limited to its application in ophthalmology. And these programs were fully 
mn by ESBATech, of course. 
Interviewer: And do you think, because you brought this whole expe1t ise in biotechnology to 
Alcon, con ect? Do you think that gave way to some transf01m ative change within Alcon? 
Dominik Esche1·: Yes. And if Nova1tis would bave not acquired Alcon, with Beovu, Alcon 
would now probably again be number one also in the pha1m a part. Tbat was always the rationale 
of tbe management, to strengthen the pba1ma pipeline of Alcon. And througb tbe integration 
or, better, the two integrations, we lost at least two years in developing. So instead of last year, 
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Beovu could have been on the market in 2017. And by that, I think Alcon would have fully 
achieved the goal of the acquisition. But then, of course, it came different since Alcon was fully 
acquired by Novaitis. 
Interviewer: And what about Novaitis? Do you think there was any kind of transfo1mation 
within Novaitis that came through the integration ofESBATech? 
Dominik Escher: No, not at all. They always claim that they can do eve1ything themselves. 
But if you look closely, every single biologic that Nova1tis is in late-development with is not 
coming from Nova1tis. They were not even capable of generating a simple antibody, which 
eve1y PhD student can do. And they had to collaborate with Morphosis to generate antibodies. 
So, from my point ofyou, it was an extremely poor perfmmance by Novartis. 
Interviewer: So, the greatest benefit came with the integration of ESBATech into Alcon? 
Dominik Escher: Y es. 
Interviewer: We also a1ways have to think about customers in the end and how they can benefit 
from these collaborations and M&As. Do you think with Beovu and the progress dorre at 
ESBA Tech, would this have happened without the acquisition, given that financing would have 
been available? 
Dominik Escher: Y es, sure. That was a1ways the plan. 
Interviewer: Do you think the integration helped in accelerating the drng development? Or do 
you think there would have been the same or better progress on Beovu without the acquisitions. 
Dominik Escher: Y es, it would have definitely been faster and earlier. If we had been able to 
do an IPO and to raise 150 to 200 million, which is doable with a good IPO and a good program 
behind, then I think we would have been faster. We would not have developed it in that 
indication which it is now on the market for, but in a smaller indication as it would have been 
faster and cheaper. But then, you can always expand from an existing indication into larger 
indications. This would have been the strategy that we would have followed on our own. 
Interviewer: Do you think that the platfmm of Alcon and Nova1tis helped in the clinical 
development and marketing aspect? 
Dominik Esche1·: Of course, that certainly helps. But it is probably a bit special in 
ophthalmology ifyou have a product which scientifically is better than anything eise out there. 
Ophthalmologists and, in paiticular, retinal specialists are ve1y scientific-driven people. And 
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basically, you have two main congresses in the United States and two main congresses here in 
Europe. And if you present this data at the scientific congress, ophthalmologists are jumping 
on your product. You don 't actually need a big marketing division. Interestingly, the first 
product which came to the market for this indication was Lucentis from Genentech, which was 
actually also the first biologics which came in ophthalmology. This was a product which was 
approved in 2006. They had a handful of marketing guys at Genentech and that product 
immediately reached blockbuster potential. Just driven by the science and the efficacy they had 
shown, people jumped on it. That was always a sign to me that you probably don 't need 3,000 
marketing guys out there like big pha1m a has. But if you can really position your product 
sma1tly and in a good indication and show that it is superior to everything out there, then it goes 
by its own, basically. 
Interviewer: May I ask if ESBATech also took on new projects from Alcon or Novaitis? 
Dominik Escher: No, we always actually developed our own products. 
Interviewer: And does the technology for ophthalmologic application still remain with 
Novaitis? 
Dominik Escher: Yes. Also, ESBATech as a legal entity remained and is still present. lt was 
closing in Schlieren, but this was a typical phaim a decision. They had to cut the budget at NIBR 
because, as I mentioned, with more than 6,000 people, they also have to lay-off some 
employees. And they ai·e quite under pressure because now, comparing to the outcome, it's 
really poor what they perform. So, they had to cut the budget. They closed down Shanghai, a 
UK site, a Califomia site, and Zurich. And in the case of Zurich, they were under the impression 
that they just can move the majority of the people to Basel, where they of course had 
laboratories available. And I had a call with the president of NIBR before they announced it 
and he wanted to get my advice on how to best approach this. He ' s an American guy and ! just 
said, in Switzerland, the commuting is different to the US. And the flexibility is also different. 
lt the end, there were a handful of people which moved to Basel and as of today, I think there 
are two people left in Basel. lt was a complete destrnction of all the know-how, which they 
were not anticipating at that range. But, on the other hand, it was an opportunity. There were a 
number of new companies sta1ted by former ESBA Tech employees and from that point of view, 
it went well. 
Interviewer: So, Novartis did not intend or anticipate the loss of ESBATech employees, they 
thought they could relocate them? 
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Dominik Escher: Y es. 
Interviewer: And then with the announcement of the relocation came the employee tumover? 
Dominik Escher: That's conect. I left Novartis at the beginning of 2016 and I felt we are ve1y 
weil embedded within N ovaitis. As I said, we delivered a number of proof of concepts. For me, 
it was a big surprise when this guy called me and said we would shut down Zurich. 
Interviewer: So, you left before the announcement? 
Dominik Escher: Y es. I would have fought against that and I made a recommendation to him 
that ESBATech could be used as a unit which has special expe1tise for so-called difficult 
proteins or non-alternative protein fo1m ats. And he felt it is a ve1y good idea, but obviously the 
boai·d had already decided. I think the head ofESBATech was ce1tainly involved much earlier, 
so I think there would have been a possibility to fight against it. That was a missed oppo1tunity. 
But as I said, in the end, I think it was good for new opportunities outside ofNovaitis. 
Interviewer: And ESBATech still remains as a legal entity with two employees? 
Dominik Escher: Y es, I assume there are probably also some tax reasons why the legal entity 
is still embedded within Novaitis Phanna. 
Interviewer: And there ai·e still two forrner ESBATech employees working with the 
technology? 
Dominik Escher: I think there ai·e more people now working with the technology and I assume 
they have more programs in ophthalmology using single-chain antibody fragments. But of 
course, that info1m ation is confidential, so I do not know on what programs they are working 
onnow. 
Interviewer: On a more general subject, what do you think the position of Swiss biotech stait-
ups will be in the future and where do you see the collaboration between big phaim a and Swiss 
biotech? 
Dominik Escher: I think Switzerland has an extremely good ecosystem for biotech companies, 
staiting from the science, which means we have excellent acadernic institutions in Switzerland 
at multiple locations. We have large phaim a companies where people at one time rnight get a 
little bit tired and sta1t to have ideas about founding their own companies. Then, we have 
excellent hospitals for clinical trials. All what is rnissing here is sufficient financing, which we 
ai·e hy ing to take care a bit with Pureos Bioventures. So I think there is a great ecosystem and 
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we have more than 300 biotech companies doing R&D, mostly small- to mid-sized companies, 
and there are more than 1,500 people in these biotechs employed. And from that point ofview, 
it' s a really good ecosystem. On the other hand, the pha1ma model in my opinion is developing 
more and more into the direction where phaima is more concentrated on sales and marketing, 
and less on own research. And ttying to in-license, or acquire, or collaborate on programs with 
biotechs early on and by that have a foot in that program. And as soon as it gets into larger 
clinical trials, then pharma takes over. And if you look at all the FDA approvals over the last 
years, I think now above 75% of all the FDA approvals are coming from small- to mid-sized 
biotechs, which really shows the business model is going in the direction that biotechs are the 
innovation engine and the large pha1ma companies are then excellent at large clinical trials, 
sales and marketing. 
Interviewer: The R&D model is ce1tainly changing. Do you think, in the next ten to twenty 
years, the M&A tt·end will continue or will there be a shift towards open innovation and 
collaboration? 
Dominik Escher: I think the M&A tt·end will probably even increase since phaima is sitting 
on a lot of cash and the companies are desperate to innovate on their pipeline. And that' s the 
driver behind the tt·end. They have to come up with new innovative treatments and better 
effi.cacy. And that's only done through innovation and they cannot provide these innovations 
through intemal research. That's just impossible. 
Interviewer: As a final question, what do you think is the most irnportant factor which has to 
be considered when integrating a biotech company, especially for big pha1ma or larger 
pha1maceutical companies? 
Dominik Escher: I would follow the Roche model. And other companies are doing this as well. 
They acquire companies and tun them as independent units. But, of course, you need a good 
communication stt-ategy through the leadership team. Keep the spirit, keep the people, and keep 
the innovation. And I think that is in my view the key to success. If you make eve1ything flat 
and integrate completely, as in the case of Nova1tis, I think that never goes well. Y ou lose the 
people, the innovation, and the culture. 
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10.5.3 Interview with Dr. Alcide Barberis, Representative ofESBATech 
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW 
Interview with Dr. Alcide Barberis 
• Company Co-Founder, CSO of ESBATech AG (until 2006) 
• Company Co-Founder, CSO/CEO of Oncalis AG (until 2008) 
• President & Owner LCID Consulting LLC 
• CEO of Mabylon AG 
Interview Details: 
Interviewer: Francy Grnbenmann, Student at ZHA W 
Interview Paitner: Dr. Alcide Barberis 
Date and Time oflnteiview: Thmsday, 16th of April 2020, 13:30 - 14:00 
Format, Place: Telephone Call, Switzerland 
Language: English 
Interviewer: When and how did the idea for entering into an M&A emerge for ESBATech? 
Alcide Barberis: When you found a company, any company not only a biotech company, then 
you want the company to succeed. And it depends really on what type of company you have. If 
you found a high-tech company, a biotech company, then of comse the chance of getting into 
paitnerships or an M&A becomes an option, a possibility. Especially in the biotech business, 
to become a fully integrated company, you need a lot of money and a lot of expeitise from 
preclinical to clinical to marketing, financing, and so on. And, of course, you can build that, but 
you need a lot of money to do it. And that's not easy to get, at least at the early stage of a 
company. lt's not that we decided at any time early to go absolutely for an M&A or for an IPO 
or to go forever fo1ward until we would be on the market on our own. We didn't decide that, 
we just worked in parallel on a number of options. And since you need a lot of money, especially 
as a biotech company, you 're always looking for potential investors and partnerships. We saw 
that our compound had technical advantages, biophysical advantages, biological advantages, 
which could be applied paiticularly for topical and local delive1y. We had sta1ted to work on 
eye disease inflammations, with animals first. And already at that time, we made contact with 
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companies that were potentially interested in these activities and in this area. And then, we 
grasped the opportunity. Of course, it was a discussion, especially among the investors, whether 
we should seil to Alcon or not. lt's not that Alcon came and we sold. lt was one of the ten to 
twelve companies with which we were in contact. But Alcon was a US-specialised eye care 
company with a lot of medtech and traditional chemistly drngs on the market, so a successful 
company, but they didn' t have any biologics. And for intemal sti·ategic reasons, Alcon decided 
to enter the biological field and we happened to be there with a product that had positive results 
and with efficient technology. And that's why they said they were interested. Of course, we 
discussed intemally and paiiicularly the investors who owned a great majority of the shai·es, 
and finally, it was decided to go down that avenue. lt could have been that the shareholders and 
investors decided not to do it and invest another 100 million instead and go all the way to phase 
2b and enter phase 3 and go for an IPO. But this is not something you can plan years in advance. 
You have to keep all the options and oppo1tunities open, that's the nature ofthe business. And 
I believe that in other tech or high-tech companies, it is fairly the same. lt really depends on 
how quick and how expensive it is to go to the marked with your own product. In a biotech 
company, it is very difficult. As you know, Mabylon, for instance, is a ve1y early company at 
the research level. But what we do is ah-eady looking for potential interest, for companies that 
are interested and might like our programs, looking for matching technologies. We are doing 
that and at the present time we cannot say we want to absolutely go for an IPO or to seil the 
company or so. We say let's move fo1ward with the R&D products, let's get good and 
convincing results, let's show that our technology and our platform and our products are of 
really high value. You have to show that and, step by step, look for potential interest, raise 
awareness. Youjust have to catch the oppo1tunities. Carpe diem, so to say. 
Interviewer: And why not licensing? Was that an option for ESBATech? 
Alcide Barberis: lt was. We actually had a discussion with another company on a licensing 
opp01tunity. But licensing would mean much less money, it would not be money for the 
shai·eholders, it would not be a retum on investinent. Because licensing would be a deal with 
the company and, of course, the shareholders could then decide to disti·ibute dividends, but this 
is peanuts compai·ed to the investlnent. In total, ESBATech raised more than 70 million Swiss 
Francs, so to make a retum on investinents on 70 million is not that simple with dividends. So, 
licensing was an option. But that would still entail additional investments, because it means that 
the company has to move fo1ward, and it would be a revenue for the company, but not so much 
a retum on investment for shai·eholders. And Alcon was not interested in licensing, they were 
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really interested in entering the biological domain in ophthalmology. So, that was what they did 
when they bought ESBATech. And that was the deal that shareholders agreed to. 
Interviewer: So, it was also that kind of innovative technology and the people that Alcon was 
interested in and to really have them work for them? 
Alcide Barberis: Exactly. Of course, it is not always like that in all the M&A cases. Alcon did 
not have any experience in biotechnology and not anything in antibodies or biologics and, 
therefore, it was a ve1y wise decision to keep the company in place, at least with the researchers 
working on those projects. And then, of course, they brought in their expe1tise in clinical 
development, in marketing, and so on, and this was a ve1y nice match I would say. 
Interviewer: Alcon was then taken over by Novaitis and the situation changed again, right? 
Alcide Barbel'is: Y es, that changed, and unfortunately for the worse. 
Interviewer: And Novartis already had a stake in Alcon at the time of the acquisition and 
Nova1tis Venture Fund also helped start the company in the beginning and continued to invest 
later on. Do you think this kind of connection was also fostering this deal in a way? 
Alcide Barberis: No. I mean, of course, people knew ea.ch other, but it's not beca.use we ha.d 
an investment from Novartis that we went that way. 
Interviewer: So, it was between ESBATech and Alcon, while Novaitis at that point didn' tplay 
a role? 
Alcide Barbel'is: Exactly. 
Interviewer: In regai·ds to the integration, I think you weren' t with ESBATech anymore at that 
point of post-acquisition, is that conect? 
Alcide Barberis: That's conect. I moved to Oncalis because it was a technology company and 
I was the R&D technology guy at tha.t time. So, I moved to Oncalis. But unf01tunately, Oncalis 
didn't work. But I was still door-to-door with ESBATech when ESBATech was acquired, but 
formally, I was no langer active in ESBA Tech. Of course, I was still a shareholder of 
ESBA Tech, but not in the management anymore. 
Interviewer: Oncalis focused on small molecules, right? Does that mean phaimaceuticals and 
not biotechnology? 
Alcide Barbel'is: That's right. 
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Interviewer: So, was that a strategic change for you? 
Alcide Barberis: No. Of course, it requires chemistiy for the molecules, but the specialty of 
Oncalis was not chemistiy, the specialty was the yeast screening technology with two avenues, 
one for single-chain antibody fragments and the other for screening system of small molecules. 
lt all came from the same original technology based on the yeast cells and my specialty was 
really yeast genetics and molecular biology. I staited to develop paits of it on my academic 
level and it got fmther developed and optimised in ESBATech andin Oncalis. Toset up the 
yeast cellular system to screen for activities on enzymes, on protein interactions, so targets that 
could have a potential therapeutic role, that's my specialty and that's why I moved to Oncalis. 
Interviewer: With the integration, you mentioned in your article that Alcon did well to let 
ESBA Tech stay in Schlieren in the Bio-Technopai·k and to keep the employees as they were. 
Do you think there are other things that especially for sta1t-up enti-epreneurs in biotechnology 
need to be considered? So, what do you think are the challenges of being integrated and what 
ai·e the aspirations that there could be when being integrated in such a big company? 
Alcide Barberis: I don't think that there are many aspirations before. lt really depends on how 
much flexibility and freedom to operate the acquirer allows, and that's what I mentioned before. 
Tue acquisition of Alcon by Novaitis was not good news for the ESBATech people for the 
simple reason that Alcon conti·ibuted with their know-how in those areas where we didn't have 
any experience but let the company be, so the ESBATech people, the researchers, and the 
programs. Of course, there was a board of directors, people who conti-olled the budget and 
eveiything, but not on decisions on the level of micromanagement. When Nova1tis came in, it 
changed because Nova1tis wanted füll control. You know, I wasn' t there, it's not that I have 
first-hand experience but, of course, I talked to my f01mer colleagues and I know that they were 
not happy . lt was tolerated and still okay as long as Fishman was the head ofR&D at Novaitis. 
Then, it changed and there was a centralisation of the R&D units and that caused the closure, 
the shut-down ofESBATech. 
Interviewer: Do you know whether the technology remained with Novartis? 
Alcide Barbel"is: Y es, it did. 
Interviewer: But they did not keep the R&D centre for future projects? 
Alcide Barberis: Well, they said, "We're going to shut down the site in Schlieren." They did 
the same with a couple of other places around the world, and they said, "Y ou can join the 
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research teams in Basel or in Boston." And some people went, while others didn't. But the 
specific know-how and the technology got lost or is at least not as active as it used tobe. 
Interviewer: That's tmly a pity. I did some research in the field and I found out that most 
acquirers were successful if they - as Alcon didl in the beginning - let the acquired company be 
independent and keep the innovation going. 
Alcide Barberis: Absolutely. Another success story in Schlieren is GlycAlt acquired by Roche. 
Now Roche is in Schlieren, but with the people of Glycart and the spirits of Glycait. 
Interviewer: Y es, I am also having an interview with Pablo Umafi.a. I'm sure this is going to 
be really interesting. 
Alcide Barbel"is: Definitely. 
Interviewer: But it really is a pity about ESBATech. When I read your article, I felt very sony 
to hear that such a successful company is no longer here. 
Alcide Barbel"is: Yes, itjust doesn' t make sense. 
Interviewer: And this also shows that there really is a difference in the strategic mindset 
between entrepreneurs in the biotech field and big phaima corporations, right? 
Alcide Barberis: Yes. I don't k:now if you saw it but there was, about a year ago, a documenta1y 
by the Swiss German DRS, by Eco. They first presented Basel, you k:now, Roche and Nova1tis, 
and their research activity and what came out of the Basel research activities of these pha1ma 
giants. And it tumed out, that the latest product that came out from reseai·ch in Basel was 
Bepanthen. Everything else came out from research activities done somewhere else, in biotech 
companies or acquired by Novartis or by Roche. And then, they interviewed my paitner at 
ESBA Tech, Dominik Escher, as well as other people from biotech companies, and they showed 
how many products actually came out from biotech companies, through acquisitions or 
licensing deals, and that was a quite interesting overview. lt is essentially a business strategy of 
the pharma companies, it's much less expensive than setting up their own research centres, just 
looking for oppmtunities like ESBATech or GlycAlt and then acquire them. 
Interviewer: Yes, that' s also what my desk reseai·ch on that topic showed. It's impressive how 
much innovation and technology comes from biotech companies. 
Alcide Barberis: Yes, but it is a lost race for the phaima companies, not because they don' t 
have skills or money, but because the setup is different. In biotech companies, you have 
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enthusiasm, you have flexibility, you have people coming fresh out of the academic research. 
It' s a totally different environment, much more creative, much more flexible and research-
oriented. It's just different. 
Interviewer: Y es, you can also see from the waves of acquisitions that occur that big phaima 
is now seeking to get access to this know-how and these skills, this innovative drive and 
ent:repreneurialism. My thesis on this topic actually is that, as in the case of Glyca1t , if big 
phaima companies leave biotechs as independent as possible in their research, then they are 
more successful in keeping this biotech culture, which brings fo1ward innovation. 
Alcide Barberis: Exactly, this is why I think the dismantling of ESBATech didn't make sense, 
because I don't think that Novartis found ESBATech too costly tobe maintained. lt is more a 
personal decision, it's a typical big company attitude. The new guy comes in and has to do 
something different, he cannot just keep going because otherwise he would be a follower. 
Interviewer: Yes, it is really a pity. If they, ESBATech and Novartis, collaborated and really 
prioritised what is impo1tant, things might have come differently. 
Alcide Barberis: Yes. 
Interviewer: Do you have any other points that are important with regai·d to integration? The 
human aspect, for example? Were there employees that left during the acquisition by Alcon or 
did employees from Alconjoin ESBATech? 
Alcide Barberis: No, apait from the board, nobody eise joined ESBATech, I think. But people 
who left. .. Of course, people who had no role anymore during the acquisition, so the business 
development director, the CFO, all from those activities/depaitments that were taken over by 
Alcon. But the R&D people, they stayed. And! the shai·eholders, as I wrote in my aiticle, we 
were allowed to get a license on our technology that Alcon had acquired for non-ophthalmology 
applications and with that we founded Delenex. And I think a couple of people moved to 
Delenex, but these were technology specialists whose know-how would be more applicable in 
Delenex than in ESBATech. 
Interviewer: Great, thank you for taking the time and providing me with these insights. 
Alcide Barberis: Sure, have you been to the Bio-Technopark in Schlieren? I assume so, right? 
Interviewer: No, I couldn't. Due to the current Covid-19 situation, it has not been possible. 
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Alcide Barberis: That's unfortunate. The interesting story about the Bio-Technopark in 
Schlieren is that it really came out from the necessity of lab space that biotech sta1t-ups were 
looking for, and by chance, a company found a lab space there, because there was an ETH lab, 
and then ESBATech and two other companies moved to Schlieren in Janua1y 2002 as well. And 
the owner of this area, that used to be the Wagonfabrik Schlieren, he really saw the oppo1tunity 
of getting the biotech business concentrated or clustered there and that ' s how the Bio-
Technopark was sta1ted. Out of a spontaneous action. 
Interviewer: That ' s a great story. And it has become a ve1y imp01tant innovation cluster and 
brings many benefits for biotech companies. I mean, for innovation itself, collaboration and 
info1m ation exchange are so essential. 
Alcide Barberis: Absolutely, yes. lt's just great to be there. lt' s indeed important, in particular 
for investors as well as for pha1ma companies and potential pa1tners. They see that you are 
situated in a high-quality place, surrounded by high-quality companies and that you are pait of 
a respected family . That counts as well. 
Interviewer: That is certainly so. Tue Bio-Technopark has brought out a lot of success stories. 
I really hope to visit it in the future. 
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10.5.4 Interview with Nicholas Franco, Representative of Actelion 
WRITTEN INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
Interview with Nicholas Franco 
• Executive Vice President and Chief Business Development Officer, Actelion 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd, subsidiary of Actelion Ltd. (until 2017) 
• EVP & CBDO, Actelion Pharrnaceuticals Ltd, a Janssen Pharmaceutical Company of 
Johnson and Johnson 
• Allschwil Site Head, Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd, a Janssen Phar·maceutical 




Date and Time of Interview: 
Fo1mat, Place: 
Language: 
Francy Grnbenmann, Student at ZHA W 
Nicholas Franco 
Friday, 1 st of May 2020, Email received at 11 :28 
Written Questionnaire, Switzerland 
English 
Interviewer: What is your background and what was your role m the acquisition and 
integration of Actelion? 
Nicholas Franco: As EVP & CBDO at the f01mer Actelion, my role in the transaction was 
mainly dming the due diligence and agreement phase as well as during the transition phase (i.e. 
pre-Closing of the transaction). Once the transaction closed (April 16, 2017), a global, cross-
functional Integration Team was activated. lt mainly included colleagues from J&J, who were 
assigned to the Integration Team for a certain period of time, and Deloitte manpower tasked to 
provide logistical support. My role during the integration phase was mainly supp01ting the 
Integration Team in providing them with inf01mation, either historical at Actelion or from the 
transaction and transition periods. 
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Interviewer: How was the integration management organised from both Actelion and J&J? 
Sub-Questions: 
• Did the integration planning already happen at an early stage? 
• Did the integration team consist of both Actelion and J&J managers? 
• Were operational key employees involved/consultedfor the integration management? 
• Were there any noteworthy changes in strategy during the post-merger integration phase? 
Nicholas Franco: As mentioned above, a specific and dedicated Integration Team, of both J&J 
and Deloitte individuals, was established early on to lead and execute the integration plan. 
Some fo1mer Actelion colleagues were also involved in the integration, especially within the 
various functions and subfunctions. The Integration Team clearly identified and involved 
(fo1mer) Actelion colleagues who were responsible for key data or systems as these were critical 
in ensming the transition to the J&J systems. Tue Actelion strategy of being the leader in 
cardiopulmona1y diseases, mainly pulmona1y hype1tension, remains unchanged until today. 
Tue ways of operating and the organizational strncture aligned itself to the J&J ways, but this 
was expected. 
Interviewer: What kind of integration strategy was followed on an organisational level? 
Sub-Questions: 
• Wh ich parts of Actelion 's value chain were taken over by J&J, and which were mostly left 
standalone (i. e. R&D [ drug discoverylclinical testing} vs. non-R&D [ marketing & sales})? 
• Were any parts of J&J's value chain transferred to Actelion? 
• Were the supportingfunctions (i.e. IT, HR, Finance) fully integrated? 
• In what way did the core competencies of Actelion and J&J complement each other? 
Nicholas Franco: All paiis of Actelion's value chain were taken over by J&J, except maybe 
the manufacturing of our products. Actelion had an established network of third-paiiy suppliers 
(CM Os) manufacturing all of its products, with an intemal organization managing this network. 
The network of CM Os has been maintained, while their management was integrated within the 
J&J Supply Chain organization, including the implementation of all its policies and processes. 
One ofthe main benefits related to the acquisition, i.e. expansion ofthe commercial availability 
of Actelion products via the Janssen global footprint, was initiated quickly after the closing. All 
supporting functions have been fully integrated within the global/regional/national J&J 
functions. An example of an enabler of any integration is how quickly the transactional 
systems/processes and indeed the legal entities can be merged. Keeping these elements separate 
can drive duplication of costs and ultimately slows the overall pace of integration. The Actelion 
integration actually managed to accomplish the merging of key systems and processes, while 
generating ' lessons leamed' for future transactions. 
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Interviewer: What were the major challenges during the post-acquisition integration? 
Sub-Questions: 
• Were there any challenges in the cultural, human, or organisational aspect of the 
integration? 
• Did the integration change the corporate culture of Actelion? 
• Were there any potential challenges in the integration managernent? 
• How were these challenges addressed/overcorne? 
Nicholas Franco: Both Actelion and J&J had/have a culture of innovation and putting the 
patient at the centre of its strategy. As such, there was not a major shift in the culture following 
the integration. Clearly the Actelion employees had to learn the new ways for doing things but 
extremely well-suppo1ted and staffed processes were put in place to ease the organization into 
the new processes/systems. An element of the success of the integration was the oversight at 
the highest levels of the J&J organization, providing quick decision-making, adaptation of the 
plans based on the actual situation and additional resources when necessa1y. 
Interviewer: Which factors/aspects in the integration strategy did most contribute to the 
success of Actelion's integration? 
Sub-Questions: 
• Wh ich were the biggest sources of value creation? 
• In what ways did the integration benefit Actelion and J&J? 
• Did the acquisition/integration spur innovation? 
• How was the unique corporate culture of Actelion preserved? 
• How was employee retention and cornmitment ensured? 
Nicholas Franco: As announced at the time of the acquisition, the main value drivers were 1) 
the expansion of the availability of the Actelion products via the global Janssen footprint, 2) 
additional funding for the expanded development of the Actelion portfolio, and 3) the increased 
resources to increase the diagnosis and future treatment of patients with pulmona1y 
hype1tension. These continue to be the case today. Innovation has been at the core of both 
company strategies, pre- and post-acquisition. This remains today. The Actelion organization 
has implemented the many beneficial processes of J&J, while J&J has gained a deeper 
appreciation of the customer-intimacy model at Actelion, while implementing all the 
compliance programs in place. 
Interviewer: Any additional comments on post-merger integration success? 
Nicholas Franco: A well-designed plan, early involvement and dedicated resources are key to 
a successful integration. 
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